中觀論疏 4.11

4.11

「問曰若去者去有何咎」，此下第二縱破釋章門。但釋初門、不釋後二，以初破故後二自崩。又初門是通立通破，以三時有去者名為通立。破三時有去名為通破，從此文是別破別立。別立去者去為別立，破去者去為別破。上破法中亦有縱奪二門、通別兩意也。初問、次答。此問是外道犢子及成實等義，並明有人御去法而去。但成實二師：一云別有人體人用、二無體但有假用，此中含其二說也。「答曰」下，三偈為三：初無體破、次兩法破、三各體破。初上半牒而不受、下半正作無體破。若離法別有人體，即人可御法而去；以離法無人體，云何人御法而去？問：論主用無體以破耶？答：不爾。汝既云去者，即用去以成者，則者無自體。如用指以成捲，捲無自體，非用無體破外有體。又如人作師子，師子不能去，須人御方去。今明此二相離可得爾耳，離兩脚動無別有人，故不得去。此通得破外道、犢子、成實等義。既其易知，不煩作也。第二偈二法破者，前偈是奪破，今二偈並是縱關。上半牒、下半破。破意云：若避前無體而言有體，今縱有體墮二去：者前之去以為者體，者後之去為者所用。問：二去有何過？答：二去法是二色陰，即二身動，一人二身是為大過。又人法不相離，法二即人二、人一即法一。汝一人而法二，亦可人二而法一也。又法二即人二，此之二人各往東西，則東西去者復用去法去亦有二去，既有二法復成二人，如是一人成無量人，具如前說。長行有二論。一本云：一以去法成去者、二去者成已然後用去法。此文為定，餘本悉非。所以然者，初明以一去法為人體、次一去法為人用，故成一人二法過也。第三偈各體破，亦云獨去破。上半牒而標過、下半正明各體。「離去有去者」，汝明去者用去法，必先有去者而後用去法，即是離去法有去者體也。「說去者有去」，師云：「離去有去者，外人懷中作如是解：離去別有去者，說去者有去。口中復說：去者御去法而去。故云各體也。」又此句意詺外義成上離過。汝先有者體，而說者用於法，故知離法別有者體。此偈與破去法中各體破全同，但上明時法各體，今明人法各體為異耳。問：前各體破與無體破相次，今何故在二體後耶？答：蓋是翻論者誤。何以知然？外人前立三時有去者，青目就二法破中以結三時中無去者竟，更說此偈者，當知是誤也。若非翻論者誤，則是梵文本失。

“Question: If the goer goes, what fault is there?” Below this is the second [section], which explains the chapter's rubric through a refutation by concession. It explains only the first rubric and does not explain the latter two, because once the first is refuted, the latter two collapse on their own. Furthermore, the first rubric is a general establishment and a general refutation: establishing that there is a goer in the three times is called a general establishment; refuting that there is going in the three times is called a general refutation. From this text onward, it is a specific refutation and a specific establishment: specifically establishing that the goer goes is the specific establishment; refuting that the goer goes is the specific refutation. In the preceding refutation of the dharma, there were likewise the two approaches of concession and deprivation, and the two senses of general and specific. First comes the question, followed by the answer. This question represents the doctrines of the non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and so forth, which all explain that there is a person who directs the dharma of going and thereby goes. However, there are two masters of the *Tattvasiddhi*: one says that there is a distinct personal entity and personal function; the other says there is no entity, only a provisional function. Here both explanations are encompassed.

From “Answer” onward, the three verses constitute three [arguments]: first, refutation through lack of an entity; second, refutation through two dharmas; third, refutation through separate entities. In the first [verse], the first half takes up [the thesis] without accepting it, and the second half directly constitutes the refutation through lack of an entity. If, apart from the dharma, there were a separate personal entity, then the person could direct the dharma and go; since apart from the dharma there is no personal entity, how could the person direct the dharma and go?

Question: Does the author of the treatise use lack of an entity to refute [the opponent]?

Answer: It is not so. Since you say “goer,” you use going to establish the goer; hence the goer has no intrinsic entity. Just as one uses fingers to form a fist, and the fist has no intrinsic entity, it is not using lack of an entity to refute the opponent's assertion of an entity. Furthermore, it is like a person making a lion: the lion cannot go on its own and requires a person to direct it before it goes. Here it is shown that this can only be so if the two are distinct from each other; apart from the movement of the two feet there is no separate person, and therefore [the person] cannot go. This generally refutes the positions of the non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and so forth. Since this is easy to understand, there is no need to elaborate further.

The second verse, the refutation through two dharmas: the preceding verse was a refutation by deprivation, whereas these two verses are both checkpoints of concession. The first half takes up [the thesis] and the second half refutes it. The meaning of the refutation is: if, to avoid the preceding lack of an entity, one says there is an entity, now, conceding that there is an entity, it falls into two goings: the going prior to the goer serves as the goer's entity, and the going subsequent to the goer serves as what is employed by the goer.

Question: What fault is there in two goings?

Answer: The two dharmas of going are two form aggregates, which means the movements of two bodies; one person having two bodies is a great fault. Furthermore, person and dharma are not separate from each other: if the dharma is twofold, the person is also twofold; if the person is one, the dharma is also one. If you have one person and two dharmas, it would also be possible to have two persons and one dharma. Moreover, if the dharma is twofold, then the person is twofold; these two persons would go to the east and west respectively, and the goers to the east and west would again use the dharma of going to go, so that there would also be two goings. Since there are two dharmas, they would again constitute two persons, and in this manner one person would become immeasurable persons, entirely as explained before. In the prose commentary there are two editions of the treatise. One edition says: first, by the dharma of going the goer is established; second, once the goer is established, only then does it employ the dharma of going. This text is correct; the other editions are all incorrect. Why is this? The first explains using one dharma of going as the personal entity, and the next explains using one dharma of going as the personal function; hence it incurs the fault of one person and two dharmas.

The third verse is the refutation through separate entities, also called the refutation of solitary going. The first half takes up [the thesis] and indicates the fault; the second half directly clarifies separate entities. “If apart from going there is a goer”: you explain that the goer employs the dharma of going; there must first be a goer and only afterward does it employ the dharma of going, which means that apart from the dharma of going there is an entity of the goer. “Stating that the goer has going”: the master said, “'Apart from going there is a goer'—in the opponent's mind this is understood as: apart from going there is distinctly a goer, and one states that the goer has going. With their mouth they further state: the goer directs the dharma of going and goes. Therefore it is said they are separate entities.” Moreover, the sense of this line is to designate the opponent's doctrine as incurring the preceding fault of separation. You first have the entity of the goer, and state that the goer employs the dharma; therefore we know that apart from the dharma there is distinctly an entity of the goer. This verse is identical to the refutation through separate entities in the refutation of the dharma of going, with the sole difference that the earlier [verse] explained separate entities of time and dharma, whereas the present [verse] explains separate entities of person and dharma.

Question: Earlier, the refutation through separate entities and the refutation through lack of an entity were adjacent; why is it placed after the two entities here?

Answer: This is likely an error by the translator of the treatise. How is this known? The opponent earlier established that there is a goer in the three times; after Piṅgala had already concluded in the refutation through two dharmas that there is no goer in the three times, to speak this verse again must be recognized as an error. If it is not an error by the translator of the treatise, then it is a defect in the Sanskrit text.