中觀論疏 3.37

3.37

「增上緣者」，解有二家。一云：穀牙生時萬法不障，是以穀牙得生長增上，故萬法為增上果作緣，故云增上，此從果受名。次解云：穀牙生時，萬法於牙各有增上勝力，如地有勝持、空有容受。以萬法各有增上之力，故當體受增上名也。增上緣有通有別。所言通者，一切法不障一法，故一法得生，則一切法為一法作緣；一法不障一切法，故一切法得生，則一法為一切法作增上緣義。但增上緣通為無為，而果但是有為。又雖不相障，而終取一時因果及前緣後果，無有前後亂相生義也。別者，如眼識從眼根生，眼根望識但是別相增上緣。若如《成實》云：從勝受名故云增上。如空明等生而名眼識、不名色識，以從勝受名，故名增上緣也。破增上緣者，然緣緣具攝一切法，若破緣緣則已破一切法竟，但縱外情更復破耳。偈為二：上半破、下半呵。破有三意：一者緣果無性。由果有緣，緣無性也。由緣有果，果無自性。即無自性，即無法也。二者緣果無定。如萬法不障牙，牙是果、萬法為緣；今牙不障萬法，牙即是緣、萬法為果，故知緣果無有定性。三善惡無定。如施不障人天，故是善因者；施亦不障三塗，施則是惡因，故無定性也。「故無有有相」者，一有是緣有，一有是果有。恐外云雖無定性，應有無性因果，故今明有性乃有因果，無性則無因果。下半呵者，「說有是事故是事有」，此是牒。不然二字，則呵之。

"Predominant condition": two traditions explain this. One says: when a grain shoot arises, all things do not obstruct it; therefore, the grain shoot can grow and flourish predominantly. Thus all things serve as conditions for the predominant effect, and hence it is called "predominant"; this takes its name from the effect. The next explanation says: when a grain shoot arises, all things each have predominant, superior power regarding the shoot, just as earth has superior support and space has accommodation. Because all things each have predominant power, it takes the name "predominant" in terms of its own substance. The predominant condition has both a general and a specific [sense]. The general sense means: all things do not obstruct one thing, and so the one thing can arise, which means all things serve as conditions for the one thing; one thing does not obstruct all things, and so all things can arise, which means the one thing serves as the predominant condition for all things. However, the predominant condition extends to both the conditioned and the unconditioned, whereas the effect is only conditioned. Moreover, although they do not obstruct each other, it ultimately takes simultaneous cause and effect or prior condition and posterior effect; there is no sense of disorderly mutual origination across before and after. The specific sense means: just as visual consciousness arises from the eye organ, the eye organ relative to the consciousness is merely a specifically characterized predominant condition. If, as the *Tattvasiddhi* says, it takes its name from what is superior, hence it is called "predominant." Just as it arises from space, light, and so on, yet is called "visual consciousness" and not "color-form consciousness," because it takes its name from what is superior, it is called the predominant condition. Refuting the predominant condition: now, the objective condition fully encompasses all phenomena; if one has refuted the objective condition, one has already completely refuted all phenomena, but here we merely accommodate external positions to refute it further. The gāthā has two parts: the first half refutes, and the second half reproaches. The refutation has three points: First, conditions and effects lack intrinsic nature. Because of the effect there is a condition, so the condition lacks intrinsic nature. Because of the condition there is an effect, so the effect lacks intrinsic nature. Since they lack intrinsic nature, they are non-existent. Second, conditions and effects are not fixed. Just as all things do not obstruct the shoot, so the shoot is the effect and all things are the condition; now the shoot does not obstruct all things, so the shoot is the condition and all things are the effect. Thus we know conditions and effects have no fixed nature. Third, good and evil are not fixed. If giving does not obstruct humans and gods and is therefore a good cause, giving also does not obstruct the three evil destinies, and giving would then be an evil cause; therefore there is no fixed nature. "Hence there is no characterized being": one "being" is the being of the condition, and one "being" is the being of the effect. Fearing that the opponent might say that although there is no fixed nature, there should be cause and effect without intrinsic nature, it is now made clear that only if there is intrinsic nature can there be cause and effect; without intrinsic nature, there is no cause and effect. As for the reproach in the second half, "Saying, 'Because this exists, that exists'": this cites [their position]. The two words "is not so" reproach it.