俱舍論疏 19.154

19.154

論「無有名何法至名無有愛」，《婆沙》二十七云「無有者，謂眾同分無常，緣此起愛名無有愛。是故此愛唯修所斷，以眾同分唯修斷故。」《正理論》云「豈不見所斷亦有無常無有愛，何緣唯修所斷？實亦見斷，且隨經說。謂契經中說有三愛，欲愛、有愛、無有愛三。於此經中說無有愛，取緣眾同分無常為境者，貪求異熟相續斷故。如契經言『一類苦逼，作如是念：願我死後斷壞無有，無病樂哉。』今且據斯說唯修斷，非見所斷無無有愛。」今詳《正理》，此無有愛通緣一切取蘊無有起愛，皆名無有愛。其於煩惱愛滅不生，此是善欲，如何成愛？不求擇滅，唯愛不生。如何成善法欲？由執法斷此愛方生，此由見增。聖人不起。此論中說三界無常，通其二釋。若一切三界無常，即同《正理》。若謂三界眾同分無常，即同《婆沙》。准下文，此諸纏愛一切皆緣修所斷故，知此論同《婆沙》也。

On the Śāstra's statement: 'What dharma is called non-existence... to... is called craving for non-existence': The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 27, says: '"Non-existence" refers to the impermanence of the common group-homogeneity (sabhāgatā); taking this as object and giving rise to craving is called craving for non-existence. Therefore, this craving is abandoned only by cultivation, because common group-homogeneity is abandoned only by cultivation.' The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Is there not also impermanence and craving for non-existence that is abandoned by seeing? For what reason is it abandoned only by cultivation? In reality it is also abandoned by seeing; this is provisionally stated in accordance with the sūtra. That is, the sūtras speak of three cravings: craving for sensual pleasure, craving for existence, and craving for non-existence. In this sūtra, when speaking of craving for non-existence, it takes as its object that which grasps the impermanence of common group-homogeneity, because one longs for the severance of the continuity of retribution. As the sūtra says: "A certain class, oppressed by suffering, has this thought: 'May I, after death, be severed, destroyed, and non-existent; how delightful without affliction!'" Now this is provisionally stated based on this as abandoned only by cultivation; it is not that there is no craving for non-existence abandoned by seeing.' Now, examining the Nyāyānusāra: this craving for non-existence universally takes the non-existence of all grasping skandhas as object to give rise to craving, and all are called craving for non-existence. If one's desire is for the cessation and non-arising of defilements, this is wholesome desire (chanda); how could it constitute craving (tṛṣṇā)? If one does not seek cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), but merely craves non-arising, how could it constitute desire for wholesome dharmas? Only by clinging to the annihilation of dharmas does this craving arise, which is reinforced by views; noble ones do not give rise to it. What this treatise says about the impermanence of the three realms applies to both explanations: if it means the impermanence of all three realms, it agrees with the Nyāyānusāra; if it means the impermanence of the common group-homogeneity of the three realms, it agrees with the Vibhāṣā. Following the text below, because these entanglements and cravings all take what is abandoned by cultivation as object, we know that this treatise agrees with the Vibhāṣā.