俱舍論疏 7.6

7.6

The treatise states: "Among the six causes, […] is the nature of the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya)"; from this point onward, it explains the intrinsic nature of the four conditions. This text first explains the substance of the cause-condition. If one relies on the Vibhāṣā, within the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), the five causes by which the four great elements produce derived matter are also the nature of the cause-condition. Here, it is abbreviated, speaking only of the subsumption of entire causes. Thus, Vibhāṣā 107 states: "The cause-condition is like the principle of a seed. The immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is like the principle of yielding a way. The objective-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is like the principle of leaning on a staff. The sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya) is like the principle of non-obstruction. According to these four meanings, phenomena are not exhaustively subsumed, for there is an efficacious efficient cause that does not merely refrain from obstructing." Vibhāṣā 16 asks: "Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume each other. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, while the efficient cause is the remaining three conditions. Some say: The conditions subsume the causes, but the causes do not subsume the conditions. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, and the efficient cause is the sovereign condition. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under the causes." However, there is no evaluative judgment [by the compiler of the Vibhāṣā]. Now, in examining the underlying intentions of the difference between these two theories: the former master includes [active] efficacy in the efficient cause, so that apart from the five causes, all functions are subsumed under the efficient cause. Therefore, the functions of yielding a way and leaning on a staff are also subsumed under the efficient cause. The latter master takes the meaning of non-obstruction as the efficient cause; thus, the six causes do not exhaustively subsume all functions. For this reason, non-obstruction is the meaning of the sovereign condition, not the meaning of yielding a way or leaning on a staff. Now, examining the two theories, mutual subsumption is superior. Question: If so, why does the Prakaraṇasāsana-śāstra (*Xianzong lun*) state: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct. Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct. Because their meanings as conditions are alike, they are all distinct from causes; therefore, there are general statements distinguishing causes and conditions. 'Cause' means capable of producing, and 'condition' means capable of nourishing, just like the difference between a natural mother and a foster mother. Furthermore, conditions assist a cause so that it can produce; once produced, the continuation is nourished by the power of conditions. Or some say that a cause is only one, while conditions are manifold, just like the difference between seed, manure, soil, and so forth. Moreover, a cause is uncommon, while that which is common is a condition, like the eye and visible form. Moreover, performing its own task is called a cause, while performing another's task is called a condition, like a seed and manure. Moreover, that which is capable of initiating is called a cause, and that which is capable of upholding is called a condition, like a flower and its stem. Moreover, the proximate is called a cause, and the remote is called a condition, like a jewel and the sun. Moreover, a cause can produce, and a condition can bring about, just as curd produces ghee, and a person's churning implement can bring it about. Moreover, that which possesses the primary meaning is a cause, and that which assists in manifestation is a condition, just as a verbal root (dhātu) and an affix (pratyaya) differ in meaning. Such categories of difference are manifold; therefore, distinct names and concepts are established for cause and condition. This general intention shows that causes are intimate and conditions are remote; therefore, among the intimate causes, five are intimate and one is remote, while among the remote conditions, three are remote and one is intimate. Thus, based on reason and teaching, the conditions have been briefly analyzed." Since the treatise states this, by what principle of proof is mutual subsumption known to be superior? Answer: In general, it is not that there is no difference between causes and conditions: "cause" is a designation for the intimate, and "condition" is a name for the remote. Among the six causes, five are intimate, and are therefore identical under the intimate name; among the four conditions, three are remote, and are therefore identical under the remote name. However, among the causes there is the remote—namely, the efficient cause; among the conditions there is the intimate—namely, the cause-condition. One cannot, because the meaning of condition is remote, make the cause-condition remote from the efficient cause; nor can one, because the meaning of cause is intimate, make the efficient cause intimate to the cause-condition. Therefore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct." Furthermore, based on the Vibhāṣā: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." Based on this, one knows that causes and conditions take function as their substance. Since their functions are one, one knows there is no difference. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct, because their meanings as conditions are alike." Now, examining this statement, its meaning is incomplete. Because one master stated that causes do not subsume two conditions, [the treatise] immediately claims that causes also do not subsume the cause-condition and the sovereign condition. Why not, on the grounds that the cause-condition and the sovereign condition are subsumed under causes, also subsume the two conditions under causes? Moreover, regarding these two conditions, both masters in the Vibhāṣā agree that they are subsumed under causes. As for the [other] two conditions, one master says they are subsumed and one says they are not; how can one use the one-sided view of one master to overturn by analogy the view of both masters? Furthermore, that one master says causes do not subsume the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition has a distinct intention. The efficient cause has two meanings: first, merely not obstructing; second, also having efficacious power. If one takes merely not obstructing, it only subsumes the sovereign condition; if one includes function, it subsumes the three conditions. Hence, the statements of the two masters differ. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana cites other sources explaining the distinct meanings of cause and condition, saying: "A cause is like a natural mother, a seed, etc.; a condition is like a foster mother, manure, soil, etc." This refers to intimate causes as causes and remote causes as conditions. For example, when the Vibhāṣā asks whether the four great elements producing derived matter have the meaning of a cause or the meaning of a condition, this takes the cause-condition as the meaning of a cause, and the sovereign condition as the meaning of a condition. Could it be that the meaning of a cause is the six causes, and the meaning of a condition is the four conditions? Furthermore, within the efficient cause, the intimate refers to the four great elements producing derived matter, the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.; the remote refers to mere non-obstruction, the immediately preceding condition, and the objective-condition. If one says that because it is remote it is not subsumed under causes, could it be that remote merely means non-obstruction? If one says that because it is intimate it is not subsumed under causes, how could it be intimate to the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.? Therefore, one knows that the statement saying they are not subsumed is an incomplete statement. All treatises state that, setting aside the efficient cause, the remaining five causes are the nature of the cause-condition. "Nature" has the meaning of substance and category; phenomena of this category are the substance of the cause-condition. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā states: "The sovereign condition is like non-obstructing phenomena," and in explaining the efficient cause it also speaks of non-obstruction; therefore, one knows they are the same. How could non-obstruction as a cause and non-obstruction as a condition be two different things? Since both are non-obstruction, how could one be intimate and the other remote? Some people do not understand this at all, and set up their own questions and answers: In the two theories, when explaining their mutual subsumption, is it stated in terms of substance or in terms of function? If stated in terms of substance, the efficient cause should subsume the four conditions, and the single sovereign condition should subsume the six causes, since their substances are both broader. If stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and four conditions are each distinct; how could they mutually subsume each other? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explained in terms of substance; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the Vibhāṣā explains it in terms of substance: the cause-condition subsumes five, and the efficient cause subsumes three. If based on the substance of the efficient cause being broad, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and the substance of the sovereign condition being broad can subsume the six causes. The reason it merely states that the efficient cause subsumes three and the sovereign condition subsumes one is that this master intends to explain mutual subsumption comparatively between the six causes and four conditions, and simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect; thus he says the cause-condition subsumes five and the efficient cause subsumes three. Because apart from the efficient cause there are the other five causes, and apart from the sovereign condition there are the other three conditions, when explaining their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the efficient cause subsumes four and the sovereign condition subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature exists perpetually; this would mean there is no difference between the six causes and four conditions, so how could they mutually subsume each other? Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." The explanation says: Based on substance being changeless, causes and conditions are identical. Subordinating substance to function, distinctions are therefore stated. If [we follow] the second master of the Vibhāṣā and this treatise, mutual subsumption is distinguished based on similarity of function. If discussing the functions of the six causes and four conditions, they are each distinct and do not mutually subsume each other. However, stating that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and the sovereign condition subsumes the efficient cause explains mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not similar to causes, and therefore are not subsumed under causes. Examining this explanation, it has not grasped the intent of the treatise. Why have all the venerable masters failed to realize this? Since the treatises all say "the five causes are the nature of the cause-condition," how could one say this is done on the basis of similarity? Furthermore, the meaning of non-obstruction is the efficient cause and is also the meaning of the sovereign condition; what difference is there between the non-obstruction of a cause and the non-obstruction of a condition, that one should speak of them being similar rather than identical? Moreover, on what sūtra or treatise does one rely for saying that they subsume based on similarity, or for saying that one simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect, and what precedent is there? Furthermore, the substance of the efficient cause is the substance of the four conditions; why would the cause-condition be so remote that the efficient cause is only three conditions? Furthermore, the sovereign condition is the substance of the six causes; why would the five causes be so remote that the sovereign condition solely subsumes the efficient cause? According to this, such an explanation is not reasonable. Question: Are the five causes—production, etc.—by which the four great elements produce derived matter the cause-condition or the sovereign condition? Answer: Relying on Vibhāṣā 131, which asks: "For derived matter, how many conditions are the primary elements? Answer: Cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause refers to the cause of production (janana-hetu), the cause of reliance (niśraya-hetu), the cause of establishment (pratiṣṭhā-hetu), the cause of maintenance (dhṛti-hetu), and the cause of nourishment (upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu). Sovereign refers to non-impediment and mere non-obstruction." Explanation: This explains the text of the Jñānaprasthāna, which frames its discussion in terms of the four conditions. Where it says "cause", it is the cause-condition. Vibhāṣā 127 asks: "Question: What does 'produce' (upādāya) mean? Does it mean a cause, or does it mean a condition? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it means a cause, for derived matter none of the five causes exist in these four great elements; how could one say they produce matter? If it means a condition, with the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are without exception its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: It should be stated that producing is the meaning of a cause. Question: None of the five causes exist in this with respect to derived matter; how is it the meaning of a cause? Answer: Although none of the five causes, such as the cause of the same class (sabhāga-hetu), exist, there are five other distinct meanings of cause: the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of establishment, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; by these they produce [derived matter]. Other masters say: Producing is the meaning of a condition. Question: With the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: The meaning of sovereign condition has the intimate and the remote, the proximate and the distant, the conjoined and the non-conjoined, existence in this life and existence in another life. The intimate, proximate, etc., are called causes; the remote, distant, etc., are called conditions. By this meaning, saying that the great elements are the cause and sovereign [conditions] for derived matter does not contradict reason. Furthermore, the Pañcavastuka also recounts both theories, with no evaluative judgment." Now, examining both theories, the former master is correct. Why is it known to be so? Since the Jñānaprasthāna frames its questions and answers in terms of the four conditions, how could it answer that it is a cause-condition if it were actually a sovereign condition? There is no other such precedent. If so, why does the treatise state that five causes are the cause-condition? These are not the five causes like the cause of the same class; how could they be subsumed under the cause-condition? Answer: Because their meaning differs from the five causes like the cause of the same class, they are not subsumed under those five causes. Their functional efficacy in producing an effect shares aspects with the five causes and is unlike the other sovereign conditions; therefore, they are the cause-condition. Consequently, the fundamental treatise states that ten causes are the cause-condition, and one is the sovereign condition. Question: If so, why does it not speak of eleven causes, but speaks only of six? Answer: Because the causal meaning of the five causes, such as production, is distinct. If a phenomenon acts as a cause whose effect extends to the three realms and the four or five skandhas, it is stated here. The causes of derived matter are the effect only of two realms and a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. Furthermore, if a phenomenon acts as a cause whose shared effect extends to multiple skandhas, it is stated here. The four great elements act as a cause whose shared effect is only a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. For this reason, apart from the five causes such as the coexistent cause (sahabhū-hetu), the five causes of production, etc., are not established separately, and are therefore subsumed under the efficient cause. Consequently, because the efficacy of derived matter surpasses the remaining three conditions, it is subsumed under the cause-condition. If one unfolds the five causes of production, etc., there are ten causes that are the cause-condition. All treatises proceed on the basis of the subsumption of entire causes; therefore they say that five causes are the cause-condition. One should reflect further on this.