俱舍論疏 7.6

7.6

論「於六因內至是因緣性」，自此已下釋四緣體性也。此文第一釋因緣體。若依《婆沙》，能作因中四大造色五因亦因緣性。此中略也，唯說全因相攝。故《婆沙》一百七云「因緣者，如種子法。等無間緣者，如開避法。所緣緣者，如任杖法。增上緣者，如不障礙法。准此四義攝法不盡。如有力能作，非唯不障故。」《婆沙》十六云「問：為因攝緣、緣攝因耶？答：互相攝。謂前五因是因緣，能作因是餘三緣。有作是說：緣攝因，非因攝緣。謂前五因是因緣，能作因是增上緣。等無間緣及所緣緣，非因所攝。」然無評家。今詳二說不同意者，前師兼有作用為能作因，除五因外所有作用皆能作因攝。由此開避、任杖之用亦能作因攝。後師取不障礙義為能作因，故即六因攝用不盡。由斯不障礙是增上緣義，非是開避及任杖義。今詳二說，相攝為善。問：若爾，何故《顯宗論》云「六因、四緣體雖無別而義有異。且等無間及所緣緣既非因攝，故知餘二義亦有殊。緣義等故與因皆別，故有總辨因、緣異言。因謂能生、緣能長養，猶如生、養二母差別。又緣攝助因方能生，生已相續緣力長養故。或有說因唯有一，緣乃眾多，猶如種子、糞、土等異。又因不共，共者是緣，如眼、如色。又作自事名因，若作他事名緣，如種、糞等。又能引起名因，能任持者名緣，如花、如蔕。又近名因，遠者名緣，如珠、如日。又因能生，緣者能辨，如酪出生蘇，人鑽器能辨。又正有義名因，能助顯發名緣，如字界、字緣於義有差別。如斯等類差別眾多，是故因、緣別立名想。此總意顯因親、緣疎，故因親中親五、疎一，疎緣之中疎三、親一。已隨理、教略辨諸緣。」論既此說，何理證知相攝為善？答：總說因之與緣非無有異，因是親稱、緣是疎名，六因之中五是親故以親名同，四緣之中三是疎故以疎名同。然因中有疎，謂能作因；緣中有親，因緣也。不可以緣義疎故因緣疎能作，不可以因義親故能作親因緣。故《顯宗》云「六因、四緣體雖無別而義有異。」又准《婆沙》云「我說作用以為因、果。諸法實體恒無轉變，非因、果故。」准此故知，因緣以作用為體。作用既一，故知無異。又《顯宗》云「且等無間及所緣緣既非因攝，故知餘二義亦有殊，緣義等故。」今詳此說，義有餘也。以一師說因不攝二緣，即謂因緣及增上緣，因亦不攝。何不以因緣、增上是因攝故，二緣亦合攝在因中。又此二緣，《婆沙》兩師同許攝在因中。二緣，一師說攝、一說不攝，如何以一師偏義例破兩師之義？又一師說因不攝等無間緣、所緣緣者，有別意也。能作因有二義：一但不障、二兼有力。若但取不障即唯攝增上，若兼作用即攝三緣。由此二師說有差別。又《顯宗》引餘處釋因、緣別義，云「因如生母、種子等。緣如養母、糞土等」者，此說親因為因、疎因名緣。如《婆沙》問四大造色為是因義？為是緣義？此以因緣為因義，增上為緣義。豈即因義是六因，緣義是四緣耶？又能作因中，親謂四大造色，根識依等。疎謂但不障礙，等無間緣及所緣緣。若言疎故不攝入因，豈疎但不障礙？若言親故不攝入因，豈得親於根識依等？故知說不攝者是有餘說。諸論皆言除能作因，所餘五因是因緣性。性是體義、類義，此類之法是因緣體。又《婆沙》云「增上緣如不障法」，解能作因亦云不障，故知同也。豈可因不障、緣不障二不同也。一種不障，豈得有親有疎？有人於此全不開悟，自問答云：於二說中明其相攝，為約體說？為約用說？若約體說，應能作因攝彼四緣，增上一緣攝彼六因，體皆寬故。若約用說，六因、四緣作用各別，如何相攝？解云：夫六因、四緣展轉相攝，有其二義：一約體以明、二據用相似。《婆沙》初師約體以明，因緣攝五，能作攝三。若據能作體寬實攝四緣，增上體寬能攝六因。所以但言能作攝三、增上攝一者，此師意說六因、四緣相對明攝，且據一相攝體盡即休，故說因緣攝五、能作攝三。為能作因外有餘五因，增上緣外有餘三緣，明其相攝，故不別說能作攝四、增上攝六。問：若據體性明相攝者，體性恒有，是即六因、四緣無別，如何相攝？故《婆沙》云「我說作用以為因果。諸法實體恒無轉變，非因果故。」解云：據體無變，因與緣同。以體從用，故說差別。若《婆沙》第二師及此論，據用相似以辨相攝，若論六因、四緣作用各別，互不相攝。然說因緣攝五因、增上攝能作因者，據用相似以明相攝也。其等無間及所緣緣，不似因故故因不攝。詳其此釋，未得論意。一何諸德總無覺者。論既皆云「五因是因緣性」，如何說是以為似也。又不障之義是能作因，亦是增上緣義，因之不障與緣不障有何差別，而言相似非即是也。又言相似故攝，及云且據一相攝體盡即休者，憑何經、論，復有何例？又能作因體即四緣體，因緣何疎能作唯三緣？又增上緣即六因體，五因何疎增上獨攝能作？准此解釋，未為當理。問：四大造色生等五因，為是因緣？為是增上？答：准《婆沙》一百三十一云「大種與所造色為幾緣？答：因、增上。因謂生因、依因、立因、持因、養因。增上者謂不礙及唯無障。」解云：是釋《發智》文，此是約四緣作論。言因者，是因緣也。《婆沙》一百二十七云「問：造是何義？為是因義？為緣義耶？設爾何失？俱見其過。若是因義，此四大種於所造色五因皆無，如何可言能造諸色？若是緣義，諸所造色各除自體，餘一切法無不皆是此增上緣，如何但言大種所造？答：應作是說，造是因義。問：此於造色五因皆無，如何因義？答：雖同類等五因皆無，而別有餘五種因義，謂生因、依因、立因、持因、養因，由此能造。有餘師言：造是緣義。問：諸所造色各除自體，餘法皆是增上緣，如何但言大種所造？答：增上緣義有親有疎、有近有遠、有合有不合、有在此生有在餘生。諸親近等說名為因，諸疎遠等說名為緣。由此義故，說諸大種與所造色為因、增上，亦無違理。又《五事論》亦敘兩說，竝無評文。」今詳兩說，前師為正。所以知然？《發智》既約四緣問答，如何實是增上緣而答是因緣，更無此例故。若爾，何故論說五因因緣？此非同類等五因，如何是因緣攝？答：此與同類等五因義不同故，非五因攝。生果力用分同五因，不同餘增上緣，故是因緣。由此本論說十因為因緣，一為增上。問：若爾，何不說十一因而但說六？答：生等五因因義別故。若法為因果，通三界四蘊、五蘊，此中說之。造色之因唯二界果、一蘊少分，由斯不說。又若法為因，通多蘊共果，此中說之。四大為因，唯是一蘊少分共果，此中不說。由斯俱有因等五因之外，不別建立生等五因，故入能作因攝。由此造色力用勝餘三緣，故入因緣中攝。若開出生等五因，即有十因為因緣也。諸論竝據全因相攝，故說五因為因緣也。應更思之。

The treatise states: "Among the six causes, […] is the nature of the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya)"; from this point onward, it explains the intrinsic nature of the four conditions. This text first explains the substance of the cause-condition. If one relies on the Vibhāṣā, within the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), the five causes by which the four great elements produce derived matter are also the nature of the cause-condition. Here, it is abbreviated, speaking only of the subsumption of entire causes. Thus, Vibhāṣā 107 states: "The cause-condition is like the principle of a seed. The immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is like the principle of yielding a way. The objective-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is like the principle of leaning on a staff. The sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya) is like the principle of non-obstruction. According to these four meanings, phenomena are not exhaustively subsumed, for there is an efficacious efficient cause that does not merely refrain from obstructing." Vibhāṣā 16 asks: "Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume each other. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, while the efficient cause is the remaining three conditions. Some say: The conditions subsume the causes, but the causes do not subsume the conditions. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, and the efficient cause is the sovereign condition. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under the causes." However, there is no evaluative judgment [by the compiler of the Vibhāṣā]. Now, in examining the underlying intentions of the difference between these two theories: the former master includes [active] efficacy in the efficient cause, so that apart from the five causes, all functions are subsumed under the efficient cause. Therefore, the functions of yielding a way and leaning on a staff are also subsumed under the efficient cause. The latter master takes the meaning of non-obstruction as the efficient cause; thus, the six causes do not exhaustively subsume all functions. For this reason, non-obstruction is the meaning of the sovereign condition, not the meaning of yielding a way or leaning on a staff. Now, examining the two theories, mutual subsumption is superior. Question: If so, why does the Prakaraṇasāsana-śāstra (*Xianzong lun*) state: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct. Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct. Because their meanings as conditions are alike, they are all distinct from causes; therefore, there are general statements distinguishing causes and conditions. 'Cause' means capable of producing, and 'condition' means capable of nourishing, just like the difference between a natural mother and a foster mother. Furthermore, conditions assist a cause so that it can produce; once produced, the continuation is nourished by the power of conditions. Or some say that a cause is only one, while conditions are manifold, just like the difference between seed, manure, soil, and so forth. Moreover, a cause is uncommon, while that which is common is a condition, like the eye and visible form. Moreover, performing its own task is called a cause, while performing another's task is called a condition, like a seed and manure. Moreover, that which is capable of initiating is called a cause, and that which is capable of upholding is called a condition, like a flower and its stem. Moreover, the proximate is called a cause, and the remote is called a condition, like a jewel and the sun. Moreover, a cause can produce, and a condition can bring about, just as curd produces ghee, and a person's churning implement can bring it about. Moreover, that which possesses the primary meaning is a cause, and that which assists in manifestation is a condition, just as a verbal root (dhātu) and an affix (pratyaya) differ in meaning. Such categories of difference are manifold; therefore, distinct names and concepts are established for cause and condition. This general intention shows that causes are intimate and conditions are remote; therefore, among the intimate causes, five are intimate and one is remote, while among the remote conditions, three are remote and one is intimate. Thus, based on reason and teaching, the conditions have been briefly analyzed." Since the treatise states this, by what principle of proof is mutual subsumption known to be superior? Answer: In general, it is not that there is no difference between causes and conditions: "cause" is a designation for the intimate, and "condition" is a name for the remote. Among the six causes, five are intimate, and are therefore identical under the intimate name; among the four conditions, three are remote, and are therefore identical under the remote name. However, among the causes there is the remote—namely, the efficient cause; among the conditions there is the intimate—namely, the cause-condition. One cannot, because the meaning of condition is remote, make the cause-condition remote from the efficient cause; nor can one, because the meaning of cause is intimate, make the efficient cause intimate to the cause-condition. Therefore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct." Furthermore, based on the Vibhāṣā: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." Based on this, one knows that causes and conditions take function as their substance. Since their functions are one, one knows there is no difference. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct, because their meanings as conditions are alike." Now, examining this statement, its meaning is incomplete. Because one master stated that causes do not subsume two conditions, [the treatise] immediately claims that causes also do not subsume the cause-condition and the sovereign condition. Why not, on the grounds that the cause-condition and the sovereign condition are subsumed under causes, also subsume the two conditions under causes? Moreover, regarding these two conditions, both masters in the Vibhāṣā agree that they are subsumed under causes. As for the [other] two conditions, one master says they are subsumed and one says they are not; how can one use the one-sided view of one master to overturn by analogy the view of both masters? Furthermore, that one master says causes do not subsume the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition has a distinct intention. The efficient cause has two meanings: first, merely not obstructing; second, also having efficacious power. If one takes merely not obstructing, it only subsumes the sovereign condition; if one includes function, it subsumes the three conditions. Hence, the statements of the two masters differ. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana cites other sources explaining the distinct meanings of cause and condition, saying: "A cause is like a natural mother, a seed, etc.; a condition is like a foster mother, manure, soil, etc." This refers to intimate causes as causes and remote causes as conditions. For example, when the Vibhāṣā asks whether the four great elements producing derived matter have the meaning of a cause or the meaning of a condition, this takes the cause-condition as the meaning of a cause, and the sovereign condition as the meaning of a condition. Could it be that the meaning of a cause is the six causes, and the meaning of a condition is the four conditions? Furthermore, within the efficient cause, the intimate refers to the four great elements producing derived matter, the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.; the remote refers to mere non-obstruction, the immediately preceding condition, and the objective-condition. If one says that because it is remote it is not subsumed under causes, could it be that remote merely means non-obstruction? If one says that because it is intimate it is not subsumed under causes, how could it be intimate to the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.? Therefore, one knows that the statement saying they are not subsumed is an incomplete statement. All treatises state that, setting aside the efficient cause, the remaining five causes are the nature of the cause-condition. "Nature" has the meaning of substance and category; phenomena of this category are the substance of the cause-condition. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā states: "The sovereign condition is like non-obstructing phenomena," and in explaining the efficient cause it also speaks of non-obstruction; therefore, one knows they are the same. How could non-obstruction as a cause and non-obstruction as a condition be two different things? Since both are non-obstruction, how could one be intimate and the other remote? Some people do not understand this at all, and set up their own questions and answers: In the two theories, when explaining their mutual subsumption, is it stated in terms of substance or in terms of function? If stated in terms of substance, the efficient cause should subsume the four conditions, and the single sovereign condition should subsume the six causes, since their substances are both broader. If stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and four conditions are each distinct; how could they mutually subsume each other? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explained in terms of substance; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the Vibhāṣā explains it in terms of substance: the cause-condition subsumes five, and the efficient cause subsumes three. If based on the substance of the efficient cause being broad, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and the substance of the sovereign condition being broad can subsume the six causes. The reason it merely states that the efficient cause subsumes three and the sovereign condition subsumes one is that this master intends to explain mutual subsumption comparatively between the six causes and four conditions, and simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect; thus he says the cause-condition subsumes five and the efficient cause subsumes three. Because apart from the efficient cause there are the other five causes, and apart from the sovereign condition there are the other three conditions, when explaining their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the efficient cause subsumes four and the sovereign condition subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature exists perpetually; this would mean there is no difference between the six causes and four conditions, so how could they mutually subsume each other? Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." The explanation says: Based on substance being changeless, causes and conditions are identical. Subordinating substance to function, distinctions are therefore stated. If [we follow] the second master of the Vibhāṣā and this treatise, mutual subsumption is distinguished based on similarity of function. If discussing the functions of the six causes and four conditions, they are each distinct and do not mutually subsume each other. However, stating that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and the sovereign condition subsumes the efficient cause explains mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not similar to causes, and therefore are not subsumed under causes. Examining this explanation, it has not grasped the intent of the treatise. Why have all the venerable masters failed to realize this? Since the treatises all say "the five causes are the nature of the cause-condition," how could one say this is done on the basis of similarity? Furthermore, the meaning of non-obstruction is the efficient cause and is also the meaning of the sovereign condition; what difference is there between the non-obstruction of a cause and the non-obstruction of a condition, that one should speak of them being similar rather than identical? Moreover, on what sūtra or treatise does one rely for saying that they subsume based on similarity, or for saying that one simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect, and what precedent is there? Furthermore, the substance of the efficient cause is the substance of the four conditions; why would the cause-condition be so remote that the efficient cause is only three conditions? Furthermore, the sovereign condition is the substance of the six causes; why would the five causes be so remote that the sovereign condition solely subsumes the efficient cause? According to this, such an explanation is not reasonable. Question: Are the five causes—production, etc.—by which the four great elements produce derived matter the cause-condition or the sovereign condition? Answer: Relying on Vibhāṣā 131, which asks: "For derived matter, how many conditions are the primary elements? Answer: Cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause refers to the cause of production (janana-hetu), the cause of reliance (niśraya-hetu), the cause of establishment (pratiṣṭhā-hetu), the cause of maintenance (dhṛti-hetu), and the cause of nourishment (upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu). Sovereign refers to non-impediment and mere non-obstruction." Explanation: This explains the text of the Jñānaprasthāna, which frames its discussion in terms of the four conditions. Where it says "cause", it is the cause-condition. Vibhāṣā 127 asks: "Question: What does 'produce' (upādāya) mean? Does it mean a cause, or does it mean a condition? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it means a cause, for derived matter none of the five causes exist in these four great elements; how could one say they produce matter? If it means a condition, with the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are without exception its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: It should be stated that producing is the meaning of a cause. Question: None of the five causes exist in this with respect to derived matter; how is it the meaning of a cause? Answer: Although none of the five causes, such as the cause of the same class (sabhāga-hetu), exist, there are five other distinct meanings of cause: the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of establishment, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; by these they produce [derived matter]. Other masters say: Producing is the meaning of a condition. Question: With the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: The meaning of sovereign condition has the intimate and the remote, the proximate and the distant, the conjoined and the non-conjoined, existence in this life and existence in another life. The intimate, proximate, etc., are called causes; the remote, distant, etc., are called conditions. By this meaning, saying that the great elements are the cause and sovereign [conditions] for derived matter does not contradict reason. Furthermore, the Pañcavastuka also recounts both theories, with no evaluative judgment." Now, examining both theories, the former master is correct. Why is it known to be so? Since the Jñānaprasthāna frames its questions and answers in terms of the four conditions, how could it answer that it is a cause-condition if it were actually a sovereign condition? There is no other such precedent. If so, why does the treatise state that five causes are the cause-condition? These are not the five causes like the cause of the same class; how could they be subsumed under the cause-condition? Answer: Because their meaning differs from the five causes like the cause of the same class, they are not subsumed under those five causes. Their functional efficacy in producing an effect shares aspects with the five causes and is unlike the other sovereign conditions; therefore, they are the cause-condition. Consequently, the fundamental treatise states that ten causes are the cause-condition, and one is the sovereign condition. Question: If so, why does it not speak of eleven causes, but speaks only of six? Answer: Because the causal meaning of the five causes, such as production, is distinct. If a phenomenon acts as a cause whose effect extends to the three realms and the four or five skandhas, it is stated here. The causes of derived matter are the effect only of two realms and a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. Furthermore, if a phenomenon acts as a cause whose shared effect extends to multiple skandhas, it is stated here. The four great elements act as a cause whose shared effect is only a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. For this reason, apart from the five causes such as the coexistent cause (sahabhū-hetu), the five causes of production, etc., are not established separately, and are therefore subsumed under the efficient cause. Consequently, because the efficacy of derived matter surpasses the remaining three conditions, it is subsumed under the cause-condition. If one unfolds the five causes of production, etc., there are ten causes that are the cause-condition. All treatises proceed on the basis of the subsumption of entire causes; therefore they say that five causes are the cause-condition. One should reflect further on this.