俱舍論頌疏論本 6.48

6.48

無為無因果者，釋疑也。論云：「若爾無為許是果故，則應有因，要對彼因，乃可得說此為果故。又此無為許是因故，則應有果，要對彼果，乃可得說此為因故。」解云：無為是離繫果，應名有因。無為是能作因，應名有果也。為遣此疑，故有斯頌。無為無因者，無六因故，謂無為法體雖是果，是所證果，非是六因所引生果，故名無因。無為無果者，無五果故，謂無為法於生不障，立能作因，非能證故，無離繫果，無取與用，無有為果，是故擇滅是因無果，是果無因，餘二無為是因非果，故三無為皆無因果。舊譯無為非因果者，此翻謬矣。無為是能作因，不可言非因。無為是離繫果，不可言非果。非，即非其自體；無，即乃是無他。故得言無，不可言非也。論云：「何緣不許諸無間道與離繫果為能作因（難合有因）？於生不障，立能作因，無為無生，道何所作（答前難也）。若爾誰果？果義如何（解云：此有兩句問，一道既非因，未知誰果。二無因是果，果義如何也）？謂是道果，道力得故（言道果者，答誰果也。道力得者，答果義也）。若爾，道果應唯是得，道於得有能，非擇滅故（解云：得者，離繫得也。由道引故，應有功能）。不爾，於得於擇滅中，道之功能有差別故（答也）。云何於得道有功能（徵也）？謂能生故（答也）。得是有為，道能生故。云何於滅道有功能（徵也）？謂能證故（答由道證擇滅也）。由此理故，道雖非滅因，而可得說擇滅為道果（結成也）。」

'Unconditioned [phenomena] have neither cause nor result' resolves a doubt. The treatise states: 'If so, since unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be results, they should have causes, for it is only in relation to a cause that something can be called a result. Furthermore, since these unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be causes, they should have results, for it is only in relation to a result that something can be called a cause.' The explanation is: unconditioned [phenomena] are the result of disjunction, so they should be called 'having causes'. Unconditioned [phenomena] are efficient causes (kāraṇa-hetu), so they should be called 'having results'. To dispel this doubt, there is this verse. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no cause means they lack the six causes; that is, although the real nature of an unconditioned dharma is a result, it is a result that is realized, not a result induced and produced by the six causes, hence it is called 'having no cause'. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no result means they lack the five results; that is, unconditioned dharmas do not obstruct arising and are thus established as efficient causes, but because they are not what realizes, they have no result of disjunction; and because they lack the function of taking and giving, they have no conditioned results. Therefore, analytical cessation is a cause without result and a result without cause; the remaining two unconditioned [dharmas] are causes and not results; hence, all three unconditioned [dharmas] lack cause and result. The older translation's rendering 'unconditioned [phenomena] are neither cause nor result' is an error of translation. Unconditioned [dharmas] are efficient causes, so one cannot say they are 'not causes'. Unconditioned [dharmas] are the result of disjunction, so one cannot say they are 'not results'. 'Non-' (fei) negates its own nature; 'without' (wu) indicates the absence of another. Therefore one can say 'without', but cannot say 'non-'. The treatise states: 'For what reason is it not admitted that the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) serve as efficient causes for the result of disjunction (objection asserting it must have a cause)? Established as an efficient cause because of not obstructing arising, what could the path do with respect to the unconditioned, which has no arising (reply to the previous objection)? If so, whose result is it, and what is the meaning of result (explanation: this has two questions: first, since the path is not a cause, whose result is it? Second, if it has no cause yet is a result, what is the meaning of result)? It is the result of the path, because it is obtained through the power of the path (saying "result of the path" answers whose result it is; "obtained through the power of the path" answers the meaning of result). If so, the result of the path should only be acquisition (prāpti), for the path has efficacy regarding acquisition, not analytical cessation (explanation: "acquisition" refers to the acquisition of disjunction; since it is induced by the path, it should have efficacy). Not so, because the path's efficacy differs regarding acquisition and analytical cessation (the reply). How does the path have efficacy regarding acquisition (the interrogation)? Because it can produce it (the reply). Acquisition is conditioned, so the path can produce it. How does the path have efficacy regarding cessation (the interrogation)? Because it can realize it (the reply: because through the path one realizes analytical cessation). By this principle, although the path is not the cause of cessation, it may still be said that analytical cessation is the result of the path (the conclusion).'