俱舍論頌疏論本 6.48

6.48

'Unconditioned [phenomena] have neither cause nor result' resolves a doubt. The treatise states: 'If so, since unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be results, they should have causes, for it is only in relation to a cause that something can be called a result. Furthermore, since these unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be causes, they should have results, for it is only in relation to a result that something can be called a cause.' The explanation is: unconditioned [phenomena] are the result of disjunction, so they should be called 'having causes'. Unconditioned [phenomena] are efficient causes (kāraṇa-hetu), so they should be called 'having results'. To dispel this doubt, there is this verse. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no cause means they lack the six causes; that is, although the real nature of an unconditioned dharma is a result, it is a result that is realized, not a result induced and produced by the six causes, hence it is called 'having no cause'. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no result means they lack the five results; that is, unconditioned dharmas do not obstruct arising and are thus established as efficient causes, but because they are not what realizes, they have no result of disjunction; and because they lack the function of taking and giving, they have no conditioned results. Therefore, analytical cessation is a cause without result and a result without cause; the remaining two unconditioned [dharmas] are causes and not results; hence, all three unconditioned [dharmas] lack cause and result. The older translation's rendering 'unconditioned [phenomena] are neither cause nor result' is an error of translation. Unconditioned [dharmas] are efficient causes, so one cannot say they are 'not causes'. Unconditioned [dharmas] are the result of disjunction, so one cannot say they are 'not results'. 'Non-' (fei) negates its own nature; 'without' (wu) indicates the absence of another. Therefore one can say 'without', but cannot say 'non-'. The treatise states: 'For what reason is it not admitted that the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) serve as efficient causes for the result of disjunction (objection asserting it must have a cause)? Established as an efficient cause because of not obstructing arising, what could the path do with respect to the unconditioned, which has no arising (reply to the previous objection)? If so, whose result is it, and what is the meaning of result (explanation: this has two questions: first, since the path is not a cause, whose result is it? Second, if it has no cause yet is a result, what is the meaning of result)? It is the result of the path, because it is obtained through the power of the path (saying "result of the path" answers whose result it is; "obtained through the power of the path" answers the meaning of result). If so, the result of the path should only be acquisition (prāpti), for the path has efficacy regarding acquisition, not analytical cessation (explanation: "acquisition" refers to the acquisition of disjunction; since it is induced by the path, it should have efficacy). Not so, because the path's efficacy differs regarding acquisition and analytical cessation (the reply). How does the path have efficacy regarding acquisition (the interrogation)? Because it can produce it (the reply). Acquisition is conditioned, so the path can produce it. How does the path have efficacy regarding cessation (the interrogation)? Because it can realize it (the reply: because through the path one realizes analytical cessation). By this principle, although the path is not the cause of cessation, it may still be said that analytical cessation is the result of the path (the conclusion).'