俱舍論頌疏論本 30

English (machine translation) 30

Language: English

30.1

From here on is the third section: setting aside answers to benefit sentient beings, first presenting an objection and then replying. The Vātsīputrīyas object: If the person is identical to the aggregates, why did the World-Honoured One not state that the life-principle (jīva) is identical to the body? The author of the treatise answers: "Because he took into consideration the disposition (āśaya; here translated as 'inclination') of the questioner. That is to say, because the questioner grasped at a single, real self called a 'life-principle', based on this he asked the Buddha whether the life-principle and the body are identical or different. Therefore the Buddha replied: Since a self has no real entity, being identical or different cannot be established. Just as one cannot answer whether the hair of a turtle is hard or soft—since the hair of a turtle does not exist to begin with, what hardness or softness could one answer?—so the life-principle fundamentally does not exist, so what identity or difference could one answer?" Considering the intention of the questioner, the Buddha therefore did not answer.

30.2

Masters of ancient times have already untied this knot. Formerly there was a venerable master named Nāgasena, endowed with the three knowledges, the six supernormal powers, and complete with the eight liberations. At that time, a king, Milinda, came to the venerable master and spoke as follows: "My intention in coming now is to ask about my doubts. However, the nature of monks is to be fond of many words. If the Venerable One can answer directly, I will ask." The venerable master accepted the request. The king then asked: "Is the life-principle identical to or different from the body?" The venerable master answered: "This should not be declared." The king said: "Did we not have an agreement beforehand? Why do you now make different statements and not answer my previous question?" The venerable master reproached him: "I wish to ask about a doubt. However, the nature of kings is to be fond of many words. If the Great King can answer directly, I will raise my question." The king then agreed. The venerable master asked: "Are the fruits borne by the mango trees in the Great King's palace sour or sweet in flavor?" The king said: "There are no such trees in the palace to begin with." The venerable master again reproached him: "Did we not have an agreement beforehand? Why do you now make different statements and not answer what was asked?" The king said: "Since these trees do not exist in the palace, how could it be permissible to answer whether the fruit's flavor is sweet or sour?" The venerable master instructed him: "The life-principle likewise does not exist; how could one say whether it is identical to or different from the body?"

30.3

The Vātsīputrīyas also asked: "Why did the Buddha not say that a life-principle is completely non-existent?" The reply: "Also because he took into consideration the disposition of the questioner. The questioner regarded the continuum of causes and effects of the aggregates as the life-principle, and asked based on this. If the World-Honoured One had answered that the life-principle is completely non-existent, the questioner would have fallen into wrong views, thinking there are no causes and effects; hence the Buddha did not say so." They also asked: "Why did the Buddha not state that the life-principle is a nominal designation?" The reply: "Because he considered that that questioner was not yet able to understand the principle of dependent origination and was not a suitable vessel for receiving the true Dharma of true emptiness; therefore he did not speak to him of a conventionally existent life-principle. The principle must certainly be like this. As the World-Honoured One told Ānanda: 'The wanderer of non-Buddhist tradition, Vatsagotra (here translated as 'Vātsīputra'), came to where I was and asked: "Do I, in the world, have a self, or do I not have a self?"' The Buddha did not declare an answer for him. Why? If he had declared that it exists, it would contradict the true principle of Dharma, because in reality there is no self. If he had declared that it does not exist, it would have increased his delusion, and he would have thought that a self existed before and now does not. Compared to the delusion of having a self, this delusion of not having a self is an even greater fault. If one grasps that a self exists, one falls into the extreme of eternalism; if one grasps that a self does not exist, one falls into the extreme of annihilationism. Grasping that the self is eternal, one cultivates merit for the self; grasping that the self is annihilated, one then thinks the body does not exist, so why cultivate any more merit? Regarding the gravity of these two, as a sūtra says: 'Better to give rise to a view of self as large as Mount Sumeru, than to give rise to an annihilationist view as small as a mustard seed.' The above summarizes these questions and answers based on the treatise.

30.4

From here on, verses are cited to directly clarify the section on setting aside answers to benefit sentient beings. In this there are two: first, a verse by the Sautrāntika master Kumāralāta; second, verses by the author of the treatise.

30.5

Now, as for the first, the verse says:

30.6

"Seeing that they would be harmed by views,
And would destroy all good karma,
Therefore the Buddha taught the true Dharma
As a tigress holds her cub in her mouth:
If one grasps that a real self exists, one is harmed by the teeth of views;
If one rejects the conventional self as non-existent, one destroys the cub of good karma."

30.7

The explanation says: 'Seeing that they would be harmed by views' indicates why he did not say that a self exists. 'And would destroy all good karma' indicates why he did not say that a self does not exist.

30.8

'Therefore the Buddha taught the true Dharma as a tigress holds her cub in her mouth' cites an analogy to explain and establish the meaning. Just as a tigress holds her cub, if too tight it is harmed, if too loose it falls.

30.9

'If one grasps that a real self exists, one is harmed by the teeth of views' explains the first line. The view of grasping a self is like her teeth, which would inevitably harm the person, corresponding to the previous analogy of being too tight.

30.10

'If one rejects the conventional self as non-existent, one destroys the cub of good karma' explains the second line. The continuum of causes and effects is conventionally a nominal self; rejecting this as non-existent destroys good karma, just as the cub brings about excellent fruits, which corresponds to the previous analogy of being too loose.

30.11

Next is the second part, where he again speaks in verse:

30.12

"Because a real life-principle does not exist,
The Buddha did not state identity or difference;
Fearing they would reject the nominal self as non-existent,
He also did not say it is completely non-existent.
Namely, within the continuum of aggregates,
There is a life-principle of karma and result;
If he said there is no life-principle,
They would reject this as non-existent.
He did not speak of the aggregates
Having a nominally designated life-principle,
Because he observed that the questioner
Lacked the capacity to understand true emptiness.
Thus observing Vatsa's
Different dispositions,
When he asked about the existence or non-existence of a self,
The Buddha did not answer with existence or non-existence."

30.13

The explanation says: 'Because a real life-principle does not exist, the Buddha did not state identity or difference' explains the reason for setting aside an answer.

30.14

'Fearing they would reject the nominal self as non-existent, he also did not say it is completely non-existent' indicates the reason for not stating that a real life-principle does not exist.

30.15

From 'Namely, within the continuum of aggregates' up to 'They would reject this as non-existent' explains the previous indication. That is to say, within the continuum of aggregates, karma leads to results, and upon these karmas and results a life-principle is nominally established. If the hearer heard the Buddha say there is no real life-principle and failed to understand, he would also reject the nominal life-principle as non-existent, and would fall into an annihilationist view; therefore the Buddha did not say so.

30.16

[The phrase] "He did not speak of [a soul] within the aggregates… because they lacked the power to understand true emptiness" clarifies the reason for not speaking of a nominal soul. A nominal soul is the principle of true emptiness; the questioner was foolish and was not a vessel capable of receiving the Dharma, hence the Buddha did not speak of it.

30.17

[The phrase] "Thus regarding Vatsa… the Buddha answered neither existence nor non-existence" concludes [the explanation of] setting aside [the question without] prediction. Vatsa's inclination was that if a self exists, it is eternal, and if a self does not exist, it is annihilation. The Buddha regarded this intention, and therefore did not answer him. To speak of existence would contradict principle; to speak of non-existence would sever wholesome roots. The answer by setting aside [the question] is fully treated here.

30.18

Next, refuting the Sāṃkhya. They object, saying: "A self definitely exists, because activity necessarily depends on an agent of activity. For example, the activities of consciousness and the like, such as cognizing, necessarily depend on having a self as their basis before consciousness and the like can possess activities such as cognizing. That which is capable of cognizing is precisely the self. Just as Devadatta's walking necessarily depends on Devadatta—Devadatta being the self and walking being the activity—so we know that activity necessarily depends on a self."

30.19

The author of the treatise resolves this by explaining: "Devadatta's being able to walk does not mean there is an agent of walking distinct [from the body]. It is merely this Devadatta's moving and shifting, arising in continuum from here to there, that is called 'walking'; apart from Devadatta, there is no distinct walking. Yet when this walking occurs, the prior moment serves as cause, giving rise to the subsequent effect. The cause is the agent of walking; there is no distinct self. Just as Devadatta can walk, so consciousness can cognize. As Devadatta's body can serve as the cause of consciousness, worldly conventions also say that Devadatta can cognize. However, the noble ones, conforming to worldly convention, also speak of Devadatta as the one who can cognize." Another explanation says: Or, when consciousness arises in continuum regarding an object, the prior consciousness serves as cause, inducing the subsequent consciousness to arise; calling the prior causal consciousness the 'cognizer' is also without fault, because worldly convention refers to the cause as the agent. Just as bells and drums are called 'capable of sounding'—yet the sound is what is sounded, not the bells and drums; because bells and drums can produce sound, one says that bells and drums are capable of sounding, which is also speaking of the cause as the agent. Therefore, we know that the cause of consciousness is called the cognizer; apart from consciousness, there is no distinct self called the cognizer. Another explanation says: Or, just as a lamp can move, so consciousness can cognize. The continuum of the lamp-flame is called the lamp's moving; there is no distinct moving. Precisely when consciousness arises in continuum regarding an object, it is said to be able to cognize; apart from this, there is no cognizer.

30.20

The Sāṃkhya objects again: "If the subsequent consciousness arises from consciousness and not from a self, for what reason does the subsequent consciousness not constantly resemble the prior one, and why do minds of the three natures arise indeterminately? If there is a real self, this poses no problem. Because the self is sovereign, it can cause consciousness not to constantly resemble [the prior one] and to arise indeterminately; logically there is no problem."

30.21

The author of the treatise resolves this, saying: "Consciousness, due to the characteristic of change, causes the subsequent to differ from the prior. That is, the natural principle of all conditioned phenomena is subtle continuum, and by the power of the characteristic of change, the subsequent must differ from the prior, not because of a self. Were it not so, there would be no emergence from meditative absorption, because when entering absorption the continuum is similar; since there is emergence from absorption, we know that the subsequent moment must differ from the prior. Furthermore, the arising of minds definitely has a fixed order without any disorder, like the mutual arising of the twenty minds. Also, only minds that share a certain degree of mental mode can generate each other, because of differences in lineage. For instance, immediately following a woman's mind, there arises a mind of adorning the body, or a defiled mind arises, or a mind concerning her husband arises, or a mind concerning her child arises. When these minds arise, they definitely perfume and form seeds; later, from the transformation and differentiation of the continuum of these minds, a woman's mind arises again. In this way, a woman's mind can subsequently give rise to minds of adornment, defilement, and the like; minds differing from adornment, defilement, and the like cannot be produced. Hence we know that a woman's mind gives rise to [minds of] adornment, defilement, and the like. If it were a man's mind, it could not give rise to minds of adornment, defilement, and the like, because of differences in lineage. Although immediately following a woman's mind it is possible for minds of adornment, defilement, and the like to arise, among those of adornment, defilement, and the like, if one has arisen frequently before, and among those that have arisen frequently, if one is vivid, and among those that are vivid, if one has arisen recently—immediately following the woman's mind, that one will be induced first, because the power of cultivating such a mind is strong."

30.22

The Sāṃkhya objects again: "If there is one whose power of cultivation is strongest, why does it not constantly produce its own fruit?"

30.23

The author of the treatise answers, saying: "Because this mind has the characteristics of duration and change, it does not constantly produce its own fruit. These characteristics of duration and change are most compliant in the continuum of minds arising from distinct cultivation."

30.24

From here, the author of the treatise defers to the World-Honoured One, which corresponds to the fourth section, on the unfathomable characteristics of causes. The treatise says: "I have briefly explained the general principles of the causes and conditions for the sequential arising of the various classes of minds; thorough and exhaustive comprehension belongs solely to the World-Honoured One, because he has mastery of knowledge regarding all phenomena." Therefore, a verse says:

30.25

"Regarding the circle of a single peacock's feather,
The characteristics of the causes of all varieties
Are not the domain of any other's knowledge;
Only the Omniscient One knows them."

30.26

Explanation: The circle of a peacock's feather has all kinds of distinctions, such as blue, yellow, and so on. By what causes are all these varieties produced? Such characteristics of causes are not within the domain of others; only a Buddha can know them. Even the causes of the differentiations of form are difficult to understand, how much more could the distinct causes and conditions of formless phenomena, the mind and mental factors, be easy to comprehend?

30.27

From here is the fifth section, on the sequence of karmic arising. First an objection, then clarification, next refuting the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika objects, saying: "If there is truly no self, and karma has already perished, how can it again produce future fruits?"

30.28

The author of the treatise answers, saying: "Future fruits do not arise from perished karma. Although the karma has already perished, the seeds still remain; it is solely from the efficacious capacity of the continuum, transformation, and differentiation of the karmic seeds that future fruits arise. It is just as in the world a fruit arises from a seed, yet the fruit does not arise from an already perished seed, nor does it arise immediately from the seed; rather, only from the efficacious capacity of the continuum, transformation, and differentiation of the seed can the fruit arise. That is, the seed produces a sprout, the sprout produces a stem, the stem produces a leaf, the leaf produces a flower, and the flower comes last, whereupon it induces the fruit to arise."

30.29

The Vaiśeṣika objects again: "If so, why is it said that fruit arises from a seed?"

30.30

The author of the treatise answers, saying: "Strictly speaking, the fruit is solely the capacity of the flower. Because the prior seed serves successively as cause, inducing the capacity to produce the fruit within the flower, with reference to the successive cause it is said that the seed produces the fruit. Therefore, because this capacity to produce the fruit within the flower was successively induced by the prior seed, the characteristics of the produced fruit resemble the seed. Now, karma producing a fruit is also like an external seed: with karma preceding, it perfumes and forms seeds; through continuum and transformation, differentiated fruits arise."

30.31

The Vaiśeṣika asks: "What is meant by 'continuum, transformation, and differentiation'?"

30.32

The author of the treatise answers, saying: "With karma preceding, seeds are perfumed into matter and mind; these very seeds having no interruption within is called 'continuum'. This very continuum arising in subsequent moments differing from the preceding ones is called 'transformation'. This very transformation having a superior capacity that produces the fruit at the very end, surpassing other transformations, is called 'differentiation'."

30.33

Due to this question and answer, the prior [ripening of] fruits is explained, which corresponds to the fifth section. For example, at the time of death, although the mind of consciousness bears many seeds that will bring about future fruits, there are summarily three kinds of such karmic seeds that can induce fruits first: First, the extremely heavy—like being in debt, the strongest pulls first. Second, the recently performed—such as encountering good or bad spiritual companions at the point of death, the good or evil that arises will induce its fruit first. Third, the frequently performed—that is, karma that one has frequently performed throughout life can induce its fruit first. Therefore, the Sautrāntika master has this verse:

30.34

"Karma that is extremely heavy, recently arisen,
Frequently practiced, or done earlier—
Each preceding one matures before the next,
Transmigrating in saṃsāra."

30.35

Explanation: First, extremely heavy karma brings about vipāka first. Second, recently arisen karma brings about vipāka first. Third, frequently performed karma brings about vipāka first. If karma is light or the like, it brings about later ripening; by the power of such karma, one transmigrates in saṃsāra.

30.36

From here is the sixth section, that karmic retribution is difficult to know. This is the author of the treatise deferring to the World-Honoured One: that seeds perfumed by karma undergo continuum and transformation, and upon reaching such and such stages produce such and such fruits, is realized and known only by the Buddha, not being the domain of others. Therefore, the Sautrāntika master has this verse:

30.37

"This karma and this perfuming,
Yielding fruit upon reaching this time,
The fixed principle of all varieties,
None can know apart from the Buddha."

30.38

Explanation: When karma arises, it definitely perfumes and forms seeds; this karma and this seed can yield their fruit upon reaching this time. This fixed principle of seeds can be known only by the Buddha. The six sections of the main body of the text above are now concluded.

30.39

From here is the second [major part], the dissemination. Within this are three: first, praising the path and exhorting relinquishment; second, praising the path [which blind eyes] cannot see; third, briefly revealing [the path] and exhorting study.

30.40

Now this is the first. The verse says:

30.41

"Already well-spoken is this path of pure causes,
Namely, the supreme words of the Buddha, the true nature of phenomena;
One should abandon the blind external attachments,
And, for what wrong views have wrought, seek the eye of wisdom."

30.42

Explanation: [The line] "Already well-spoken is this path of pure causes" states praise of the path. Nirvāṇa is called 'pure'. This path of non-self can realize nirvāṇa, and is called the 'path of pure causes'. Attachment to self has been refuted, and the principle of non-self established; hence it is called 'well-spoken'.

30.43

[The line] "Namely, the supreme words of the Buddha, the true nature of phenomena" explains the preceding statement. The teaching of non-self is the supreme word of the Buddha; the principle of non-self is the true nature of phenomena. Both the teaching and the principle are causes of nirvāṇa, the path of pure causes.

30.44

[The lines] "One should abandon the blind external attachments, / And, for what wrong views have wrought, seek the eye of wisdom" exhort relinquishment. The views grasped by tīrthikas are called 'wrong views'; lacking the eye of wisdom is termed 'blind'. Turning one's back on the path of cessation, they become causes of transmigration; abandoning them is indeed excellent.

30.45

From here is the second, praising the path [which blind eyes] cannot see. The verse says:

30.46

"This broad and sole path to the palace of nirvāṇa,
Trod by a thousand noble ones, is the nature of non-self;
Illumined by the light of the sun-like words of the Buddhas,
Though opened, dim eyes cannot see it."

30.47

Explanation: The principle of non-self leads to the palace of nirvāṇa; this broad and sole path is trodden by a thousand noble ones. The correct teaching of non-self is the sun of the Buddhas, meaning that its teaching dispels darkness like the blazing sun. Relying on the teaching to reveal the principle is called being illumined by its light, which is the efficacy of the path. The evil eyes of tīrthikas are called 'dim eyes'; how could they behold the sun of non-self?

30.48

From here is the third, briefly revealing [the path] and exhorting study. The verse says:

30.49

"Herein the general principles have been briefly spoken,
To open the poisoned-arrow entry of wisdom for the wise,
Hoping that each according to their own capacity
Will fully awaken to the knowable and accomplish supreme deeds."

30.50

Explanation: The general principles of non-self have already been briefly spoken by me to open the poisoned-arrow entry of wisdom for the wise. Just as when the body is slightly scratched and a little poison is applied, in an instant the vapor of the poison pervades the entire body—this treatise is also like that: opening a slight gate of wisdom, all persons of wisdom are able to awaken and enter deeply; hence it is called the 'poisoned-arrow entry of wisdom'. This poisoned-arrow entry of wisdom universally exhorts people to practice, hoping that each according to the capacity of their three vehicles will fully awaken to what is to be known and definitely accomplish supreme deeds. Since its efficacy is such, how could one not study it!

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論頌疏論本 — Classical Chinese