中觀論疏 3.34

3.34

The prose has two parts: first, explaining the thesis; second, explaining the refutation. Regarding 'the mental dharmas and mental concomitants arise sequentially across the three times': first, this distinguishes mental dharmas from among the three aggregates of dharmas as being immediate conditions, so it specifically elucidates mental dharmas. As for mentioning 'mental concomitants', this distinguishes from schools that assert there are no separate mental concomitants; hence it states 'mental dharmas and mental concomitants'. The various schools are twofold: first, those explaining that there are mental concomitants; second, those explaining that there are no mental concomitants. The absence of mental concomitants is the thesis of the Tattvasiddhi and Buddhadeva. If taking what arose earlier as the primary mind and what arose later as the concomitant, the Tattvasiddhi can also accept this; the present text properly establishes the thesis that there are mental concomitants. Regarding 'across the three times': it properly adopts the sequence across the three times to distinguish it from the sequence of the three natures. Question: The various schools are limitless; why specifically explain this doctrine? Answer: Because this school is widely prevalent, it is specifically refuted. Regarding 'future dharmas have not yet arisen' and below: this is the second part, explaining the refutation. First, it explains the three lines of verse that directly refute; next, it explains the fourth line of verse that concludes the refutation. Explaining the three lines has two parts: first, explaining the first half by adducing the effect to refute the condition; next, explaining from the perspective of the condition to refute the condition. Explaining the adducing of the effect to refute the condition has two approaches: first, refuting in terms of not yet arisen; second, refuting in terms of already arisen. Two meanings may be fully present: first, challenging a single school with a dilemma: if the effect has not yet arisen, with what does the present act as a condition? If the effect has already arisen, then no condition is needed. Second, refuting the theses of two schools through the dilemma: 'not yet arisen' refutes the thesis that the two times do not exist—not yet arisen is non-existence, no different from space; with what could it act as a condition? If it already exists, then it is arisen, which refutes the thesis that the two times exist—being different from space means it exists, and being different from unarisen means it is already arisen, so what need is there for a condition? Regarding 'the present mental dharmas and mental concomitants have no abiding duration' and below: this explains the third line, refuting the condition from the perspective of the condition. This can have two meanings: first, it refutes that the present mind cannot act as a condition for the future, but whereas above it was refuted from the perspective of the effect, here it is refuted from the perspective of the condition. Second, the preceding prose stated that 'mental dharmas and mental concomitants arise sequentially across the three times'; above refuted that the present mind cannot act as a condition for the future, while here it refutes that the past cannot act as a condition for the present. As for not refuting with what the future acts as a condition: for the Sarvāstivādins, future dharmas are in disarray and have no immediate condition, hence it is not refuted. In the text there are three parts: first, challenging in terms of not yet [perished]; second, in terms of already [perished]; third, in terms of the time of perishing. The challenge in terms of not yet [perished] has two intentions: conceding and eliminating. The intention of eliminating says: if a present dharma had a single thought-moment not yet perished, one could grant that the unperished acts as a condition; since there is not a single thought-moment unperished, how could the unperished act as a condition? Question: Do any of the various schools also state that mental dharmas do not perish? Answer: Among the Sthaviravāda, one master says that while material dharmas perish immediately upon arising, mental dharmas endure without perishing for fifteen kṣaṇas. This thesis is refuted here. 'If it abides, it is not conditioned' is the second, refutation by concession. Even granting that there is a single thought-moment not yet perished, that single thought-moment would be permanent, and that single thought-moment would not be conditioned. In your doctrine, there is not a single permanent thought-moment; how then could a single thought-moment not yet have perished? 'If it has already perished': this is the second part, refuting in terms of the meaning of already perished. This also has two parts: first, direct explanation; second, taking the intent. The direct explanation says: perishing is non-existence; it has no power or capacity to induce what follows, hence it is not a condition. This line directly accords with the verse text, and it also directly refutes that the past cannot act as a condition for the present. 'If it is said that the perished dharma still exists': this takes the intent. Their intent says: although the preceding mind has perished, the power to induce what follows still persists. This is the Sarvāstivādins' doctrine of latent existence in the past. It is also the Kāśyapīya doctrine that a cause does not perish and abides in the past, awaiting the arising of the effect before it fades away. Harivarman refutes this, saying: this is perishing again after having already perished. It is also the Tattvasiddhi position on possession in the past. The refutation says: if the preceding mind's power to induce what follows does not perish, it would be permanent; just as if a preceding unwholesome mind did not perish, it would permanently be an unwholesome mind, and there would be no merit; and merit would permanently be merit, and there would be no demerit. Hence it says 'there would be neither demerit nor merit.' Furthermore, to what is this power of yours attached? If it is attached to the essence of the mind, then the essence of the mind has already perished; to what could the power to induce what follows be attached? Furthermore, if the power to induce what follows does not perish, then the power is permanent while the essence of the mind is impermanent; this would divide one mind into two, half permanent and half impermanent. Furthermore, if it continues without perishing, non-perishing is a unity; how could a unity be an immediate condition? Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa does not go beyond two meanings: if it perishes thought-moment by thought-moment and is not steadfast in itself, how could it produce what follows? If it does not perish, then it is permanent, like the true consciousness doctrine of the Dilun masters, and there would be no immediate condition. 'If it is claimed that at the time of perishing it can act as an immediate condition for it': this is the third part, refuting the time of perishing. The text also has two parts: first, taking the intent; next, the refutation. Their intent says: the time of perishing serves as the condition, which is neither already perished nor not yet perished, so the two challenges are dismantled; the time of arising serves as the effect, which is neither already arisen nor not yet arisen, so the two challenges do not hold. Question: How does that school establish the time of perishing? Answer: When the preceding mind is about to perish, the subsequent mind is about to arise; being about to perish can activate what is about to arise, and what is about to arise is activated by what is about to perish; therefore, being about to perish is the condition, and being about to arise is the effect. 'The time of perishing is termed half-perished and half-not-perished': this is the second part, the refutation. The text contains three points: first, refutation by pointing out identity; second, refutation by adducing sūtras; third, refutation by guarding against regression. Refutation by pointing out identity means: although they establish a time of perishing, it still amounts to already and not yet; hence half-perished is 'already' and half-unperished is the same as 'not yet'. The former was coarse already and not yet, while the present is subtle already and not yet. Furthermore, being about to perish that has already perished belongs to the portion of 'already', while being about to perish that has not yet perished belongs to the preceding portion of 'not yet'; being about to arise that has already arisen belongs to the preceding portion of 'already', while being about to arise that has not yet arisen still belongs to the portion of 'not yet'. Furthermore, if being about to perish has not yet perished, the subsequent effect cannot arise; if being about to perish has already perished, there is no preceding [factor] to act as a condition for the subsequent, so the subsequent also cannot arise. If being about to arise has not yet arisen, for what does the preceding act as a condition? If being about to arise has already arisen, what need is there for the preceding condition? The Tattvasiddhi holds: when consciousness perishes, ideation arises; when ideation arises, consciousness perishes; they are merely simultaneous. We now ask: if the two times of arising and perishing are identical to a single time, then the two dharmas of arising and perishing are also identical to a single dharma; then consciousness and ideation would be identically one consciousness and identically one ideation. If two dharmas cannot be identically one dharma, neither can two times be identically one time. If there are two dharmas at the same time, then apart from dharmas there would separately be time. Furthermore, it is commonly said: when consciousness perishes, ideation immediately arises; if there were a void between them, one would be a person without a mind; therefore consciousness and ideation are simultaneous. We now ask: if consciousness perishes, ideation cannot arise; if ideation arises, consciousness cannot perish; because they are simultaneous, if one perishes and one arises, there are two times. It is also commonly said: the mind is the substance, and good and evil are functions upon the mind. We now ask: if the mind is not good or evil, the mind should also not be the cognizing subject; if the mind is the cognizing subject, the mind is good and evil. They answer: the mind at times gives rise to good and at times gives rise to evil, so it does not equal good or evil. We now press them: the mind also at times can cognize and at times cannot cognize, as when Hīnayāna enters the cessation attainment or enters the remainderless [nirvāṇa] it does not cognize, and when Mahāyāna merges with the real, being the real it does not cognize. If you say that the mind is good and evil, since good and evil are severed, the mind should also be severed. Since the mind can ultimately not be severed, the mind is not evil, and evil is itself evil. If so, understanding is itself understanding, and the mind is not understanding. If so, cognizing is itself cognizing, and the mind is not cognizing. Regarding 'Moreover, as the Buddha said' and below: this is the second part, refutation by adducing sūtras. Having presented the dilemma earlier to refute them, they will surely not accept it; therefore sūtras of the Buddha are cited to show that all conditioned dharmas perish thought-moment by thought-moment—how could there be a third time of perishing called about to perish and not about to perish? Question: Which sūtras are cited to refute this? Answer: The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'You, right now, are both born, aging, and dying.' The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra says: 'Moreover, he observes all dharmas, which instantly arise, abide, change, and perish.' Regarding 'You claim that in a single thought-moment there is no such being about to perish': this is the third part, refutation by guarding against regression. Fearing that upon hearing the sūtras cited showing that arising is immediately perishing they might alter their doctrine, their thesis is held fast to guard against their retreat. The mountain master says: 'This is the third part of the prose, the refutation of the four characteristics via Nirvāṇa.' We now clarify that this is the third part within the refutation of the time of perishing, guarding against regression, not the refutation of the four characteristics via Nirvāṇa. Regarding 'about to perish and not about to perish': the mountain master says, 'Perishing is the characteristic of cessation; non-perishing is the characteristic of arising; about to perish is the characteristic of change; not about to perish is the characteristic of abiding.' Another explanation says: 'Perishing is the characteristic of cessation; non-perishing represents the two characteristics of arising and abiding; about to perish is the dharma characterized by the characteristic of cessation; not about to perish is the dharma characterized by the characteristics of arising and abiding.' We now maintain according to the text that it is neither of these. As for 'about to perish and not about to perish', it explains that when a conditioned dharma arises in a single thought-moment, it has two meanings: first, having just arisen; second, being about to perish. The portion that is about to perish is called 'about to perish'; the portion that has just arisen is called 'not about to perish'. However, the phrase 'not about to perish' is general, so it broadly discusses four dharmas, namely the past, the future, the present, and the unconditioned. The reason it only explains about to perish and not about to perish is that when outsiders hear the sūtra cited in refutation, they wish to evade it, so it explains this to demonstrate it to them. It only explains these two dharmas while broadly treating the other two, hence it does not explain the other two. Furthermore, four dharmas explain four, and two dharmas explain four. Four dharmas explaining four: 'about to perish' is the present portion that is about to perish; 'not about to perish' is the present portion that has just arisen; 'perished' is past dharmas; 'unperished' is future and unconditioned dharmas. Two dharmas explaining four dharmas is as in the text: it merely takes the present portion about to perish as 'about to perish', and everything besides this is 'not about to perish'. Regarding 'Therefore there is no immediate condition' and below: this is the second part, the conclusion.