中觀論疏 3.20.4

3.20.4

二眾緣中無自性，亦無餘之三性，三無自可待，故無有三。 「如諸法自性不在於緣中」者，此文可以三義釋之：一約就緣假破、二對緣假破、三並決破。 就緣假破者，就眾緣內撿無有自，如五陰內無人、四微內無柱。 尚無有自性，云何言從自性生耶？ 二對緣假者，借於緣自牙兩斥之，若有自性則不假緣，若必假緣則無自性。 三並決破者，既本有自體不假緣有，亦應自體本生不假緣生也。 而言如諸法者，若諸法實有性而言無性者，則不如諸法； 今實無性而言無性，故言如諸法也。 則顯外人計有自性，不如諸法矣。 又還就汝五陰緣中無有人體性，故云如諸法也。 「以無自性故」者，下半非是破他，乃顯不須破他耳。 所以不須破他者，以自無故他即無，即詺此為破他亦得也。 就緣中既無自性，指自為他即無他性，指自他為共即無共性，指有者為無即無無因性。 此是切論無四句，並就果門辯無四句也。 若奢論，待於人自故有五陰之他，既無人自，何所待故有陰他耶？ 合人與陰名之為共，竟無人自陰他，云何有共耶？ 人自因人、復因於陰，名為有因； 竟無此二因，云何有無因耶？ 又作一勢釋，此偈上半借緣破自，下半借自破緣。 上半借緣破自，明有眾緣則無有自； 下半明無自故則無眾緣。 借緣以破自，此是借有以破無； 借自以破緣，借無以破有，故云自無故他亦無也。 又一勢釋，此偈寄捲指顯之。 捲由指有，故捲無自性。 若言由指有捲故是他性者，是亦不然。 指望捲不得是他，以更無別體故也。 若捲望指為他，而捲由指； 捲望柱是他，應從柱有。 故得他則失自、得自則失他。 又捲於捲是自，而捲無自性； 指於指是自，指亦無自性，無自性則無指，云何以指而為捲他？

Second, within conditions there is no self-nature, nor are there the remaining three natures; third, there is no self to be depended upon, and therefore there are no three [others]. As for 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions': this line can be explained through three meanings: first, refutation based on provisionality through conditions; second, refutation confronting provisionality through conditions; third, refutation by equivalent deduction. Refutation based on provisionality through conditions: examining within the conditions, there is no self, just as within the five aggregates there is no person, and within the four subtle atoms there is no pillar. When there is not even a self-nature, how can one say that it arises from self-nature? Second, confronting provisionality through conditions: using the conditions, self, and sprout, we dismiss both: if there were a self-nature, it would not depend on conditions; if it must depend on conditions, it has no self-nature. Third, refutation by equivalent deduction: since having an inherent self-substance would not depend on conditions to exist, it would also follow that the self-substance inherently arises without depending on conditions to arise. And in saying 'as [with] phenomena': if phenomena genuinely had intrinsic nature and one said they lacked it, that would not accord with phenomena; but now they truly lack intrinsic nature and one says they lack it, hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. This shows that the heterodox notion of an intrinsic nature does not accord with phenomena. Furthermore, turning back to your conditions of the five aggregates, there is no substance or nature of a person; hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. As for 'because of lacking self-nature': the lower half [of the verse] is not a refutation of 'other', but rather reveals that there is no need to refute 'other'. Why is there no need to refute 'other'? Because since self is non-existent, other is non-existent; thus calling this the refutation of other is also admissible. Since within conditions there is no self-nature, pointing to self as other means there is no other-nature; pointing to self and other as both means there is no both-nature; pointing to what exists as non-existent means there is no uncaused-nature. This is a rigorous discussion of the non-existence of the four propositions, and in each case demonstrates the non-existence of the four propositions from the standpoint of the fruit. In a broader discussion: depending on the self of the person, there is the other of the five aggregates; since there is no self of the person, what is there to depend upon so that the other of the aggregates exists? Combining the person and the aggregates is called 'both'; since in the end there is neither a self of the person nor an other of the aggregates, how could there be 'both'? The self of the person is caused by the person, and is further caused by the aggregates, which is termed 'having a cause'; since in the end these two causes do not exist, how could there be 'uncausedness'? Explained from yet another perspective: the first half of this verse uses conditions to refute self, and the second half uses self to refute conditions. The first half uses conditions to refute self, clarifying that if conditions exist, then self does not exist; the second half clarifies that because self is non-existent, conditions are non-existent. Using conditions to refute self is using existence to refute non-existence; using self to refute conditions is using non-existence to refute existence; hence it says 'because self is non-existent, other is also non-existent.' Explained from yet another perspective: this verse is illustrated by taking a fist. A fist exists through fingers, so the fist lacks self-nature. If one says that because the fist exists through fingers it is other-nature, this is also not so. Fingers viewed from the perspective of a fist cannot be 'other', because there is no separate substance. If the fist viewed from the fingers is 'other', and the fist depends on fingers, then since the fist viewed from a pillar is 'other', it should arise from the pillar. Therefore, establishing 'other' loses 'self', and establishing 'self' loses 'other'. Furthermore, a fist in relation to a fist is self, yet the fist lacks self-nature; fingers in relation to fingers are self, yet fingers also lack self-nature; lacking self-nature, there are no fingers—how then could fingers be the 'other' to the fist?