中觀論疏 3.37

3.37

"Predominant condition": two traditions explain this. One says: when a grain shoot arises, all things do not obstruct it; therefore, the grain shoot can grow and flourish predominantly. Thus all things serve as conditions for the predominant effect, and hence it is called "predominant"; this takes its name from the effect. The next explanation says: when a grain shoot arises, all things each have predominant, superior power regarding the shoot, just as earth has superior support and space has accommodation. Because all things each have predominant power, it takes the name "predominant" in terms of its own substance. The predominant condition has both a general and a specific [sense]. The general sense means: all things do not obstruct one thing, and so the one thing can arise, which means all things serve as conditions for the one thing; one thing does not obstruct all things, and so all things can arise, which means the one thing serves as the predominant condition for all things. However, the predominant condition extends to both the conditioned and the unconditioned, whereas the effect is only conditioned. Moreover, although they do not obstruct each other, it ultimately takes simultaneous cause and effect or prior condition and posterior effect; there is no sense of disorderly mutual origination across before and after. The specific sense means: just as visual consciousness arises from the eye organ, the eye organ relative to the consciousness is merely a specifically characterized predominant condition. If, as the *Tattvasiddhi* says, it takes its name from what is superior, hence it is called "predominant." Just as it arises from space, light, and so on, yet is called "visual consciousness" and not "color-form consciousness," because it takes its name from what is superior, it is called the predominant condition. Refuting the predominant condition: now, the objective condition fully encompasses all phenomena; if one has refuted the objective condition, one has already completely refuted all phenomena, but here we merely accommodate external positions to refute it further. The gāthā has two parts: the first half refutes, and the second half reproaches. The refutation has three points: First, conditions and effects lack intrinsic nature. Because of the effect there is a condition, so the condition lacks intrinsic nature. Because of the condition there is an effect, so the effect lacks intrinsic nature. Since they lack intrinsic nature, they are non-existent. Second, conditions and effects are not fixed. Just as all things do not obstruct the shoot, so the shoot is the effect and all things are the condition; now the shoot does not obstruct all things, so the shoot is the condition and all things are the effect. Thus we know conditions and effects have no fixed nature. Third, good and evil are not fixed. If giving does not obstruct humans and gods and is therefore a good cause, giving also does not obstruct the three evil destinies, and giving would then be an evil cause; therefore there is no fixed nature. "Hence there is no characterized being": one "being" is the being of the condition, and one "being" is the being of the effect. Fearing that the opponent might say that although there is no fixed nature, there should be cause and effect without intrinsic nature, it is now made clear that only if there is intrinsic nature can there be cause and effect; without intrinsic nature, there is no cause and effect. As for the reproach in the second half, "Saying, 'Because this exists, that exists'": this cites [their position]. The two words "is not so" reproach it.