俱舍論頌疏論本 30.19

30.19

The author of the treatise resolves this by explaining: "Devadatta's being able to walk does not mean there is an agent of walking distinct [from the body]. It is merely this Devadatta's moving and shifting, arising in continuum from here to there, that is called 'walking'; apart from Devadatta, there is no distinct walking. Yet when this walking occurs, the prior moment serves as cause, giving rise to the subsequent effect. The cause is the agent of walking; there is no distinct self. Just as Devadatta can walk, so consciousness can cognize. As Devadatta's body can serve as the cause of consciousness, worldly conventions also say that Devadatta can cognize. However, the noble ones, conforming to worldly convention, also speak of Devadatta as the one who can cognize." Another explanation says: Or, when consciousness arises in continuum regarding an object, the prior consciousness serves as cause, inducing the subsequent consciousness to arise; calling the prior causal consciousness the 'cognizer' is also without fault, because worldly convention refers to the cause as the agent. Just as bells and drums are called 'capable of sounding'—yet the sound is what is sounded, not the bells and drums; because bells and drums can produce sound, one says that bells and drums are capable of sounding, which is also speaking of the cause as the agent. Therefore, we know that the cause of consciousness is called the cognizer; apart from consciousness, there is no distinct self called the cognizer. Another explanation says: Or, just as a lamp can move, so consciousness can cognize. The continuum of the lamp-flame is called the lamp's moving; there is no distinct moving. Precisely when consciousness arises in continuum regarding an object, it is said to be able to cognize; apart from this, there is no cognizer.