俱舍論疏 5.13

5.13

On the text of the Treatise, "Furthermore, for what reason is it not admitted... since they are mutually similar?": This is the fourth objection. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "'Why is it not admitted that there is a generic similarity (sabhāgatā) of non-sentient things?' One should not censure [us] in this way, for there would be a great fault. You also admit that there are destinies (gati) such as humans and gods, and modes of birth (yoni) such as from the womb or from eggs; why do you not also admit destinies such as mangoes or modes of birth such as mung beans? Furthermore, the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, never spoke of [a similarity among non-sentient things]. One should only discern: why did the World-Honoured One speak of generic similarity only regarding sentient beings and not regarding grass and the like? Moreover, how is it known that such generic similarity is a distinct, real entity? For my part, I explain it in this way: Because those grasses and the like have no mutually similar activities or desires with one another, a distinct generic similarity is not stated with regard to them. Moreover, grasses and the like arise only necessarily through sentient beings; therefore, generic similarity is spoken of only regarding sentient beings. Furthermore, this dharma arises due to past karma and present exertion, and in those grasses and the like both of these are absent; therefore they lack generic similarity. It is precisely through this fact that it is proven to be a real entity. Furthermore, wooden, clay, lacquered, sculpted, and painted images and their true forms, though they have mutually similar forms and shapes, are said to be a single real [class]. Thus, it is not merely by seeing their similarity that one says it is real; only with respect to similar, distinct classes of entities does the verbal designation of reality arise. Therefore, we know that this distinct dharma exists as a real entity. This verbal designation of reality arises from this dharma; wood and the like lack generic similarity and thus cannot be called real [in that sense], whereas humans and the like possess generic similarity and thus are called real."