俱舍論疏 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

5.2

Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties, Part Three

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "Having thus explained … what is generic similarity (nikāyasabhāga)?": From here below is the second [section], one line explaining generic similarity. 'Generic' (sabhāga) is the domain; 'similarity' (bhāga) is its cause; because it is the cause of similarity, it is called generic similarity. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: 'Herein, bodily forms, actions, and desires are mutually similar, hence it is called similar. Bhāga has the meaning of cause; there is a distinct real entity that is the cause of this similarity, hence it is called generic similarity.' Since the Śāstra already explains it this way, divergent interpretations are needlessly troublesome. It is also called 'multitude-similarity' (nikāyasabhāga). The similar dharmas are not one, hence called 'multitude-similarity'; being the cause for them, it is called 'similarity' (bhāga).

5.4

[On the passage] "The Śāstra says: … is called generic similarity": Within the prose commentary there are two parts: first, setting forth the Sarvāstivāda school; second, citing the Sautrāntika objection. Within setting forth the Sarvāstivāda school, there is first the general and then the specific. This is the general: 'There is a distinct real entity' points to its substantial entity; 'is called generic similarity' states its name; 'the root treatise calls this multitude-similarity' harmonizes the variant names.

5.5

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "This again is of two kinds … because they equally possess each": Within this are two kinds: first, generic similarity of sentient beings; second, generic similarity of dharmas. Within the generic similarity of sentient beings, it is further divided into two: first, undifferentiated; second, differentiated. This text explains the undifferentiated: it means all sentient beings possess it equally, and it solely excludes insentient things, hence it is called undifferentiated.

5.6

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "As for the differentiated … because they equally possess each": This explains the differentiated. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: 'For all sentient beings born in the same destiny and the like, the cause of their mutual resemblance in bodily form, faculties, activities, food and drink, etc., together with the cause of their mutual desire, is called multitude-similarity. Just as fresh, pure matter has karma, mind, and the great elements all as its causes, so bodily form and so forth are not solely caused by karma. We observe that bodily form is the fruit projected by more similar karma, while faculties, activities, food and drink, etc., have differences. If one claims that this difference is due to differences in completing karma, that is logically incorrect, for there are bodily forms that arise solely from similar projecting karma, yet because of differences in multitude-similarity their activities and so on differ. If bodily form and so forth were solely the fruit of karma, then following their desires, activities, and so on, whether giving up or undertaking [them], could not occur. Herein, bodily forms, activities, and desires are mutually similar, hence called similar; bhāga has the meaning of cause. There is a distinct real entity that is the cause of this similarity, hence it is called generic similarity. Such generic similarity the World-Honoured One taught solely in reliance on sentient beings, not grass, trees, and the like. Therefore a sūtra says: "This generic similarity of gods, this generic similarity of humans," and so on up to extensive explanations; according to distinctions of realm, destiny, birth, place, body, and so on, there are immeasurable kinds of generic similarity of sentient beings. Furthermore, there is generic similarity of dharmas, which corresponds to aggregates, sensory bases, and elements.' According to the above passage of the treatise, the cause of difference is not only the power of karma, but also generic similarity. The varieties and differences are manifold and diverse, and every single class has generic similarity, which serves as the intentional object for undifferentiated awareness. The similarity of aggregates, sensory bases, and elements has the same meaning: namely, sentient beings' aggregates, elements, and sensory bases are similar, and their resemblance in appearance also has generic similarity.

5.7

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "Furthermore, there is generic similarity of dharmas, which corresponds to aggregates, sensory bases, and elements": This explains the generic similarity of dharmas. This generic similarity of dharmas serves as the cause for undifferentiated awareness of aggregates, elements, and sensory bases, and also serves as the cause of non-difference for those dharmas.

5.8

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "If there were no real entity … should be understood in accordance with reason": This adduces the fruit of generic similarity to prove that there is a cause of similarity.

5.9

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "Is there dying and taking rebirth … that is, excluding the previous characteristics": This clarifies acquisition and abandonment; it can be understood from the text.

5.10

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "If there were a distinct real entity … because there is a distinct human-nature": From here below is the Sautrāntika objection. Within it are six parts: first, the objection concerning the separate establishment of ordinary-person-nature; second, the objection of immeasurability; third, the objection of uselessness; fourth, the objection concerning generic similarity of insentient things; fifth, the objection that generic similarity lacks generic similarity; sixth, the objection of being identical to non-Buddhists. This is the first objection: since there is the generic similarity of ordinary persons, what is the use of separately establishing ordinary-person-nature? The *Nyāyānusāra* explains: 'Is not ordinary-person-nature simply the generic similarity of ordinary persons? This is not correct, because their functions are different. The cause of their mutual resemblance in bodily form, activities, and desires is called generic similarity; that which is contrary to the acquisition of the noble path and is the cause of being an ordinary person is called ordinary-person-nature. When entering the detachment from birth, in regard to multitude-similarity one both abandons and acquires, while in regard to ordinary-person-nature one abandons and does not acquire.'

5.11

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "Moreover, it is not in the world … because there is no distinct function": This is the second objection.

5.12

[On the] Śāstra['s statement]: "Although the world does not understand … of what use would it be?": This is the third objection. The *Nyāyānusāra* explains: 'Generic similarity is not material form; how is it known to have function and to be able to produce distinct kinds of entities? It is known that it exists because its fruit is seen. Just as seeing the fruit obtained by karma in the present allows one to know that there was karma previously performed in a past life. Moreover, practitioners of contemplation directly realize and know it.'

5.13

On the text of the Treatise, "Furthermore, for what reason is it not admitted... since they are mutually similar?": This is the fourth objection. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "'Why is it not admitted that there is a generic similarity (sabhāgatā) of non-sentient things?' One should not censure [us] in this way, for there would be a great fault. You also admit that there are destinies (gati) such as humans and gods, and modes of birth (yoni) such as from the womb or from eggs; why do you not also admit destinies such as mangoes or modes of birth such as mung beans? Furthermore, the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, never spoke of [a similarity among non-sentient things]. One should only discern: why did the World-Honoured One speak of generic similarity only regarding sentient beings and not regarding grass and the like? Moreover, how is it known that such generic similarity is a distinct, real entity? For my part, I explain it in this way: Because those grasses and the like have no mutually similar activities or desires with one another, a distinct generic similarity is not stated with regard to them. Moreover, grasses and the like arise only necessarily through sentient beings; therefore, generic similarity is spoken of only regarding sentient beings. Furthermore, this dharma arises due to past karma and present exertion, and in those grasses and the like both of these are absent; therefore they lack generic similarity. It is precisely through this fact that it is proven to be a real entity. Furthermore, wooden, clay, lacquered, sculpted, and painted images and their true forms, though they have mutually similar forms and shapes, are said to be a single real [class]. Thus, it is not merely by seeing their similarity that one says it is real; only with respect to similar, distinct classes of entities does the verbal designation of reality arise. Therefore, we know that this distinct dharma exists as a real entity. This verbal designation of reality arises from this dharma; wood and the like lack generic similarity and thus cannot be called real [in that sense], whereas humans and the like possess generic similarity and thus are called real."

5.14

On the text of the Treatise, "Furthermore, for these generic similarities... how can non-different awareness and verbal designation arise?": This is the fifth objection. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "How can non-different awareness and verbal designation arise with respect to them without any further generic similarity? Because all generic similarities possess the nature of being equal causes (sabhāga-hetu) for entities of the same class, they serve precisely as the causes for the awareness and verbal designation of mutual similarity within that class. Just as the eyes, ears, and so forth become material natures (rūpatva) only by being made of the primary elements (mahābhūta), whereas the primary elements—though not made of other primary elements—nevertheless accomplish the nature of matter."

5.15

On the text of the Treatise, "Furthermore, it would clearly result in... arising from this": This is the sixth objection. Does non-differentiated generic similarity correspond to the category of universal generality (sāmānya), while differentiated generic similarity corresponds to the category of generality-cum-particularity (sāmānya-viśeṣa)? Or does it correspond solely to the category of generality-cum-particularity?

5.16

On the text of the Treatise, "The Vaibhāṣikas [reply]... because it applies to many": The author of the Treatise cites the Vibhāṣā to answer. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "This would seem to make it identical to the categories of universal generality and generality-cum-particularity posited by the Vaiśeṣikas. Yet if the Vaiśeṣikas posit these two categories, their substance is not one, it is momentary and impermanent, and has no substrate, being mutually distinct. Even granting that it is similar to their [view], there is still no great fault. It is not because the Vaiśeṣikas posit that the sense faculties such as the eye act upon visible matter and so forth that the sons of the Śākya must abandon such a view and fashion another explanation. Therefore, their objection is partisan speech; one who seeks the correct principle should not adopt it." Explanation: If, as the Vaiśeṣikas hold, a single dharma pervades many dharmas, its substance is eternal, and it relies on the category of inherence (samavāya), this would be faulty. But if that non-Buddhist school posits that the substances of these two categories are not one, are momentary and impermanent, without a substrate, and mutually distinct, then even granting that it resembles their view, there would be no great fault.

5.17

On the text of the Treatise, "Furthermore, even if in that text... and so on at length": The Sarvāstivādins cite a sūtra as the second proof.

5.18

On the text of the Treatise, "Although there is such a statement... it is called generic similarity": Here the Sautrāntikas interpret the sūtra. According to the Sautrāntika explanation, this sūtra passage refers to a nominal designation (prajñapti), not a real entity.

5.19

On the text of the Treatise, "If so, what is that which is called generic similarity?": The Sarvāstivādins query.

5.20

On the text of the Treatise, "It is precisely that such a class... because it contradicts our tenet": The Sautrāntikas reply. The rest of the text is easy to understand.

5.21

On the text of the Treatise, "Generic similarity having been explained, what is non-conception (āsaṃjñika)?": From here below, the third [topic] clarifies the maturation of non-conception.

5.22

"The Treatise says... it is an effect of maturation": This explains the locus, function, and so forth of non-conception. "If born among the gods of non-conception": This clarifies its locus. "There is a dharma capable of causing the mind and mental factors to cease": This indicates its substantial nature through its function. "It is called non-conception": This establishes its name. "It is a real entity": This clarifies whether it is nominal or real. "It can obstruct future minds and mental factors, preventing them temporarily from arising": This clarifies the time of cessation. "Like a dam across a river": This gives an analogy to illustrate it. "This dharma is exclusively an effect of maturation": This clarifies which of the five categories [of dharmas] it belongs to.

5.23

On the text of the Treatise, "Whose maturation is it? It refers to the non-conception attainment (asaṃjñi-samāpatti)": This discerns its cause. Fascicle 118 of the Vibhāṣā contains the explanations of several masters. "The explanation of the first master says: 'The non-conception attainment produces non-conception and the maturation of matter. The life faculty (jīvitendriya) and generic similarity are the maturations of that dhyāna with mind. The remaining skandhas are joint maturations.' Another says: 'The non-conception attainment produces non-conception and the maturation of matter. The life faculty is the maturation of that dhyāna with mind. The remaining skandhas are joint maturations.' Another says: 'The non-conception attainment produces the maturation of non-conception; the remaining skandhas are joint maturations.' Another says: 'When mind is present, it also produces the maturation of the skandhas without mind; when mind is absent, it also produces the maturation of the skandhas with mind.' The verdict says: 'One should state it thus: The maturation of non-conception is produced solely by the non-conception attainment. All life faculties and generic similarities, as well as the physical sense faculties such as the eye, are produced by karma. The remaining skandhas are produced jointly.'" The Nyāyānusāra says: "This dharma is exclusively the maturation produced by the non-conception attainment. For among those gods of the non-conception sentient beings, non-conception and matter are solely the maturation produced by the non-conception attainment. This attainment lacks the power to induce generic similarity and the life faculty, because generic similarity and the life faculty are effects produced solely by the fourth dhyāna with mind. The remaining skandhas in that place are shared maturations." According to the text of the Nyāyānusāra, this agrees with the opinion of the first master, not the opinion of the verdict. When this Treatise says, "Whose maturation is it? It refers to the non-conception attainment," judging from this text, it differs only from the fourth view. The views of the first three masters and the opinion of the verdict all state that non-conception is the result of the non-conception attainment; only the fourth view allows it to be the result of [states] with mind.

5.24

On the text of the Treatise, "Sentient beings without conception... are called the heaven of non-conception": This explains the place of the heaven of non-conception sentient beings.

5.25

On the text of the Treatise, "Are they constantly without conception, or do they also have conception?": From here below, it clarifies that the heaven of non-conception also has conception. First a question, then an answer. This is the question.

5.26

On the text of the Treatise, "In the states of birth and death... conception arises again": This is the answer. It means that when first born in that heaven, there is conception for a long time, and when approaching the point of death, there is also conception for a long time; during the interval between these, there is no conception for a prolonged period. For this reason, it is called non-conception; it is not that that heaven is entirely devoid of conception. Fascicle 154 of the Vibhāṣā states: "The verdict says: 'It should be stated thus: this matter is indefinite. Either the former is long and the latter short, or the former is short and the latter long, because there are differences depending on their aspirations.'" Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā states: "The verdict says: 'The mind emerging from non-conception includes innate good, defiled-neutral (nivṛtāvyākṛta), and undefiled-neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta), and is abandoned by all five sections. As for which anuśayas increase: those that take the rūpāvacara contaminations as objects—namely, the anuśayas of the fourth dhyāna that take contaminations as objects.' Question: Why do anuśayas that take uncontaminated objects not increase in that state of non-conception? Answer: They hold non-conception to be nirvāṇa and the non-conception attainment to be the true path. Up to the time they are born there and die from there, only such grasping continues to function; they do not slander the true cessation and path as non-existent, so [anuśayas] with uncontaminated objects do not arise at that time. Question: In that state of non-conception, the three nutriments are also ceased; how can they be said to have nutriment? Answer: Nutriment is of two kinds: first, that which induces previously; second, that which sustains in the present. Although in that state there is no present sustaining nutriment, there is nutriment that previously induced it; hence they are said to have nutriment. Question: As for the mind entering non-conception, how many moral natures does it encompass? By how many sections is it abandoned? Someone explained: 'Although no text has been seen, judging from the emerging mind, the entering mind is likewise.'" Now, examining the entering mind, it is mostly only a mind born of maturation, because it conforms to cessation and tends toward maturation. Although the preceding mind is not an immediately contiguous condition (samanantara-pratyaya), yet the Nyāyānusāra says: "They take past karma and the immediately contiguous condition as sustaining nutriment; that is, because past karma induces generic similarity, the life faculty, and so forth, and because the mind reconnecting existence and the mind immediately entering the fruit of non-conception lead and assist them, they also have past contact and so forth as sustaining nutriment. In the mindless state, there are only past contact and so forth as nutriment, with none in the present; in the state with mind, both kinds are present." The above treatise text agrees with the intention of the Vibhāṣā.

5.27

On the text of the Treatise, "After dying from there... when its power is exhausted, they fall": This clarifies the place of subsequent retribution. When those non-Buddhists initially cultivate concentration, they must have a wholesome mind of the rūpāvacara realm, being weary of the suffering of saṃsāra and seeking a place of liberation. In seeking a master and teaching, they did not encounter the correct teaching, but rather met an erroneous master; hearing previously the erroneous teaching that spoke of the place of non-conception as nirvāṇa, they developed the attachment to views regarding higher [realms] (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), grasping it as definitive deliverance; furthermore, they gave rise to attachment to precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa), positing a non-cause as a cause, grasping that the non-conception attainment can attain nirvāṇa. Thereupon they generated karma in the desire realm yielding subsequent retribution, which, according to its superiority or inferiority, leads to rebirth in the five different destinies. Seeking non-conception, they used the lower concentrations as preparatory practice (prayoga); the results of other concentrations, not being what was originally sought, do not attract effects. Furthermore, it is not definite karma; by the power of the non-conception attainment, they are born into the heaven of non-conception, and emerging from non-conception, they no longer enter concentration; when the causal force of the non-conception attainment is exhausted, they immediately fall into the desire realm, not being born into the higher realms, because they lack the power of concentration.

5.28

On the text of the Treatise, "If sentient beings... karma for being born in the heavens": This is the second explanation. This clarifies that the places of birth are naturally interconnected. Fascicle 154 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Some say: 'If one creates karma to be experienced in the immediately following existence of non-conception, one naturally also creates karma to be experienced in subsequent existences in the desire realm.'" It also says: "Question: Where are they definitely born? Answer: Some say they are born in the hells; some say they are born in the bad destinies. The verdict says: they are definitely born in the desire realm, but the location is indefinite; they may be born in the bad destinies, among gods, or among humans."

5.29

On the text of the Treatise, "Non-conception having been explained, what is its samāpatti?": From here below, the two attainments (samāpatti) are explained. First, the non-conception attainment is explained.

5.30

"The Treatise says... it is called the non-conception attainment": This explains the non-conception attainment by analogy with the maturation of non-conception. There are distinct twenty-one or twenty-two formations not associated with mind that are neither matter nor mind, which are able to cause the twenty-two minds and mental factors to cease, and are called the non-conception attainment.

5.31

On the text of the Treatise, "The attainment of non-conception... is called the non-conception attainment": This explains the compound name. The former is a genitive compound (ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa), the latter is an appositional compound (karmadhāraya). It is the non-conception attainment because the nominal agent of non-conception possesses this attainment: this is the genitive interpretation. That the attainment itself is non-conception and thus called the non-conception attainment: this is the appositional interpretation.

5.32

On the text of the Treatise, "The phrase 'in like manner'... is identical to non-conception": This explains the word 'in like manner' (tathā) in the verse. When the verse says 'in like manner', it indicates solely that the non-conception attainment causes minds and mental factors to cease, identical to non-conception, but does not identify with the nature, category, substance, or number of non-conception. Question: Why is it called samāpatti (meditative attainment)? The Nyāyānusāra says: "Because it is correctly accomplished or exquisitely accomplished, it is called samāpatti. Other masters say: 'Because it proceeds in equanimity in accordance with the principle, it is called samāpatti, causing the mind and the primary elements to proceed in balance.'" Explanation: Here the word 'dhyāna/samādhi' should properly be called samāpatti; following colloquial usage, it is called samādhi (定). The word 'sama' (等) has three senses: first, 'correct' (正); second, 'exquisite' (極); third, 'proceeding in equanimity according to the principle' (如理平等行). The former explanation takes the first two senses, while the other masters take the latter sense; this precisely explains the name samāpatti. The sense of 'accomplishment' is the sense of 'āpatti' (至). Among the three names for meditative concentration, samāpatti applies only to concentration and not to distraction, and extends to the mindless states, because the distracted mind lacks correct accomplishment and exquisite accomplishment.

5.33

On the text of the Treatise, "In which stage does this exist?... in dhyāna, not others": The second [part] clarifies its underlying stage (bhūmi).

5.34

On the text of the Treatise, "Cultivating the non-conception attainment... one cultivates the non-conception attainment": The third [part] clarifies the mental application (manaskāra).

5.35

On the text of the Treatise, "Previously it was said that non-conception... is exclusively wholesome": The fourth [part] clarifies its inclusion within moral natures.

5.36

[On] the treatise's: 'Because this is wholesome ... vipāka of the five skandhas': fifth, this explains the scope of the result.

5.37

[On] the treatise's: 'Since it is of a wholesome nature ... the entry into the certainty of rightness (samyaktvaniyāma)': sixth, this explains the nature of its retribution to be experienced. Now, examining this: since it is conceded that this absorption may be lost by falling away, and re-attained in the present life, and it is further said that it definitely ripens only in the next lifetime (upapadyavedanīya) and not in subsequent lives (aparaparyāyavedanīya) or indeterminately (aniyata)—according to this, we know that if one previously entered the absorption and was already able to invite the result lasting a full five hundred kalpas, one should not fall away and enter the non-conception [absorption] again, because the number of kalpas is fixed. Or perhaps one may invite the vipāka of the remaining skandhas, or when entering this non-conception absorption repeatedly and inducing that retribution, one enters the retribution to produce the result, or enters the result to produce the retribution.

5.38

[On] the treatise's: 'Furthermore, it is conceded that this absorption ... definitely do not cultivate it': seventh, this explains the difference in persons who cultivate it. One can enter it only after first generating grasping at views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), clinging to the place of non-conception as nirvāṇa, and then generating grasping at precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa), clinging to the non-conception absorption as the true path. Because the noble ones have already eliminated these two forms of grasping, they do not enter it.

5.39

[On] the treatise's: 'If the noble ones ... do they possess the non-conception absorption or not?': eighth, this explains possession (prāpti). In the text there are two parts: first, a question; second, an answer. This is the question.

5.40

[On] the treatise's: 'Others also do not possess it': this is the brief answer. It is not only noble ones who do not possess it; other ordinary persons in the future also do not possess it.

5.41

[On] the treatise's: 'Why is that?': this asks for the reason it is not possessed.

5.42

[On] the treatise's: 'Although they may have practiced it before ... acquired through effort': this is the detailed answer.

5.43

[On] the treatise's: 'Therefore, when it is first attained ... there is no future cultivation': this explains the scope of the times of possession. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 151, states: 'The minds entering and emerging from the non-conception absorption are both defiled wholesome minds belonging to the fourth dhyāna.' It is explained in detail there.

5.44

[On] the treatise's: 'Next, what is the character of the absorption of cessation?': fourth, this explains the absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti).

5.45

[On] 'The treatise says: ... so too is the absorption of cessation': it explains the absorption of cessation by analogy with the non-conception absorption.

5.46

[On] the treatise's: 'What meaning does the phrase "so too" take as an analogy?': this is a question.

5.47

[On] the treatise's: 'It takes as an analogy the non-conception absorption ... it is called the absorption of cessation': this is the answer. 'So too' merely analogizes the cessation of mind and mental factors, not the rest. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 152, says: 'Question: How many real entities constitute the nature of this absorption of cessation? Some say: This absorption has one real entity as its nature, because when a cessation is present, it is called mindless. Question: How can the presence of a single moment of cessation be called mindless? Answer: Just as the presence of a single moment of sensation is called having sensation, a single moment of ideation is called having ideation, and a single moment of consciousness is called having consciousness, so too, what fault is there if the presence of a single moment of cessation is called mindless? Some say: This absorption has eleven entities as its nature, because the ten mahābhūmikas and the mind are stopped. Some say: This absorption has twenty-one entities as its nature, because the ten mahābhūmikas, the [ten] kuśalamahābhūmikas, and the mind are stopped. The correct view is: according to however many minds and mental factors are stopped, there are that many real entities present constituting the nature of this absorption.' The difference between this and the third master's view is that the redactor also includes delight and aversion, whereas the third master has only twenty-one; thus they differ. According to this reasoning, non-conception has twenty-two, meaning delight is added; the absorption of cessation has twenty-two, meaning aversion is added. Since the two absorptions are numbered solely by the cessation of mind and mental factors, we know that non-conception also consists solely in the cessation of mind and mental factors, and the four characteristics (lakṣaṇas) are analogous. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 153, says: 'Question: When entering the absorption of cessation, what kind of mind and mental factors are stopped? Are they past, future, or present? If they are past, the past has already ceased; what is left to be stopped? If they are future, the future has not yet arisen; how could it be stopped? If they are present, the present does not endure; how could it be stopped? Even without the power of absorption, it would cease of itself. Answer: It should be stated that it stops the future. Question: Since the future has not arrived, how can it be stopped? Answer: Abiding in the present, it blocks future minds and mental factors from continuing, and therefore it is called cessation. Just as cutting off the city roads, closing the gates, and erecting banners prevents people from entering or leaving, and is thus called removing bandits, this is also like that. Some say: It stops both the future and the present. Question: The present definitely does not endure; how could it be stopped? Even without the power of absorption, it would cease of itself. Answer: Formerly, the mind and mental factors of the present caused things having conditions to arise in continuation and then ceased. Now, the mind and mental factors of the present do not cause things having conditions to arise in continuation and then cease. By whose power is this? It is by the power of the absorption. Between the two explanations above, the former should be accepted, as it accords with the rest of the text.' Someone says: taking 'some say' as incorrect violates many analogies. Furthermore, fascicle 153 says: 'Evaluation: It should be said that this mind entering absorption takes future absorption as its object, but one cannot specify which kṣaṇa it takes or does not take, because the future absorption has many kṣaṇas abiding intermingled without prior or posterior.' It also says: 'Evaluation: It should be said that this mind emerging from absorption takes past absorption as its object, but one cannot specify which kṣaṇa it takes or does not take, because the past absorption has many kṣaṇas abiding intermingled.' Based on the above text, since they abide intermingled and cannot be differentiated, it takes past and future absorption generally as its object. However, absorption with attachment takes the immediately preceding pure absorption as its object, because absorption with attachment is a mind associated with craving that takes particular characteristics as delusion, so it arises by taking the immediately preceding absorption mind specifically as its object. Because the mind emerging from the two absorptions is a wholesome mind, it takes the preceding absorption generally as its object and does not single it out.

5.48

[On] the treatise's: 'Such two absorptions ... preceded by mental application': first, this explains the difference in mental application.

5.49

[On] the treatise's: 'The former non-conception absorption ... the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception': second, this explains the difference in supporting stage. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 152, says: 'Question: Why is there no non-conception absorption in the lower stages? One explanation says: In the lower stages there are sensations of joy and sadness; their aspect is coarse and turbulent, difficult to eliminate. In the fourth dhyāna there is only equanimous sensation, whose aspect is subtle and easy to sever. Question: Why is there no such absorption in the formless realm? Answer: Only ordinary beings mistakenly practice this absorption, thinking it capable of realizing the nirvāṇa of non-conception. In the formless realm there is no vipāka of non-conception to be misconstrued; hence the non-conception absorption does not exist there either.' The Nyāyānusāra states: 'The former non-conception absorption is in the bordering stage of the form realm, while this absorption of cessation is in the bordering stage of the formless realm. Because it is in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the physical body one takes is propelled by the highest karma, and is thus called the pinnacle of existence (bhavāgra); or because it is the boundary limit of existence, it is called bhavāgra, just as the top of a tree is called the treetop. Only in this stage is there the absorption of cessation. For what reason is there no such absorption in the lower stages? It is because only when one is averse to all mind and when the boundary mind is severed can one attain this superior liberation. That is to say, this liberation is established due to two conditions: first, being averse to all mind; second, temporarily severing the boundary mind. If this absorption existed in the lower stages, one would not be averse to all kinds of mind, as one would not yet be averse to the minds of the higher stages; nor could it be called the severance of the boundary mind, since the minds of the higher stages would not yet be severed. It would have to be called being averse to a fraction of minds, and it would also have to be called the severance of an intermediate mind.'

5.50

[On] the treatise's: 'This is the same as the former absorption ... because it is originated from what is wholesome, etc.': third, this explains the sameness in nature.

5.51

[On] the treatise's: 'The former non-conception absorption ... the vipāka of the four skandhas': fourth, this explains the difference in results invited. In the text there are two parts: first, explaining the difference in retribution; second, the difference in supporting stage.

5.52

[On] the treatise's: 'The former non-conception absorption ... entering it through resolve': fifth, this explains the difference in practitioners. There are three reasons why it is not attained by ordinary beings: first, fear of annihilation; second, it can be induced only by the power of the noble path; third, entering it through the resolve that it is nirvāṇa in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmadharmatānirvāṇa), having the ideation of nirvāṇa in distant preparatory application and the ideation of calming in immediate preparatory application.

5.53

[On] the treatise's: 'This also, like the former ... only then realizes and attains it': sixth, this explains the sameness of initial attainment.

5.54

[On] the treatise's: 'Moreover, when first attained ... also possesses the past': seventh, this explains the sameness of the times of possession.

5.55

[On] the treatise's: 'The World-Honoured One also, by ... all attained through freedom from passion': eighth, this explains that the World-Honoured One attains it solely through freedom from passion.

5.56

[On] the treatise's: 'Has the World-Honoured One never ... liberated in both respects (ubhayatobhāgavimukta)?': from here on, ninth, this distinguishes similarities and differences with other schools. In the text there are two parts: first, a question; second, an answer. This is the question.

5.57

[On] the treatise's: 'Regarding the arising of the absorption of cessation ... becomes liberated in both respects': this is the answer. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 153, says: 'Why is the World-Honoured One called liberated in both respects as soon as the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna) arises? Answer: Because he has already attained the minds entering and emerging from that absorption, he is called liberated in both respects, not because he has attained the entity of the absorption. It is precisely due to this reason that it is said to be attained through freedom from passion, because at a later time it arises without requiring preparatory application.'

5.58

[On] the treatise's: 'The Western masters say ... afterwards attained bodhi': this states the view of a different school. What this master means is: the Bodhisattva in the stage of training had already generated the absorption of cessation, and afterwards attained bodhi.

5.59

[On] the treatise's: 'Why is their explanation not accepted here?': this questions the reason the Sarvāstivādins do not accept it.

5.60

[On] the treatise's: 'If their explanation were accepted ... afterwards generates the knowledge of exhaustion': the Western masters prove their own view accords with the treatise's statements. The Western masters are masters of the Gandhāra country. Upagupta, translated here as 'Near-Hidden' (Jincang), appeared one hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, and was the preceptor of King Aśoka.

5.61

[On] the treatise's: 'Kashmiri ... only afterwards generates the knowledge of exhaustion': this states the doctrine of the Vibhāṣā.

5.62

[On] the treatise's: 'Why is that?': the Western masters inquire.

5.63

[On] the treatise's: 'It is said that the Bodhisattva ... constitutes thirty-four': this explains. Attaining bodhi with thirty-four minds, he does not enter the absorption of cessation.

5.64

[On] the treatise's: 'All Bodhisattvas ... arise the absorption of cessation': this explains the reason for attaining bodhi with thirty-four minds.

5.65

[On] the treatise's: 'The foreign masters ... what fault is there in this?': the foreign masters question in reply.

5.66

[On] the treatise's: 'If so ... does not transgress the original resolution': this shows the fault of transgressing the original resolution.

5.67

[On] the treatise's: 'In truth, the Bodhisattva ... the uncontaminated noble path': the Western masters explain not transgressing the original resolution, differing from the Vibhāṣā.

5.68

[On] the treatise's: 'If so, how is the resolution not transgressed?': the Vaibhāṣikas refute the Western explanation: how could this count as not transgressing the resolution?

5.69

[On] the treatise's: 'Meaning: "As long as I have not attained ... the accomplishment of all matters"': the Western masters re-explain not transgressing the resolution. The Nyāyānusāra states: 'How could this not already constitute a violation? With the resolution desiring to give rise to the uncontaminated noble path, how could the Bodhisattva, in order to exhaust all āsravas, cultivate the paths of seeing and cultivation never before attained, desire to uproot the roots of affliction to be abandoned by seeing in the bhavāgra, and eliminate the enemy of afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation in the bhavāgra, make a solemn vow and sit cross-legged; and before the matter is completed, abandon the uncontaminated antidotal path he had resolved upon in the midst of it, esteem the category of worldly absorptions that have been delusive from beginningless time, and delay in order to obtain the shared and easily attained absorption of cessation? Thus it is well established that he attains bodhi in thirty-four mind-moments.'

5.70

[On] the treatise's: 'The former explanation is sound, for it is our school's tenet': this concludes by returning to their own school.

5.71

[On] the treatise's: 'Although the two absorptions have been explained ... the initial absorption of cessation is among humans': next below is half a verse, fifth, re-explaining the similarities and differences between the two absorptions.

5.72

[On] 'The treatise says: ... and may become manifest': first, this explains the sameness in the places where the two absorptions arise. Hence the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 153, says: 'Question: Why can one born in the desire or form realm arise the absorption of cessation, but not in the formless realm? Answer: The life-faculty operates dependent on two dharmas: first, form; second, mind. This absorption is mindless, because it arises through the cessation of mind. When one born in the desire or form realm arises this absorption, although the mind is severed, life operates dependent on form. When born in the formless realm, form is severed while life operates dependent on mind. If one born there were to arise this absorption, both form and mind would be absent, and because the life-faculty would have no support, it would also be severed; this would be called death, not entering absorption. Therefore, one born in that realm does not arise it.'

5.73

Regarding the treatise's statement, "If someone does not accept ... this is called the common characteristic": This cites evidence to demonstrate that their places of arising are identical. As for the statement, "If someone does not accept ... it does not have five conditioned factors": If one does not accept that the two meditational attainments can arise in the form realm, this contradicts the fundamental treatise. "There is existence in the form realm" means existence within the form realm. "This existence does not possess five conditioned factors": The five conditioned factors mean the five skandhas; during the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, the term saṃskāra ('conditioned factor') was synonymous with skandha. Fascicle 192 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Here, the skandhas are spoken of by the word 'conditioned factors' (saṃskāra). The past Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksaṃbuddhas spoke of the skandhas under the name of 'conditioned factors'; now the Buddha Śākyamuni speaks of conditioned factors as 'skandhas'. That this Abhidharma speaks of the five conditioned factors is meant to show that the five skandhas spoken of by the present Buddha are precisely the five conditioned factors spoken of by former Buddhas." The above is from the treatise. "Does not possess five conditioned factors" means having a form-realm embodiment that does not possess all five skandhas complete. As for "Sentient beings bound to the form realm ... this existence does not possess five conditioned factors": This quotes the fundamental treatise's explanation. "Or they are born in the heavens with ideation and abide in a mind of a disparate realm": This means that they give rise to a mind of another realm or an anāsrava mind, because this mind does not belong to the form realm. "Whether they enter the non-ideational attainment or enter the cessation attainment": This refers to entering the two attainments within the heavens with ideation. "Or having been born in the non-ideational heaven, they have already entered non-ideation": They have been born into the non-ideational heaven and have already entered the non-ideational vipāka. "This is what is meant by 'There is existence in the form realm, and this existence does not possess five conditioned factors'": This concludes and establishes that they do not possess the five conditioned factors. What has been discussed above possesses only the two skandhas of form (rūpa) and conditioning factors (saṃskāra), without the remaining skandhas. As for "From this it is proven and known ... this is called the common characteristic": This concludes the proof of their common characteristic.

5.74

Regarding the treatise's statement, "As for their distinct characteristics ... and cultivates and produces it again later": This is the second [section], explaining their distinct characteristics. Fascicle 152 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Question: For what reason, when born in the form realm, can one initially produce the dhyānas and the formless [attainments], but not the cessation attainment? Answer: The dhyānas are initially produced by virtue of three conditions: first, the power of the cause; second, the power of karma; third, the power of dharmatā. The formless [attainments] are initially produced by virtue of two conditions: first, the power of the cause; second, the power of karma. The cessation attainment is initially produced by virtue of only one condition, namely the power of the teaching. It can arise into manifest presence only in the desire realm because the Buddha's teaching exists there. It is not due to the power of the cause, because the cessation attainment was never produced in other lives. It is not due to the power of karma, because this attainment is not karmic in nature. It is not due to the power of dharmatā, because there is no destruction of the world in the formless realm." The Nyāyānusāra says: "The initial arising of the cessation attainment is only among humans, because there are those who teach and explain it, and because there is the power of vigorous prayoga."

5.75

Regarding the treatise's statement, "This cessation attainment ... this is possible": This clarifies that there is retrogression from the cessation attainment. If there were no retrogression, one could not produce it in the form realm. Udāyin was a disciple who dwelt together with Ānanda.

5.76

Regarding the treatise's statement, "It should be understood in this way ... it is also possible": This directly cites the sūtra to prove retrogression.

5.77

Regarding the treatise's statement, "It should be understood in this way ... goes to take birth in the form realm": This concludes the proof of the reason. If one did not retrogress and give rise to the defilements of the form realm, one could not be born among the mind-made deities (manomayadeva), because this attainment is obtained by having already separated from the defilements of [the sphere of] nothingness. Since the sūtra speaks of taking birth there, we know that there is retrogression.

5.78

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Other schools hold ... this meaning is also established": This sets forth an alternative explanation whereby the meaning of non-retrogression can also be established. Separating from the defilements of the third dhyāna, one attains the fourth dhyāna; thus the abode of the fourth dhyāna is also named "mind-made deities," and without retrogressing from the cessation attainment, one can also take birth there.

5.79

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The fourth dhyāna ... because the sūtra states": This refutes the alternative view.

5.80

Regarding the treatise's statement, "If this were necessarily so ... the meaning of the leap attainment": This is an objection raised by the divergent school.

5.81

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The sequential progression of this attainment ... one leaps and enters as one pleases": This resolves the outside objection. What is said about "sequential progression" is stated on the basis of initial practice.

5.82

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Thus the two attainments ... because it belongs to the stage of the Peak of Existence": From here downward, multiple distinctions are explained. This is the first: the difference in the stage relied upon.

5.83

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Their prayoga differs ... because it has the mental orientation [toward peace] as its antecedent": This is the second difference.

5.84

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Their continuity differs ... because it arises in the continuum [of noble ones]": This is the third difference.

5.85

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Their vipāka differs ... because it has the vipāka result": This is the fourth difference.

5.86

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Their experience of results differs ... because it produces two feelings": This is the fifth difference.

5.87

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Their initial arising differs ... because it is initially produced [among humans]": This is the sixth difference.

5.88

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Both attainments generally ... why is it called the cessation of sensation and ideation?": This inquires into the name of the attainment.

5.89

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The prayoga of the two attainments ... is named knowledge of the minds of others": This adduces an analogy to explain. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For what reason is it only called the cessation of sensation and ideation? Because this attainment is produced through revulsion toward these two. That is to say, ideation and sensation serve as the support for the afflictions of views and craving; therefore, one first feels revulsion toward these two factors, which abound in faults—as has already been broadly distinguished in the establishment of the skandhas—and thus with a specific revulsion toward them one enters the cessation attainment."

5.90

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Now, within the two attainments ... how does the mind come to arise again?": This asks about the cause for the mind to arise again.

5.91

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The masters of the Vaibhāṣika school ... as the samanantara-pratyaya": Citing the Vibhāṣā's explanation, it is able to arise through the power of the samanantara-pratyaya in the past. The Nyāyānusāra extensively clarifies that at the stage of cessation, there is completely no mind; thus that treatise states: "Reason dictates that sentient beings without mind must necessarily exist, because they possess vitality and so on, unlike dead sentient beings. Matter and mind are not definitively present. If mind were definitively present, matter should also be so; if matter is sometimes absent, mind should also be so. Therefore, one who possesses vitality is named a sentient being. However, vitality must rely on either matter or mind. Citing the sūtra's statement that consciousness does not leave the body is also without contradiction for the mindless attainment, because consciousness will definitely arise again right within this support of the body; hence it is said not to leave. That is to say, within the nikāya-sabhāga of a single continuum, the stream of consciousness's continuum is not completely severed. Just as when a demonic possession temporarily does not manifest, because it has not yet been permanently eradicated it is still said not to have departed. ... As for the fact that the mind after the attainment is able to arise again: it is because the mind prior to the attainment acts as the samanantara-pratyaya to induce it; furthermore, it is induced by the power of the resolve made during prayoga."

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese