中觀論疏 3.20.3

3.20.3

以自體只是自性，自性不可改，則應常生。 如〈業品〉云「受於果報已，則應更復受。 」汝若言自體生牙竟即滅無者，既已有還無，則應本無今有。 體既本無今有，牙亦本無今有，何得從本自體生？ 若本有自體則是常，常故常生無窮也。 此無因、無窮二難，具破由來二家義。 第一家釋無始無明云：以無有始於我者，故名無始。 此立無明有始義。 破云：第二念從第一念生，可得有因； 第一念既在初，則墮無因。 第二家云：無明無有始，故云無始無明。 若爾，第二念有始，初念復更從他生，此則無窮。 「自無他亦無」者，前自中具有四，以為兩雙：初雙自而非生、生便非自，次雙從則無窮、窮則無因。 他生亦然，他而非生，如牛馬梨㮈； 生而非他，如泥瓶蒲廗。 既從於他、復有從，從則無窮，窮則無因也。 三論破他有三門：一總門，一切法無非是自，自外無復有他，若破自即破他。 二相即，如他於他即是自，破自即破他。 三相待，可解。 「共生則有二過」，此破共有兩：一者明無有共。 本合自他名之為共，自他有故共有、自他無故共無。 二者縱有共生，便合兩過為共過也。 「無因」者，問：何人起無因計？ 答：鈍根人多起有因見，利根推斥起無因見。 又有所得人計因即是無因，以其立因不成，雖言有因即是無因也。 問：山門有無因義不？ 答：他因無因二唯是因，不得無因。 不得無因，豈成因耶？ 今只因是無因，故因無因不二也。 問：無因有幾種？ 答：有二種。 一者計無有於因，故名無因。 二者計有因是無因，如初章云「有有可有、有是自有」，故不因無也。 破無因事有四過：一常過、二理奪、三反並、四倒感果。 常過者，既不因緣合而生，亦不從緣離而滅。 不生不滅，故是常也。 又虛空不從因而是常者，萬物不從因亦應常也。 「是事不然」者，第二理奪破。 道理之中非是無因，故《大論》云「諸法實有因緣，但愚癡故不知。 」如人從扇求風、從木求火，豈是無因？ 「無因則無果」，第三反並破。 因無故果即無，亦應果有故因即有。 若無因有果，亦可無果有因也。 「若無因有果者」，第四倒感果破。 理實應云無惡因得惡果、無善因得善果，而今不得爾者，持戒之人無地獄因應生地獄，五逆之人無生天因應生天也。 復次「如諸法自性」，此偈望前偈可為三義：一者為利根唱四無生即解，今為鈍根重論不自生義。 又三偈可為三根：上根，聞佛八不即悟； 中根，聞論主唱四不生便解； 下根，待釋方悟。 二者上破非因緣自生義，故直云不自生。 今破因緣自生義，如毘曇有自性而假緣生，故文云「如諸法自性不在於緣」。 一切諸法自不出，不假緣自及假緣之自，故兩偈破之盡矣。 三者初偈正破自他等病生，後偈則申因緣假生。 故長行云「但眾緣和合故有名字」也。 問：何故不言初偈標章門、後偈釋章門。 答：青目不作標章及釋章故也。 今若作標章門、釋章門者，此是第二解釋章門。 論主前開四句釋八不，謂以論釋經； 今此偈釋前偈，謂以論釋論。 此偈中但釋不自，不釋餘三。 所以然者，龍樹牒八不釋一，餘七可明。 上雖標四，解一餘三可領。 問：何故爾耶？ 答：有四義。 一者欲顯一切法只是無生。 一切有所得並是生義，佛雖說八不，則束歸一無生。 如常云生起為生，只滅始起，何故非生？ 只生謝，復是滅，故知法起滅即是生。 又一切法中皆有心生，假令言四絕之理即有四絕心生，乃至聞想謂之言即有想謂心生，故於一切法中皆有心生。 今破生則一切想心不生，故悟無生法忍也。 二者一切眾生以有生故則有老病死繫縛等，今若息生則老病死便息，是故但明無生。 三者生法既無，餘七自壞。 四者既開四門破生，餘七亦類。 今偈亦三義：一者欲明自攝一切法，若無自體則一切法無。

Because self-substance is simply self-nature, and self-nature cannot be altered, it would have to arise perpetually. As the 'Examination of Karma' states: 'Having experienced retribution, / One would have to experience it yet again.' If you say that the self-substance, having produced the sprout, then ceases and becomes non-existent, then since that which already existed turns into non-existence, it would follow that what was originally non-existent now exists. Since the substance was originally non-existent and now exists, and the sprout was also originally non-existent and now exists, how could it arise from an original self-substance? If the self-substance existed originally, it would be permanent; and being permanent, it would arise perpetually without end. These two reductios—uncausedness and infinite regress—completely refute the positions of two traditional schools. The first school explains 'beginningless ignorance' by saying: 'Because there is nothing prior to me, it is called beginningless.' This establishes the position that ignorance has a beginning. The refutation states: The second thought-moment arises from the first thought-moment, so it can have a cause; but since the first thought-moment is at the very beginning, it falls into uncausedness. The second school says: Ignorance has no beginning, and therefore it is called beginningless ignorance. If so, while the second thought-moment has a beginning, the initial thought-moment must in turn arise from another, which constitutes an infinite regress. As for 'since there is no self, there is also no other': in the preceding [treatment of] 'self' there were four points, forming two pairs: the first pair was that self is not arising, and arising is not self; the next pair was that if there is a derivation, there is an infinite regress, and if pushed to its limit, there is no cause. Arising from other is likewise: other is not arising, as with oxen, horses, pears, and crabapples; arising is not other, as with clay and a pot, or reeds and a mat. If it arises from another, there is again another it arises from; if there is derivation, there is an infinite regress, and pushed to the limit, there is no cause. The Sanlun tradition refutes 'other' through three approaches: First, the comprehensive approach: no dharma whatsoever is anything other than self, and outside self there is no other; if self is refuted, other is refuted. Second, mutual identity: just as an 'other' is 'self' to itself, refuting self refutes other. Third, mutual dependence, which is easily understood. As for 'arising from both involves two faults': this refutation of 'both' has two parts. First, it demonstrates that there is no 'both'. Originally, the combination of self and other was called 'both'; because self and other exist, 'both' exists; because self and other are non-existent, 'both' is non-existent. Second, even granting arising from both, it merely combines the two faults into the fault of 'both'. As for 'uncaused': Question: What kind of person conceives the view of uncausedness? Answer: Dull-rooted people mostly give rise to the view of causality, while sharp-rooted people, through critical deduction, give rise to the view of uncausedness. Furthermore, those who grasp at attainments hold that the cause itself is uncaused, because their establishment of a cause fails; so although they speak of a cause, it is in fact uncaused. Question: Does our mountain lineage have a doctrine of uncausedness? Answer: The 'cause' and 'uncaused' of others are both exclusively 'cause'—they fail to grasp the uncaused. Failing to grasp the uncaused, how could it constitute a cause? In our view, the cause is simply the uncaused; therefore cause and uncaused are non-dual. Question: How many kinds of uncausedness are there? Answer: There are two kinds. First, positing that there is no cause whatsoever, hence called uncaused. Second, positing that existing causes are uncaused, as the opening section says: 'Existing being can exist; existing being is self-existent,' and thus does not depend on non-being. Refuting the proposition of uncausedness involves four faults: first, the fault of permanence; second, demolition by principle; third, reversal of parity; fourth, inverted fruition. The fault of permanence: since it does not arise from the conjunction of causes and conditions, neither does it cease through the separation of conditions. Neither arising nor ceasing, it is therefore permanent. Furthermore, if space is not from a cause and is permanent, all things not from a cause should likewise be permanent. As for 'this is not so': this is the second, demolition by principle. In the realm of principle, things are not without causes. Thus the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'All phenomena truly possess causes and conditions; it is only through delusion that one fails to know them.' Just as someone seeks wind from a fan or fire from wood, how could this be uncaused? As for 'if there is no cause, there is no fruit': this is the third, reversal of parity. Because there is no cause, there is no fruit; it should also follow that because there is a fruit, there is a cause. If there is a fruit without a cause, there could also be a cause without a fruit. As for 'if there is a fruit without a cause': this is the fourth, inverted fruition. In principle, one should say that without bad causes one obtains bad fruits, and without good causes one obtains good fruits; but if this were not so now, a person who upholds the precepts, lacking the cause for hell, should be born in hell, and a person who commits the five heinous deeds, lacking the cause for heaven, should be born in heaven. Furthermore, regarding 'As the self-nature of phenomena': compared to the preceding verse, this verse can have three meanings. First, for the sharp-rooted, merely proclaiming the fourfold non-arising brings understanding; now, for the dull-rooted, the meaning of non-self-arising is discussed again. Moreover, the three verses can correspond to the three capacities: those of superior capacity understand upon hearing the Buddha's eight negations; those of middling capacity understand when the treatise master proclaims the four kinds of non-arising; those of inferior capacity must await the explanation before awakening. Second, the preceding [verse] refuted the doctrine of self-arising apart from causes and conditions, and therefore plainly stated 'not arising from self'. Now it refutes the doctrine of self-arising through causes and conditions, such as the Abhidharma view that there is a self-nature that arises depending on conditions; hence the text says, 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions.' The 'self' of all phenomena does not emerge from either a self that does not depend on conditions or a self that does depend on conditions; therefore these two verses refute it completely. Third, the first verse primarily refutes the erroneous arising from self, other, and so forth, while the subsequent verse expounds provisional arising through causes and conditions. Thus the prose says: 'It is merely through the conjunction of conditions that there are designations.' Question: Why do you not say that the first verse sets forth the chapter's thesis and the subsequent verse explains it? Answer: Because Piṅgala did not frame it as setting forth and explaining a thesis. If we now take it as setting forth and explaining a thesis, this is the second: explaining the thesis. Previously, the treatise master set out the four propositions to explain the eight negations, which is explaining scripture by means of a treatise; now this verse explains the preceding verse, which is explaining a treatise by means of a treatise. In this verse, only 'not from self' is explained, not the remaining three. The reason is that Nāgārjuna took up the eight negations and explained one, and the remaining seven became clear. Although four were listed above, understanding one allows the remaining three to be grasped. Question: Why is this so? Answer: There are four reasons. First, he wishes to show that all phenomena are simply unarisen. All attachments to attainments are notions of arising; although the Buddha spoke of eight negations, they bundle down to a single non-arising. As is commonly said, the surging forth of arising is 'arising'; but cessation merely newly begins to surge forth, so why is it not arising? The fading away of arising is again cessation, so we know that the arising and ceasing of phenomena is just arising. Furthermore, in all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts: if one speaks of the principle of the fourfold transcendence, the thought of fourfold transcendence arises; even hearing words of conception, the thought of conception arises; therefore, within all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts. Now, by refuting arising, all conceptual thoughts do not arise; hence one realizes the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Second, because all sentient beings have arising, they have old age, sickness, death, bondage, and the like; if arising is brought to rest now, then old age, sickness, and death will come to rest; therefore he explains only non-arising. Third, since the dharma of arising is non-existent, the remaining seven collapse of themselves. Fourth, having opened the four gates to refute arising, the remaining seven are analogous. This verse also has three meanings: first, he wishes to show that 'self' encompasses all phenomena; if there is no self-substance, then all phenomena are non-existent.