中觀論疏 10.21

10.21

「復次經說涅槃」下，第二廣破邪涅槃申正涅槃。前長行發起，即引經為章門；下偈釋經，即釋章門。所以引經者，以一切外人不信論主之言故也。具二意：一明涅槃絕四句，即是破四句邪涅槃，申絕四句正涅槃也。二者內滅者，依《楞伽》，云實無外有無四境可滅，但自由內起四句心，見外境有四耳。今息內心四見，即是涅槃，故名內滅也。偈文二意：一對前略破邪涅槃，今明廣破邪涅槃。二者對前略申正涅槃，今廣申正涅槃。今此二門常具二義：破邪中即申正，申正中即破邪，無別有申正文也。所以然者，此論破有二門：一逈破門、二破邪即申正門。申正門中亦有二門：一逈申門、二申正即破邪門。上來多就逈破申門，此品帶破申門。若不信此門意，尋文自見也。所以破四句者，上辨橫絕百非，今明竪超四句，則於破申略盡。破四句應為四別，今以類例分為三章：初七偈破有無是涅槃、第二四偈破亦有亦無是涅槃、第三二偈破非有非無是涅槃。初七偈為二：前五偈別破有無是涅槃、第二兩偈合破有無是涅槃。五偈為二：初三偈破有是涅槃、次兩偈破無是涅槃。三偈即為三別：第一偈作老死相破、第二偈作有為破、第三作有受破。老死相破者，若破外道者，此破三有涅槃。如上三師，檀提欲有為涅槃，乃至計非想以無色有為涅槃。涅槃既是三有，便是老死。若破內法有所得義者，必言有於涅槃則是有得義，有所得義便是二十五有，故有老死也。若破地論師，亦麁可是有、妙可非有。又若有而非老死，應老死而非有；若老死必有，亦有必老死。又佛果有生，有生必有滅，則是有老死。彼若云：佛果生是常生，非三相中生；亦應常老，非三相中老。若言老是衰謝之法故無老者，亦應生是起動之法便無有生；若言常生非起動，亦應常老非衰謝。次地論師云：我性淨涅槃，古今常定，不起不滅，故無上過。問：既不起滅，有隱顯不？答：有隱顯。問：既其不生，亦應不顯。若取無惑妄為顯，亦取無惑妄為生。若生論體生，亦顯論體顯。既是有所得義，設有言通而理致終屈。問：此中但逈破有是涅槃，何處明申正涅槃非是有耶？答：宜細詳偈文。偈云「涅槃不名有」，此則帶申正而破邪也。長行意亦然。第二偈有為破者，若破外道義，既是三有，便是有為。破內義者，若執涅槃是有，則是有所得，有所得故不離有為。《智度論》三十一卷云「有人捨有為著無為，以著無為即成有為。」五十五卷云「汝無為從何而得？若因有為而得無為，亦因無為而得有為。若爾，此兩相因，即更相為，故皆是有為。」若破常義者，既稱妙有，應是妙為。若妙故非為，亦妙故非有。彼云：有是法體，為即是相。佛果是法體之有，已離生滅之相，故非是為。並云：若涅槃離相故非為者，亦應涅槃離始故非生。若始起故名生，亦始起故名為。又並：若有而非為，亦為而非有。長行云「以理推之無常法尚不有」者，現無常求尚無蹤，何況常不可見而是有耶？當知即是破有所得常義。舊人不應怪今難也。第三偈有受破者，若涅槃是有則是有受，受是煩惱根，何名涅槃？問：涅槃是有，云何名受？答：汝若作有解即受著有，若不作有解不應言有是涅槃，唯有此二義。下半明無第三。無第三者，無有不作受著而是有者。下諸受著門並作此三意也。《大品》云「菩薩得無受三昧，行亦不受乃至不受亦不受。」汝今乃受於有，此是受中之受，何謂無受？問：我妙有涅槃絕百非，故是不受。答：雖絕百非，心有此有，故終是受也。「問曰」下，生第二無是涅槃。前問、次答。問中前領有非、次立無是。若作二外道義者，前三外道同立有是涅槃，今一外道立無是涅槃。故《百論》云「外曰有涅槃是無」。若就內外義者，前明外道立三有為涅槃，今是內法數論小乘立滅三有為涅槃。若作大小乘論者，前是小乘立事斷無為，即是世諦名之為有；今立真空第一義諦名為涅槃。若今昔明之，前執今妙有、此執昔斷無。又外云：麁有妙有既非涅槃，無麁無妙應是涅槃也。答中兩偈為二：初相況破、次有受破。相況破者，有之與無並是諸見，有見既非，無見寧是？又有是初、無是後，則有是無本。本尚非，況末是耶？又有是妙有尚非，無是小乘斷無寧是？又有中有涅槃法尚非，無中無有法，云何是涅槃？又有是無本，本尚無；而無是有末，末寧有耶？又直云：有涅槃尚不可，況用無為涅槃耶？上半借有況無，即是以邪破邪；下半明涅槃俱離有無，則申正破邪。第二偈受著破者，還同前也。上受著有，今受著無。「問曰」下，生第二合破有無是涅槃。問：有無二句何故具離合二種破耶？答：有無是眾見之根、障正觀之本，斯病難破，故須二門。又小乘人謂無三有為涅槃，外道執三有是涅槃，此內外巨患，宜具離合二門。次答。問意云：外道計三有，非是涅槃；佛法明滅三有，復非涅槃者，離此二，何等是涅槃耶？又今日妙有、昔日斷無俱非者，離此以外更何處有涅槃耶？又有所得大乘人，聞有無非是涅槃，便謂真諦洞遣，故有無俱非；若然世諦，必應有也。又此是外難於內。若有無俱非，便是方廣。又有無俱非，行道安心置何處耶？出家何所求耶？又外人云：麁有妙有二有俱非，無麁無妙二無又非，何等是涅槃耶？「答曰」下，兩偈為二：初偈直釋、次偈引經證釋。直釋者，釋有無俱非之意。受於今昔大小內外等有無，即名生死；不受有無等，便是涅槃。又然受生死，既是生死，受於涅槃，涅槃亦成生死，受亦生死亦涅槃乃至五句，皆是生死；不受此五，方是涅槃。又受之五句皆是生死，不受之五並是涅槃，非但涅槃是涅槃，生死亦是涅槃。汝上言安心置何處者，正為汝欲心安置有無便非涅槃，故須洗有無耳。對汝有無，故言非有無耳，不言非有非無是涅槃也。故今明裁動心則生死，不動則涅槃。如《華嚴》云「流轉則生死，不轉即涅槃。」但對轉非，言不轉是。然了轉既非，不轉亦非，故非轉非不轉，可謂損之又損之。問曰：何故作此百千轉耶？答：斗藪眾生諸見耳，非是遣蕩也。然講《法華》云：小乘是化城，不知大亦是化城。望大故言小是化，望非大非小俱是化。乃至十地及以摩羅皆是化城，故空捲度一切也。第二偈引經證破。問：此品何故多引經耶？答：今欲論道，此言不易。又涅槃是眾聖所歸之本，此義若正則眾義自明，故須依經。又論將竟，明無自作之咎，始自八不終竟涅槃皆佛說也。不別標《般若》、《涅槃》等經，而通依經者，以一切大乘經顯道無二，故不須別而引。若別引，恐眾經意不同。假令是小乘經意，亦終同此說，如種種乘宗歸一乘也。明若有若無並皆被斷，則知有所得涅槃是無所得之生死，有所得佛是無所得罪過眾生。然既斷有斷非有者，亦斷妄不妄、斷常無常，萬義皆例。

From "Furthermore, a sūtra says of nirvāṇa" downward is the second [section]: broadly refuting erroneous nirvāṇa and elucidating correct nirvāṇa. The preceding prose introduction quotes the sūtra as the thematic heading; the verses below interpret the sūtra, thereby explaining the thematic heading. The reason for citing the sūtra is that non-Buddhists wholly disbelieve the treatise master's words. It contains two intentions: First, to clarify that nirvāṇa transcends the four propositions, which means refuting the erroneous nirvāṇa of the four propositions and elucidating the correct nirvāṇa that transcends the four propositions. Second, regarding "internal cessation," based on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, it is said that in truth there are no external four objective realms of existence and non-existence to be extinguished; it is merely that four-proposition thoughts arise spontaneously from within, and one perceives the external objects as fourfold. Now, setting to rest the four views of the internal mind is itself nirvāṇa; hence it is called "internal cessation." The verse text has two intentions: First, in contrast to the earlier brief refutation of erroneous nirvāṇa, here it broadly refutes erroneous nirvāṇa. Second, in contrast to the earlier brief elucidation of correct nirvāṇa, here it broadly elucidates correct nirvāṇa. Now, these two gates always possess two senses: within refuting error, the correct is elucidated; within elucidating the correct, error is refuted—there is no separate text for elucidating the correct. Why is this so? This treatise has two approaches to refutation: first, an approach of pure refutation; second, an approach where refuting error is itself elucidating the correct. Within the approach of elucidating the correct there are also two: first, an approach of pure elucidation; second, an approach where elucidating the correct is itself refuting error. Hitherto it has mostly proceeded according to the approach of pure refutation and pure elucidation; this chapter employs the approach that combines refutation and elucidation. If you do not believe the purport of this approach, examine the text and you will see it naturally. As for why the four propositions are refuted: above, it showed the horizontal cutting off of the hundred negations; now it clarifies the vertical transcending of the four propositions, whereby refutation and elucidation are basically exhausted. Refuting the four propositions should consist of four distinct parts; here, grouped by category, they are divided into three sections: First, seven verses refute that existence or non-existence is nirvāṇa. Second, four verses refute that both existence and non-existence is nirvāṇa. Third, two verses refute that neither existence nor non-existence is nirvāṇa. The first seven verses are divided into two: the first five verses individually refute that existence or non-existence is nirvāṇa; the second two verses jointly refute that existence and non-existence is nirvāṇa. The five verses are divided into two: the first three verses refute that existence is nirvāṇa; the subsequent two verses refute that non-existence is nirvāṇa. The three verses then comprise three distinctions: The first verse refutes it by the mark of old age and death; the second verse refutes it by its being conditioned; the third verse refutes it by its having grasping. As for refuting it by the mark of old age and death: if refuting non-Buddhists, this refutes the nirvāṇa of the three realms of existence. As with the three teachers mentioned above: Daṇḍika posits the desire realm as nirvāṇa, up to positing neither-conceptualisation as the nirvāṇa of the formless realm. Since nirvāṇa would thus be the three realms of existence, it would be subject to old age and death. If refuting the notion of apprehension within Buddhist doctrines: to maintain that there is nirvāṇa is an apprehension; that which is apprehended is just the twenty-five realms of existence, and hence subject to old age and death. If refuting the Dilun masters: coarse [existence] might be existence, and subtle [existence] might not be existence. Moreover, if it is existent yet without old age and death, there should be old age and death without existence; if old age and death necessarily entails existence, existence must also entail old age and death. Furthermore, the Buddha-fruit would have arising; that which has arising necessarily has cessation, and thus has old age and death. If they say: "The arising of the Buddha-fruit is permanent arising, not arising among the three marks [of conditioned phenomena]"—then it should also have permanent aging, not aging among the three marks. If they say that aging is a phenomenon of decay and decline and therefore does not exist [in the Buddha], then arising is an active phenomenon and so arising too would not exist; if they say permanent arising is not active, then permanent aging should likewise not be decaying. Next, the Dilun masters say: "Our nirvāṇa of pure intrinsic nature is eternally fixed from past to present, neither arising nor ceasing; therefore it lacks the above faults." Question: Since it neither arises nor ceases, does it have concealment and manifestation, or not? Answer: It has concealment and manifestation. Question: Since it does not arise, it should also not be manifested. If you take the absence of delusive afflictions as manifestation, you could also take the absence of delusive afflictions as arising. If arising is discussed in terms of substance arising, manifestation is also discussed in terms of substance manifesting. Since this is an apprehension, even if the phrasing seems sound, the principle is ultimately refuted. Question: Here it only purely refutes that existence is nirvāṇa; where does it clarify and elucidate that the correct nirvāṇa is not existent? Answer: One must carefully scrutinise the verse text. The verse says, "Nirvāṇa is not called existent"; this refutes the error while simultaneously elucidating the correct. The intention of the prose is also like this. As for the second verse refuting it as conditioned: if refuting the non-Buddhist view, since it is the three realms of existence, it is conditioned. If refuting the internal [Buddhist] view, if one clings to nirvāṇa as existent, then it is an apprehension; because it is an apprehension, it is not apart from the conditioned. Fascicle thirty-one of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Some people abandon the conditioned and attach to the unconditioned; by attaching to the unconditioned, it becomes conditioned." Fascicle fifty-five says: "From what is your unconditioned obtained? If the unconditioned is obtained dependent on the conditioned, the conditioned is also obtained dependent on the unconditioned. If so, these two are mutually dependent, and thus are mutually made; therefore, both are conditioned." If refuting the permanence view: since it is called "subtle existence," it should be "subtle conditionedness." If because it is subtle it is not conditioned, then because it is subtle it is not existent either. They say: "Existence is the substance of the dharma, and conditionedness is its mark. The Buddha-fruit is an existence of dharma-substance, already free from the marks of arising and ceasing; therefore it is not conditioned." We counter: If nirvāṇa is not conditioned because it is free from marks, nirvāṇa should also not be arising because it is free from a beginning. If it is called arising because it newly arises, it should also be called conditioned because it newly arises. Furthermore, we counter: If it is existent yet not conditioned, it should also be conditioned yet not existent. The prose says: "Reasoning through principle, impermanent dharmas do not even exist"—present impermanence, when sought, leaves no trace, so how could permanent [dharma], which is invisible, be existent? One should know that this precisely refutes the apprehended view of permanence. Former teachers should not be surprised at this present critique. As for the third verse refuting it through having grasping: if nirvāṇa is existent, it entails grasping; grasping is the root of afflictions, so how could it be called nirvāṇa? Question: Nirvāṇa is existent; why is it called grasping? Answer: If you form an understanding of existence, you grasp and attach to existence; if you do not form an understanding of existence, you should not say that existence is nirvāṇa—there are only these two options. The second half of the verse explains that there is no third alternative. Having no third alternative means there is none that is existent without forming grasping and attachment. The subsequent approaches regarding grasping and attachment all adopt these three meanings. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "A bodhisattva attains the samādhi of non-grasping, practicing yet not grasping, up to not grasping non-grasping." Now you actually grasp at existence; this is grasping within grasping—how could it be called non-grasping? Question: My nirvāṇa of subtle existence cuts off the hundred negations, and is therefore non-grasping. Answer: Although it cuts off the hundred negations, the mind holds onto this existence, so in the end it is grasping. From "The opponent asks" downward introduces the second [section]: non-existence is nirvāṇa. First comes the question, then the answer. In the question, first it accepts that existence is not [nirvāṇa], and next asserts that non-existence is. If explained according to the two non-Buddhists: the previous three non-Buddhists all asserted that existence is nirvāṇa; now one non-Buddhist asserts that non-existence is nirvāṇa. Thus the Śata-śāstra says: "The non-Buddhist says there is a nirvāṇa that is non-existence." If approached from internal and external teachings: previously it was clarified that non-Buddhists assert the three realms of existence as nirvāṇa; now it is the internal Abhidharma Hīnayāna asserting that the cessation of the three realms of existence is nirvāṇa. If explained according to Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna: previously it was the Hīnayāna asserting unconditioned cessation of phenomena, which is conventional truth and called existence; now it asserts true emptiness, the ultimate truth, as nirvāṇa. If explained in terms of the present and the past: previously they clung to the present subtle existence; here they cling to the past annihilative non-existence. Furthermore, the outsider says: "Since coarse existence and subtle existence are not nirvāṇa, the absence of the coarse and the absence of the subtle should be nirvāṇa." In the answer, two verses form two parts: first, refutation through comparison; second, refutation through having grasping. As for refutation through comparison: both existence and non-existence are views; since the view of existence is already incorrect, how could the view of non-existence be correct? Furthermore, existence comes first and non-existence comes after, so existence is the root of non-existence. If the root is already incorrect, how could the branch be correct? Moreover, subtle existence is already incorrect; how could the Hīnayāna's annihilative non-existence be correct? Moreover, if a dharma of nirvāṇa existing within existence is already incorrect, how could there be nirvāṇa when there is no existent dharma within non-existence? Moreover, existence is the root of non-existence, and the root is already non-existent; while non-existence is the branch of existence, so how could the branch exist? Or simply: even an existent nirvāṇa is inadmissible, so how much less can one take non-existence as nirvāṇa? The first half of the verse uses existence to compare with non-existence, which is using error to refute error; the second half clarifies that nirvāṇa is free from both existence and non-existence, thereby elucidating the correct and refuting the erroneous. The second verse refuting through grasping and attachment is the same as before: previously one grasped and attached to existence; now one grasps and attaches to non-existence. From "The opponent asks" downward introduces the second [section]: jointly refuting that both existence and non-existence is nirvāṇa. Question: Why are the two propositions of existence and non-existence subjected to both separate and joint refutations? Answer: Existence and non-existence are the roots of all views, the foundation obstructing correct contemplation; this disease is difficult to eradicate, so two approaches are required. Moreover, Hīnayāna practitioners deem the absence of the three realms of existence to be nirvāṇa, while non-Buddhists cling to the three realms of existence as nirvāṇa; this is a immense affliction for both internal and external traditions, so both separate and joint approaches are appropriate. Next is the answer. The import of the question is: "The non-Buddhists posit the three realms of existence, which is not nirvāṇa; the Buddha's Dharma clarifies the cessation of the three realms of existence, which is also not nirvāṇa—apart from these two, what is nirvāṇa? Furthermore, if today's subtle existence and the past's annihilative non-existence are both incorrect, apart from these where else is there nirvāṇa?" Moreover, Mahāyāna practitioners who hold apprehensions, hearing that existence and non-existence are not nirvāṇa, assume that the ultimate truth thoroughly dispels them and thus both existence and non-existence are negated; if so, within conventional truth, they must exist. Furthermore, this is an outsider's objection against Buddhism: "If both existence and non-existence are negated, that is the Fangguang [view]. Furthermore, if both existence and non-existence are negated, where does one settle one's mind in practicing the Way? What does one seek in renouncing household life?" In addition, the outsider says: "If both coarse existence and subtle existence are negated, and the non-existence of the coarse and the non-existence of the subtle are also negated, what is nirvāṇa?" From "The master answers" downward, two verses form two parts: the first verse directly explains; the second verse cites a sūtra as proof. As for directly explaining: it explains the rationale for negating both existence and non-existence. Grasping at the existence and non-existence of present and past, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, internal and external, is termed saṃsāra; not grasping at existence and non-existence is nirvāṇa. Furthermore, grasping at saṃsāra is saṃsāra; grasping at nirvāṇa turns nirvāṇa into saṃsāra as well; grasping at both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, up to the five propositions, is entirely saṃsāra; not grasping at these five is truly nirvāṇa. Moreover, grasping at the five propositions is wholly saṃsāra; not grasping at the five is wholly nirvāṇa—not only is nirvāṇa nirvāṇa, but saṃsāra is also nirvāṇa. When you said above, 'Where does one settle one's mind?', it is precisely because your mind wishes to settle upon existence or non-existence that it is not nirvāṇa; therefore, existence and non-existence must be washed away. In response to your existence and non-existence, it is said to be neither existent nor non-existent; it does not say that neither existent nor non-existent is nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is now clarified that the slightest stirring of the mind is saṃsāra, while being unstirred is nirvāṇa. As the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: 'Revolving is saṃsāra; not revolving is nirvāṇa.' Only in contrast to revolving being wrong is it said that not revolving is right. But when one understands that revolving is already wrong, not revolving is also wrong; hence it is neither revolving nor not revolving—this can be called decreasing it and further decreasing it. Question: Why make these hundreds of thousands of shifts? Answer: Simply to shake out the various views of sentient beings; it is not mere nihilistic clearing away. However, those lecturing on the Lotus Sūtra say that the Hīnayāna is the conjured city, not knowing that the Mahāyāna is also a conjured city. Relative to the great, the small is said to be conjured; relative to neither great nor small, both are conjured. Even the ten bhūmis and the amala[-vijñāna] are conjured cities; therefore, emptiness rolls up and delivers all. The second verse cites a sūtra to verify the refutation. Question: Why does this chapter quote sūtras so frequently? Answer: Now wishing to discuss the Way, these words are not easy. Moreover, nirvāṇa is the foundation to which all sages return; if this doctrine is rectified, all doctrines become self-evident, so one must rely on the sūtras. Furthermore, as the treatise draws to a close, to show there is no fault of personal invention, from the eight negations at the beginning to nirvāṇa at the end, all are the Buddha's preaching. Rather than specifically citing the Prajñā, Nirvāṇa, and other sūtras, it relies generally on sūtras because all Mahāyāna sūtras reveal that the Way is without duality; hence there is no need to cite them individually. If cited individually, one might fear the sūtras' intents differ. Even if it were the intent of Hīnayāna sūtras, it would ultimately agree with this teaching, just as the various vehicles return to the Ekayāna. Clarifying that both existence and non-existence are completely severed makes it known that an apprehended nirvāṇa is an unapprehended saṃsāra, and an apprehended Buddha is an unapprehended transgressive sentient being. Since one severs existence and severs non-existence, one also severs delusion and non-delusion, permanence and impermanence; all ten thousand doctrines follow this pattern.