俱舍論頌疏論本 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.1

From here is the third major section, explaining causes and conditions, which contains two parts: first, explaining the six causes; second, explaining the four conditions.

Within the direct explanation of the six causes, it is further divided into three: first, directly explaining the essence of the causes; second, explaining how causes obtain fruits; third, explaining how dharmas arise from causes.

6.3

Under the first part, directly explaining the essence of the causes, the text has three sections: first, general presentation of the names; second, distinct clarification of their essences; third, analysis according to the three periods of time.

6.4

First, regarding the general presentation of the names, the treatise states: 'Having thus spoken of the factors disassociated from thought, it was stated earlier that the characteristic of arising gives rise to the dharma that is produced, not without the concurrence of the remaining causes and conditions. Among these, what dharmas are spoken of as causes and conditions? (This is the general question.) First, causes are of six kinds (general answer). What are the six? (Specific question.)' The verse states:

6.5

"Efficient, coexistent,
Homogeneous, and associated,
Universal, and ripening:
Causes are accepted as only of six kinds."

6.6

The commentary explains: The first three lines of the verse list the names of the six causes, and the fourth line concludes by returning to their own school. 1. Efficient cause (kāraṇahetu), 2. coexistent cause (sahabhūhetu), 3. homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), 4. associated cause (samprayuktakahetu), 5. universal cause (sarvatragahetu), and 6. ripening cause (vipākahetu); these will be explained below. Schools such as the Sautrāntika do not accept the six causes, because no sūtra speaks of them; they accept the four conditions, because sūtras speak of them. However, within the Sarvāstivāda school, the great arhat Kātyāyanīputra contemplated in a quiet chamber and stated that there is a Sūtra of Six Causes transmitted by the devas; this is not accepted by other schools. Thus the treatise states: 'The Abhidharma masters accept that causes are only of these six kinds.'

6.7

From here secondly, regarding the distinct clarification of their essences, since the six causes are distinct, the text is divided into six. First, regarding the efficient cause, the verse states:

6.8

"Except itself, everything else is efficient."

6.9

The commentary explains: 'Except itself' refers only to conditioned dharmas. When a conditioned dharma arises, its own entity is excluded, because an entity cannot be a cause for itself; hence it must be excluded. 'Everything else is efficient' directly clarifies the essence of the cause. When a conditioned dharma arises, all other dharmas apart from its own entity do not obstruct it, and are called efficient causes. Therefore, the word 'else' (yu) in the verse extends to all dharmas, meaning that both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas serve as the essence of the efficient cause. Thus the treatise states: 'All conditioned dharmas, excluding only their own entities, have all dharmas as their efficient causes, because there is no obstruction when they arise.' The explanation says: Explaining the efficient cause by the meaning of non-obstruction shows that the scope of the efficient cause is broad, encompassing all dharmas. The sovereign fruit (adhipatiphala) is narrow, being only conditioned dharmas. Because a cause is able to produce a fruit, it is called an efficient cause (kāraṇahetu); that which is capable of producing is itself the cause—this is a karmadhāraya compound. Question: 'According to this meaning, the remaining five causes could also be called efficient causes, since they can all produce fruits; why is this cause alone called efficient?' Answer: 'The treatise states: "Although the nature of the other causes is also that of an efficient cause, the efficient cause has no other distinct name. Just as with the visible-form base (rūpāyatana) and so forth, the general term serves as the specific name." The explanation says: The remaining five causes all have specific names, whereas the efficient cause alone lacks a separate name. Because it is differentiated from the other five causes, although this efficient cause bears a general designation, it receives this as its specific name.'

6.10

From here secondly, explaining the coexistent cause. The text is divided into two parts: first, directly explaining the coexistent cause; second, explaining that which conforms to the mind.

6.11

First, regarding the direct explanation of the coexistent [cause], the treatise states: 'Having thus explained the characteristics of the efficient cause, what are the characteristics of the second, the coexistent cause?' The verse states:

6.12

"Coexistent things are mutually effects,
Like the great [elements] and characteristics and what they characterize,
And the mind with respect to what conforms to the mind."

6.13

The commentary explains: 'Coexistent' means existing at the same time. 'Mutually effects' explains the coexistent cause. The treatise states: 'If dharmas are mutually virile fruits (puruṣakāraphala), those dharmas are mutually coexistent causes.' The explanation says: Possessing coexistent function, what is coexistent is itself the cause, hence called 'coexistent cause'—this is a karmadhāraya compound. Or, if the fruit and cause are coexistent, it means the cause of the coexistent—this is a tatpuruṣa compound.

6.14

In “as the great [elements], the marks and that which possesses the marks, and the mind in relation to the mind-concomitants,” it points out their entities. There are three categories of these: “As the great [elements]” refers to the four great elements, which are the first category. When these four great elements produce an effect, they mutually rely on one another to produce derived matter; therefore, in relation to one another, they are coexistence causes (sahabhū-hetu). “The marks and that which possesses the marks” is the second category. The “marks” are the four characteristic marks of conditioned phenomena. These four characteristic marks of phenomena and the phenomena possessing the marks are mutually effects of one another, which means that these active markers mark that which is marked, and further, because of that which is marked, the active markers can function; therefore, they are mutually effects and are termed coexistence causes. “The mind in relation to the mind-concomitants” is the third category. That is, the primary mind and the phenomena concomitant with the mind are also mutually effects of one another. The treatise says: “Thus, coexistence causes, through being mutually effects, comprehensively encompass conditioned phenomena according to their propriety.” The commentary explains: This concludes the three categories above. “According to their propriety” means that among conditioned phenomena there are five [pairings]: first, the four great elements in relation to one another; second, the marks and that which possesses the marks in relation to each other; third, the four marks among themselves; fourth, the mind and the mind-concomitants in relation to each other; fifth, the concomitants among themselves. All of these are coexistence causes, which is why it says 'according to their propriety.' Furthermore, the treatise says: “A phenomenon and its secondary marks are not mutually effects, yet the phenomenon is a coexistence cause for its secondary marks, but not the secondary marks for the phenomenon; this should be analyzed here.” The commentary explains: This passage is where the author of the treatise points out that the Sarvāstivāda has a flaw in explaining the coexistence cause through the meaning of 'mutually being effects.' The “phenomenon” is the phenomenon possessing the marks. The “secondary marks” are the four minor marks. The phenomenon is not marked by the minor marks, so the phenomenon is not the effect of the minor marks. The minor marks function due to the phenomenon, so the minor marks are the effect of the phenomenon; thus it says that the phenomenon and the secondary marks are not mutually effects. However, that the phenomenon is a coexistence cause for the secondary marks is because the secondary marks function dependent on the phenomenon. That the phenomenon is a coexistence cause for the secondary marks, but not the secondary marks for the phenomenon, is because the secondary marks do not mark the phenomenon possessing the marks; therefore, the secondary marks are not coexistence causes in relation to the phenomenon. Since the phenomenon and the secondary marks are not mutually effects and yet are termed coexistence causes, how can one now explain the coexistence cause through the meaning of 'mutually being effects'? 'This should be analyzed here' is an encouragement to explain and resolve this.

6.15

From here, the second part explains what is concomitant [with mind]. There are two parts within this: first, explaining the entity of the concomitants; second, explaining the meaning of being concomitant.

6.16

First, to explain the entity of the concomitants, the treatise says: “What are called phenomena concomitant with the mind?” The verse states:

6.17

“Mental factors, the two moral disciplines,
Their marks and the marks of the mind:
These are phenomena concomitant with the mind.”

6.18

Commentary: The first two lines distinguish the entities, and the third line concludes. What are called “mental factors” are the forty-six mental factors. What are called “the two moral disciplines” are the two kinds of discipline, namely, the meditative (dhyāna) and the undefiled (anāsrava) moral disciplines. These two moral disciplines exist when entering concentration and do not exist when emerging from concentration; hence they are named concomitant with the mind.

6.19

“Their marks and the marks of the mind”: “Their” refers to the aforesaid mental factors and the two disciplines. “And the mind” refers to the primary mind. Taking the four marks such as arising on those phenomena and the four marks such as arising on the primary mind, they are named “the marks”; therefore, the words “the marks” apply generally to the marks on those [mental factors and disciplines] and on the primary mind. These phenomena are called concomitant with the mind. As in the three categories above: first, mental factors; second, the disciplines of meditative absorption and the path; third, the marks—these are the phenomena that are concomitant.

6.20

From here, the second part explains the meaning of being concomitant. The treatise says: “How are these phenomena called concomitant with the mind?” The verse states:

6.21

“Due to time, effect, good and the like.”

6.22

Commentary: “Due to time”: time has four varieties: first, arising; second, abiding; third, cessation; fourth, falling within the same period of time. Arising is in the future; abiding and cessation are in the present. If a future phenomenon has not yet reached the mark of arising, and for past phenomena, they are not subsumed by the three marks; therefore, apart from arising, abiding, and cessation, “falling within the same period of time” is separately stated. Although these four marks differ, they are all subsumed under time: that is, the aforesaid concomitants and this primary mind share the same arising, share the same abiding, share the same cessation, and fall within the same period of time; therefore they are termed “concomitant.” “Due to effect and the like”: “effect” refers to one effect, and “and the like” includes one maturation and one uniform outflow. That is, the aforesaid concomitants and the mind together obtain one effect, together induce one maturation, and together obtain one uniform outflow; hence they are named concomitant with the mind. This phrase “one effect” is intended to take the virile effect (puruṣakāra-phala) and the effect of disjunction (visaṃyoga-phala); hence, apart from maturation and uniform outflow, “one effect” is separately stated. However, there are four kinds of virile effect in all: 1. Co-arising virile effect, which again has two kinds: (1) the mutual virile effect of coexistence causes and associated causes; (2) and that obtained by other simultaneous activities. 2. Immediate virile effect, which again has two kinds: (1) that induced by the immediately antecedent condition; (2) and that obtained by other contiguous activities. 3. Interval virile effect, which again has two kinds: (1) the maturation effect; (2) like a farmer planting in spring and harvesting in autumn, an interval virile effect. 4. Unproduced virile effect, which refers to analytical cessation, whose entity does not arise. This phrase “one effect,” among co-arising virile effects, only takes that obtained by simultaneous activity. Among immediate ones, it excludes the immediate sequence of phenomena of the same nature—because the immediate sequence of the same nature is subsumed under uniform outflow—and takes the other immediate effect of a different maturation nature. Among interval effects, it excludes the maturation effect—because it is subsumed under maturation among the three effects—and takes the other distant interval virile effects, as well as taking the fourth, the unproduced virile effect. Therefore, the phrase “one effect” only subsumes the virile effect and the effect of disjunction. “Due to good and the like”: “and the like” includes unwholesome and indeterminate. That is, these concomitants are identical with the mind in being wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate in nature; hence they are named concomitant with the mind. The treatise says: “It should be known that here, the earlier 'one' and the later 'one' indicate simultaneousness and commonality, their meanings being distinct.” The commentary explains: The earlier mention of 'one' in time indicates being simultaneous at one time. The later mention of 'one' in effect indicates sharing one common effect. Due to these ten causes they are named concomitant with the mind: namely, the four kinds of time, the three kinds of effect and the like, and the three kinds of good and the like; these are the ten causes. The treatise says: “Here, the primary mind is at a minimum a coexistence cause for fifty-eight phenomena, namely, the ten omnipresent mental factors, their forty primary marks, and the eight primary and secondary marks of the mind, which are called fifty-eight phenomena. Among the fifty-eight, excluding the mind's four secondary marks, the remaining fifty-four are coexistence causes for the mind.” The commentary explains: The fifty-eight refers to the ten omnipresent mental factors such as sensation. On these ten phenomena there are four major marks each, making forty, which added to the previous makes fifty. The four primary marks and four secondary marks on the primary mind are eight, which added to the previous makes fifty-eight. The primary mind is a coexistence cause for these fifty-eight phenomena, and the fifty-eight phenomena are its virile effects. Among these fifty-eight, excluding the four minor marks on the primary mind, the remaining fifty-four phenomena are coexistence causes for the primary mind, and the primary mind is their virile effect; that is, the mind is not marked by the secondary marks, but the secondary marks can function depending on the mind; therefore, the secondary marks in relation to the mind are only effects, not causes. There are eight pairs of phenomena that are coexistent phenomena, but not coexistence causes. Hence the treatise says: “Whatever becomes a cause by virtue of being a coexistence cause is necessarily coexistent; but some are coexistent without becoming causes by virtue of being coexistence causes (this marks the proposition). Namely: all secondary marks in relation to their respective primary phenomena (this is the first pair: meaning the minor marks do not mark the primary phenomena; although coexistent with the primary phenomena, they are not coexistence causes); these secondary marks in relation to each other (the commentary explains: this is the second pair: meaning the secondary marks only mark their primary marks, they do not produce each other, and when viewed reciprocally they do not have the same single effect, etc.; thus although coexistent, they are not coexistence causes); of the phenomena concomitant with mind, the secondary marks in relation to the mind (the commentary explains: this is the third pair: on the phenomena concomitant with mind, the four minor marks in relation to the primary mind do not have the same effect, etc., and are not coexistence causes); these secondary marks in relation to one another (this is the fourth pair: among the secondary marks on the phenomena concomitant with mind, they are not mutually effects, so in principle they are not causes); all simultaneously arising derived matter possessing resistance, in relation to one another (the commentary explains: this is the fifth pair: as visible forms, sounds, and the like are derived matter possessing resistance; although coexistent, they do not have the same single effect, etc., and are not coexistence causes); a fraction of simultaneously arising derived matter lacking resistance, in relation to one another (the commentary explains: this is the sixth pair: matter lacking resistance refers to the non-communicating form of the prātimokṣa precepts; although the non-communicating forms of the seven limbs exist simultaneously, because in relation to one another they do not share the same single effect, etc., they are not coexistence causes; the word 'a fraction' restricts this away from the two kinds of resistance-lacking forms of meditative absorption and the path); all simultaneously arising derived matter and great elements, in relation to one another (the commentary explains: this is the seventh pair: derived matter is what is created; the great elements are what create; the creators and the created in relation to one another do not share the same single effect, etc., and are not coexistence causes); all simultaneously arising possessions and what is possessed, in relation to one another (the commentary explains: this is the eighth pair: the possession co-arising with a phenomenon and the phenomenon possessed exist simultaneously, but this possession may arise before, after, or simultaneously, and because it is variable, they are not coexistence causes).”

6.23

From here, the third part explains the cause of homogeneous class (sabhāga-hetu). The treatise says: “Thus the characteristic of the coexistence cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the third, the cause of homogeneous class?” The verse states:

6.24

“The cause of homogeneous class is similar,
Arising prior within its own category and stage.
The path mutually across nine stages,
Yields an effect only equal or superior.
Those born of practice are also like this:
Those accomplished through learning, reflection, and so forth.”

6.25

Commentary: “The cause of homogeneous class is similar”: this means that the wholesome five skandhas in relation to the wholesome five skandhas reciprocally serve as causes of homogeneous class (the word “reciprocally” means, for example, the form skandha is a cause for form and a cause for the other four skandhas; the other four skandhas, in relation to form and so forth, can all likewise be termed causes). The defiled in relation to the defiled, and the indeterminate in relation to the indeterminate, across the five skandhas should be known to be likewise. The phrase “are likewise” means that, identical to the wholesome five skandhas above, they also reciprocally serve as causes.

6.26

“Arising prior within its own category and stage”: The words “within its own category” mean that among similar phenomena, one only takes its own category as a cause of homogeneous class; not all similar phenomena are causes of homogeneous class. “Category” refers to the five categories, namely, that which is abandoned by the vision of suffering up to that which is abandoned by cultivation. Here, that which is abandoned by the vision of suffering only serves as a cause of homogeneous class for that which is abandoned by the vision of suffering, up to that which is abandoned by cultivation only serving as a cause of homogeneous class for that which is abandoned by cultivation. The words “its own stage” exclude other stages within its own category. Within its own category, one only takes its own stage as a cause of homogeneous class, not other stages. “Stage” refers to the nine stages, namely, the desire realm, the four dhyānas, and the four formless attainments. For example, what is abandoned by the vision of suffering in the desire realm only serves as a cause of homogeneous class for the desire realm, up to the peak of existence (bhavāgra) only serving as a cause of homogeneous class for the peak of existence; because the category-bindings of defiled phenomena are fixed, across different stages there is no causation. “Arising prior” means that within its own stage, one only takes what has arisen prior as a cause of homogeneous class. The past viewed relative to the present and future is called “arisen prior”; the present viewed relative to the future is called “arisen prior”; therefore, the words “arisen prior” only apply to the past and the present. If it belongs to the past period of time, it serves as a cause of homogeneous class for the present and the future; if it belongs to the present period of time, it serves as a cause of homogeneous class for the future.

6.27

Regarding "the path mutually [among] the nine stages": what was previously said about "one's own stage" was stated based on the conditioned with out-flows (sāsrava). In the case of the undefiled (anāsrava) path, when the nine stages are viewed in relation to one another, they are all mutually similar causes (sabhāgahetu) for one another. The "nine stages" refer to the preliminary (anāgamya), the intermediate (dhyānāntara), the four dhyānas, and the three formless [absorptions]. Generating the undefiled path based on these nine stages, each and every one serves as a cause for the nine stages. Arising in reliance upon the preliminary stage, the undefiled path can serve as a cause for the truth of the path in the nine stages, up to: arising in reliance upon the stage of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana), the undefiled path also serves as a similar cause for the nine stages. The treatise says: "These reside in all stages like guests; they are not subsumed within the realms (dhātu) and are not appropriated as their own by the craving (tṛṣṇā) belonging to those stages. Therefore, although the paths of the nine stages are not identical, they mutually serve as causes for one another because they are of the same kind." The explanation says: The undefiled is not bound to a realm; though it arises in various stages, it is like a guest residing [there]. Conditioned things with out-flows are appropriated by craving, and therefore fall within the subsumption of the realms. Undefiled phenomena are not appropriated as their own by the craving of the nine stages, and therefore the undefiled path does not fall within the subsumption of the realms.

6.28

Regarding "only equal or superior as fruit": this sets apart distinctions. However, it can only serve as a cause for what is equal or superior, not as an inferior cause, because it is an undefiled path. That is, because it is produced by effort (prayogaja)—how could one make strenuous exertion and have an inferior phenomenon as the fruit? Therefore, it is a similar cause only for what is equal or superior. As an illustration, the patience with the knowledge of the phenomenon of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) that has already arisen is, for its part, a similar cause for the future patience with the knowledge of the phenomenon of suffering; this is an equal cause. If the patience with the phenomenon of suffering is a similar cause for the knowledge of the phenomenon of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñāna), up to the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna), this is called superior, because knowledge is superior to patience. Expanding this up to: all knowledges of non-arising are similar causes only for their equal kind, because there is no phenomenon superior to the knowledge of non-arising. Furthermore, the path of seeing (darśanamārga), the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), and the path beyond training (aśaikṣamārga) that have already arisen are, according to their order, similar causes for three, two, and one. The explanation says: The path of seeing is a cause for three: seeing, cultivation, and beyond training. The path of cultivation is a cause for two, excluding the path of seeing. The path beyond training is a cause for one, excluding the paths of seeing and cultivation. Furthermore, within this, paths of dull faculties are similar causes for both dull and sharp [faculties]; paths of sharp faculties are causes only for sharp paths. As in the case of those who follow through faith (śraddhānusārin), those resolved through faith (śraddhādhimukta), and the time-released (samayavimukta), their paths of liberation are, according to their order, similar causes for six, four, and two. The explanation says: The path of seeing has two noble persons: first, dull; second, sharp. The dull is called the one who follows through faith; the sharp is called the one who follows through phenomena (dharmānusārin). The path of cultivation has two noble persons: first, dull; second, sharp. The dull is called the one resolved through faith; the sharp is called the one who has attained vision (dṛṣṭiprāpta). The path beyond training has two noble persons: first, dull; second, sharp. The dull is called the time-released; the sharp is called the not-time-released (asamayavimukta). In reference to these three paths, there are altogether six noble persons. Now, the one who follows through faith is a cause for six. The one resolved through faith is a cause for four, excluding the two noble persons of the path of seeing. The path of the time-released is a cause for two, excluding the four noble persons of seeing and cultivation. If it is the path of the one who follows through phenomena, of the one who has attained vision, and of the not-time-released, they are, according to their order, similar causes for three, two, and one. The explanation says: The one who follows through phenomena is a cause for three, namely, following through phenomena, attaining vision, and the not-time-released. Attaining vision is a cause for two, excluding following through phenomena. The not-time-released is a cause for one, excluding following through phenomena and attaining vision. The treatise says: "The paths of superior stages are causes for inferior stages; how can they be called either equal or superior?" The explanation says: This questions the paths of the nine stages being causes for one another—the superior stage is superior and the inferior stage is inferior; if it is a cause for the inferior, then it would be a cause for what is inferior, not equal or superior. The treatise says: "Because of the growth of the cause, and because of faculties; that is, in the path of seeing and so forth, in the lowest of the low grades and so forth, in subsequent stages the cause progressively grows." The explanation says: This answers the preceding objection. It is not that stages being higher or lower makes the path and so forth superior or inferior. Even if based on an inferior stage, when viewed in relation to the path of a superior stage, there are two kinds of causes by which it can be termed superior: first, because of the growth of the cause; second, also because of faculties. Regarding "because of the growth of the cause": the passage from "that is, in the path of seeing and so forth" explains the growth of the cause. "And so forth" includes the path of cultivation and the path beyond training. In subsequent stages the cause progressively becomes more superior: that is, cultivation and beyond training are after the path of seeing, and the path beyond training is after the path of cultivation, which is called "subsequent." Furthermore, the path of seeing and so forth each have nine grades of paths, such as the lowest of the low grade and so forth. Among these nine grades and so forth, in subsequent stages the cause also becomes more superior. For instance, the path of seeing arising in a superior stage is a cause for the path of cultivation and so forth of an inferior stage; and the path of the lowest of the low grade and so forth of a superior stage is a cause for the path of the medium of the low grade and so forth of an inferior stage, because the cause grows in subsequent stages. The second, "because of faculties": the path of dull faculties of a superior stage is a cause for the path of sharp faculties of an inferior stage. The text of the treatise does not explain "faculties" because it is easily understood. Furthermore, the treatise says: "Although within a single mental continuum there is no possibility of the two paths of following through faith and following through phenomena arising together, that which has already arisen is a cause for the future." The explanation says: This text resolves an implicit objection. The intention of the implicit objection is to challenge the preceding "also because of faculties." For example, if within one bodily continuum the dull-faculty path of following through faith has already arisen, it is impossible to further arise the sharp-faculty path of following through phenomena; how could one say that the dull-faculty path of a superior stage is a cause for the sharp-faculty path of an inferior stage? Therefore it says: although within a single continuous body there is no possibility for the two paths to arise [together], that which has already arisen in a superior stage being a cause for the future following through phenomena in an inferior stage is logically without obstruction.

6.29

Regarding "and likewise for what is produced by effort": this explains that conditioned phenomena produced by effort with out-flows, identical to the undefiled previously, are similar causes only for what is equal or superior; hence it says "likewise."

6.30

Regarding "those accomplished through hearing, reflection, and so forth": this directly explains the entity of the good [produced by] effort. That is, "accomplished through hearing, reflection, and so forth": "and so forth" includes that accomplished through cultivation (bhāvanāmayī). Virtues accomplished through the causes of hearing, reflection, and cultivation are named as accomplished by them. These three wisdoms can only be generated after applying exertion and practice; they are called good [produced by] effort. A phenomenon accomplished through hearing is a similar cause for wisdom accomplished through hearing; this is called equal. A phenomenon accomplished through hearing is a similar cause for wisdom accomplished through reflection and cultivation; this is called superior. Reflection is a similar cause for reflection and cultivation, excluding what is accomplished through hearing, because hearing is inferior. Cultivation is a similar cause only for cultivation, excluding the two of hearing and reflection, because the two are inferior. In the desire realm there is no cultivation, because it is a stage of distraction. In the upper two realms there is no reflection, because at the very moment one turns the mind to reflect, one enters meditative absorption. In the formless realm there is no hearing, because there is no ear faculty. The text of the treatise explains the causes with reference to the three realms; it can be understood upon reading. This good produced by effort is grouped into nine grades: the lowest of the low grade is a cause for nine grades; the medium of the low grade is a cause for eight; up to the highest of the high grade, which is a cause only for the highest of the high grade, because the preceding inferior ones are excluded. For innately acquired (upapattilābhika) good phenomena, the nine grades viewed in relation to one another are mutually causes; the defiled is likewise. That is, for innately acquired good, either from an inferior grade the medium and superior grades arise, or from a superior grade the medium and inferior grades arise; since each is permitted to become manifest after [any other], the nine grades are able to be mutually causes. "Defiled is also thus" is stated on analogy with the innately acquired. Non-obscured neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta) [phenomena] have altogether four kinds: namely, born of maturation (vipākaja), modes of comportment (iryāpatha), crafts (śilpasthāna), and minds of magical creation (nirmāṇa); all of them, according to their order, are causes for four, three, two, and one. The explanation says: this is because the subsequent is superior to the preceding.

6.31

From here, fourth, is the explanation of the associated cause (saṃprayuktakahetu). The treatise says: "The characteristics of the similar cause have thus been explained; what are the characteristics of the fourth, the associated cause?" The verse says:

6.32

"The associated cause is definite:
Mind and mental factors having the same support."

6.33

The explanation says: As for the associated cause, the mind and mental factors must necessarily have the same support (āśraya) before they are called associated; therefore it says "is definite." The words "same support" show that they must have the same support (āśraya), the same object of apprehension (ālambana), the same aspect (ākāra), the same time (kāla), and the same operation (dravya); when these five characteristics are complete, they are called associated. The treatise says: "Here, the word 'same' indicates that the support is one. That is, if it is visual consciousness, using the eye faculty of this moment as support, the associated feeling and so forth also use this very eye faculty as support; up to: mental consciousness and its associated phenomena having the same support in the mental faculty—it should be known that it is also thus." The explanation says: Mind and mental factors having supports that are not different is what is called "one."

6.34

From here, fifth, is the explanation of the universal cause (sarvatragahetu). The treatise says: "The characteristics of the associated cause have thus been explained; what are the characteristics of the fifth, the universal cause?" The verse says:

6.35

"The universal refers to previous universal [defilements],
Which are the cause of defilement in the same stage."

6.36

The explanation says: "Universal" refers to the eleven universal proclivities (anuśaya), as well as the associated and co-existent phenomena. The eleven universal proclivities are: under the truth of suffering there are seven: the five views, doubt, and ignorance; under the truth of origin there are four: wrong view, clinging to views, doubt, and ignorance. These phenomena universally serve as causes for the defiled phenomena of the five categories (nikāya); hence they are called universal. "Universal is the cause" is an appositional compound (karmadhāraya). "Refers to previous universal": only taking previous arisen universal phenomena as causes; this "previous arisen" excludes the future period, penetrating only the past and the present.

6.37

Regarding "of the same stage": it does not serve as a cause for defiled phenomena of different stages. The treatise says: "Because these are common causes for defiled phenomena, they are established separately outside the similar cause; and because they are also causes for defiled phenomena of other categories. By the force of these, defiled phenomena of other categories and their retinues also arise and grow." The explanation says: Taking the fruits of the five categories as a universal cause is called a common cause. As for the similar cause, it is only the fruit of its own category, not a common cause. "Retinues" refers to phenomena associated with and co-existent with the afflictions.

6.38

From here, sixth, is the explanation of the maturation cause (vipākahetu). The treatise says: "The characteristics of the universal cause have thus been explained; what are the characteristics of the sixth, the maturation cause?" The verse says:

6.39

"The maturation cause is the unwholesome
And the wholesome, exclusively with out-flows."

6.40

The explanation says: Only the unwholesome and the wholesome with out-flows are maturation causes, because they are phenomena of maturation. Question: "For what reason does the indeterminate (avyākṛta) not incur maturation?" Answer: "Because its power is weak, like a rotten seed." Question: "For what reason does the undefiled not incur maturation?" Answer: "Because it lacks the moistening of craving, like a sound and solid seed without the moistening irrigation of water. Furthermore, it is not bound to a stage; how could it incur a maturation bound to a stage? Other phenomena possess both [characteristics], and therefore are able to incur it, like a sound and solid seed irrigated by water." Regarding "maturation" (vipāka): according to the Sarvāstivāda school, the cause is wholesome or unwholesome, and the fruit is indeterminate; ripening in a different nature (visabhāgaṃ pacyate) is termed maturation. The four causes such as the co-existent [cause] ripen only as similar kinds, meaning that cause and fruit share the same moral nature. The one efficient cause (kāraṇahetu) combines both similarity and difference in ripening, meaning it has fruits of the same nature and fruits of a different nature. Therefore, the maturation cause here ripens exclusively in a different nature; hence this one alone is named the maturation cause.

6.41

From here, section three of the major text explains the subsumption under the time periods (adhvan). The verse says:

6.42

"Universal and similar [causes are of] two time periods;
Three [causes are of] three time periods."

6.43

The explanation says: "Two time periods": universal and similar causes penetrate only two time periods, the past and the present. "Three [causes are of] three time periods": the three causes of maturation, association, and co-existence penetrate the three time periods. Since the verse does not state the locus of the efficient cause, by logical implication it should be known that it penetrates the three time periods and the non-temporal; the non-temporal refers to the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).

6.44

From here, section two of the major text explains causes obtaining fruits. Within this there are four: first, generally indicating the entity of the fruit; second, matching fruits against causes; third, distinctly showing the characteristics of the fruits; fourth, the time of the cause taking and giving [the fruit].

6.45

Now, first, generally indicating the entity of the fruit: The treatise says: "The distinction of the characteristics of the six causes and their determination in time periods have been explained; what are the fruits in relation to which they constitute causes?" The verse says:

6.46

"Fruits are the conditioned and disjunction;
The unconditioned has neither cause nor fruit."

6.47

Explanation: The upper line identifies the real entity, and the lower line resolves an objection. 'Results are conditioned and disjunction' explains the real entity. There are two kinds of results: first, conditioned [results], namely [the results of] human effort (puruṣakāra), predominance (adhipati), outflow (niṣyanda), and ripening (vipāka); because these are induced and produced by the six causes, they are called results. Second, disjunction (visaṃyoga), which has analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) as its nature; analytical cessation is called a result because it is realized through the path. The path is a realizing cause (prāpti-hetu), not a producing cause (janma-hetu); therefore, this realizing cause is not subsumed under the six causes.

6.48

'Unconditioned [phenomena] have neither cause nor result' resolves a doubt. The treatise states: 'If so, since unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be results, they should have causes, for it is only in relation to a cause that something can be called a result. Furthermore, since these unconditioned [phenomena] are admitted to be causes, they should have results, for it is only in relation to a result that something can be called a cause.' The explanation is: unconditioned [phenomena] are the result of disjunction, so they should be called 'having causes'. Unconditioned [phenomena] are efficient causes (kāraṇa-hetu), so they should be called 'having results'. To dispel this doubt, there is this verse. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no cause means they lack the six causes; that is, although the real nature of an unconditioned dharma is a result, it is a result that is realized, not a result induced and produced by the six causes, hence it is called 'having no cause'. That unconditioned [phenomena] have no result means they lack the five results; that is, unconditioned dharmas do not obstruct arising and are thus established as efficient causes, but because they are not what realizes, they have no result of disjunction; and because they lack the function of taking and giving, they have no conditioned results. Therefore, analytical cessation is a cause without result and a result without cause; the remaining two unconditioned [dharmas] are causes and not results; hence, all three unconditioned [dharmas] lack cause and result. The older translation's rendering 'unconditioned [phenomena] are neither cause nor result' is an error of translation. Unconditioned [dharmas] are efficient causes, so one cannot say they are 'not causes'. Unconditioned [dharmas] are the result of disjunction, so one cannot say they are 'not results'. 'Non-' (fei) negates its own nature; 'without' (wu) indicates the absence of another. Therefore one can say 'without', but cannot say 'non-'. The treatise states: 'For what reason is it not admitted that the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) serve as efficient causes for the result of disjunction (objection asserting it must have a cause)? Established as an efficient cause because of not obstructing arising, what could the path do with respect to the unconditioned, which has no arising (reply to the previous objection)? If so, whose result is it, and what is the meaning of result (explanation: this has two questions: first, since the path is not a cause, whose result is it? Second, if it has no cause yet is a result, what is the meaning of result)? It is the result of the path, because it is obtained through the power of the path (saying "result of the path" answers whose result it is; "obtained through the power of the path" answers the meaning of result). If so, the result of the path should only be acquisition (prāpti), for the path has efficacy regarding acquisition, not analytical cessation (explanation: "acquisition" refers to the acquisition of disjunction; since it is induced by the path, it should have efficacy). Not so, because the path's efficacy differs regarding acquisition and analytical cessation (the reply). How does the path have efficacy regarding acquisition (the interrogation)? Because it can produce it (the reply). Acquisition is conditioned, so the path can produce it. How does the path have efficacy regarding cessation (the interrogation)? Because it can realize it (the reply: because through the path one realizes analytical cessation). By this principle, although the path is not the cause of cessation, it may still be said that analytical cessation is the result of the path (the conclusion).'

6.49

From here, the second [part] clarifies matching results to their causes. The treatise states: 'The general explanation is complete. Among the results, which result should be stated as obtained from which cause?' The verse states:

6.50

'The result of the last cause is ripening; that of the first cause is predominance;
Similar and universal [causes result in] outflow; simultaneous and associated [causes result in] human effort.'

6.51

Explanation: 'The last cause' refers to the ripening cause (vipāka-hetu), because it is stated last among the six causes; the first result, that of ripening, is obtained from this cause. 'The first cause' refers to the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), because it is stated first among the six causes; the later result, that of predominance, is obtained from this cause. Because the efficient cause possesses predominant power, the result induced and obtained is called 'predominant'. The result of predominance is a dependent compound (tatpuruṣa). That is, the efficient cause does not obstruct dharmas, hence it receives the name 'predominant'. Alternatively, the efficient cause also possesses superior power, just as the ten bases and elements do regarding the five bodies of consciousness, and the karma of sentient beings does regarding the receptacle world. The 'ten bases' refer to the five faculties and five sense-objects directly producing the five consciousnesses. Furthermore, faculties such as the ear also have mutually predominant power to produce eye-consciousness, etc., because upon hearing, one then gives rise to the desire to see with pleasure. That is, hearing with the ear gives rise to the delight of seeing forms, whereupon eye-consciousness is produced; thus the ear faculty has predominant power and can produce eye-consciousness.

6.52

'Similar and universal [causes result in] outflow' means that these two kinds of causes obtain the outflow result (niṣyanda-phala).

6.53

'Simultaneous and associated [causes result in] human effort' means that simultaneous and associated causes obtain the result of human effort (puruṣakāra-phala). As for the result of human effort: the cause has an operation, like the activity of a man (puruṣa) in the world engaging in agriculture and the like, so the cause is called human effort. The result arises from the cause, so it is called the result of human effort. The result of human effort is a dependent compound (tatpuruṣa). It is like worldly expressions such as 'crow-foot medicinal herb' or 'mad-elephant general': the medicinal herb resembles a crow's foot, so it is named 'crow-foot'; the general crushes enemies like a mad elephant, so he is named 'mad-elephant'. They are named by metaphor; human effort is also like this. The treatise states: 'Does only this pair have the result of human effort, or do the others have it too (the question)? Some say the other causes also have this result, with the sole exception of the ripening [cause]. For the result of human effort arises simultaneously with the cause, or arises immediately without interval, whereas ripening does not (this master posits two kinds of results of human effort, simultaneous and immediate, hence excludes the ripening cause). Other masters say that this ripening cause also has a distant, separated result of human effort, just like the fruit gathered by a farmer (this master further posits a separated result of human effort, so it extends to ripening; sowing in spring and harvesting in autumn is a separated human effort).'

6.54

From here, the third [part] clarifies the characteristics of the results. The treatise states: 'What are the characteristics of the results such as ripening?' The verse states:

6.55

'Ripening is an indeterminate dharma, arising from sentient beings and from what is determined.
Outflow resembles its own cause; disjunction is cessation through discernment.
If arisen due to the power of that, this result is named human effort.
Excepting preceding conditioned dharmas, conditioned [dharmas] are the result of predominance.'

6.56

Explanation: 'Ripening is an indeterminate dharma' means that the ripening result exists only among the non-obscured indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta). 'Sentient beings' means that the ripening result does not extend to non-sentient beings. 'Arising from what is determined' means that the ripening result is produced by good and bad karma, hence called 'arising from what is determined'. Since the ripening result arises only from what is determined, one clearly knows it does not extend to outflow or nutrition (aupacayika), because the outflow result and what is nourished arise from all three moral natures; hence it does not extend to them. The above are the characteristics of the ripening result.

6.57

'Outflow resembles its own cause' means that the outflow result always resembles its own cause, namely resembling the similar cause (sabhāga-hetu) and universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu).

6.58

'Disjunction is cessation through discernment': 'cessation' is stopping; 'discernment' is analytical selection; that is, this analytical cessation is manifested through disjunction, so analytical cessation is used to explain the result of disjunction.

6.59

'If arisen due to the power of that, this result is named human effort' means that if a dharma is produced due to the power of that, it is called the result of human effort. For example, due to the power of a preparatory mind of a lower stage, contaminated or uncontaminated concentrations of higher stages arise; and due to the power of a pure concentration mind, an indeterminate mind of transformation arises; these are called results of human effort. Analytical cessation is called an unproduced result of human effort; because it is realized through the power of the path, it also receives the name of a result of human effort.

6.60

'Excepting preceding conditioned dharmas, conditioned [dharmas] are the result of predominance': when a conditioned dharma arises and other dharmas do not obstruct it, it is a predominant result; thus the predominant result consists only of conditioned dharmas. 'Excepting preceding' means that conditioned dharmas that have already arisen previously are not predominant results; when viewing the result in relation to the cause, it is either simultaneous or subsequent, and it is never the case that the result precedes and the cause follows; hence it says 'excepting preceding'. Repeating 'conditioned' refers to all remaining conditioned dharmas aside from those preceding; these remaining conditioned dharmas are either simultaneous with the cause or subsequent to the cause, and are called predominant results. The treatise states: 'Speaking of the result of predominance indicates a dependent compound (tatpuruṣa): the result of predominance. Question: "What is the difference between the two results, human effort and predominance?" Answer: "The name 'result of human effort' is applied solely with respect to an agent; the designation 'result of predominance' applies universally to this and the rest. Like what is fashioned by a craftsman: in relation to the craftsman who can fashion it, it obtains both names, result of human effort and of predominance; in relation to others who are not the craftsman, it is only a result of predominance."' Explanation: when a craftsman builds a house, the house in relation to the craftsman is a result of human effort and also a result of predominance. The house in relation to non-craftsmen is only a result of predominance, because non-craftsmen did not build the house, and with respect to non-craftsmen, the house is not a result of human effort.

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俱舍論頌疏論本 — Classical Chinese