中觀論疏 4.10

4.10

「問曰離去者無去法可爾」下，第二次破去者。問：此章為破去者、為破去者去耶？答：具有二意，一破去者、二破去者去。問：依觀門次第，人空易得應先明，法空難得應後辨。今何得前破法、後破人耶？答：今《中》、《百》二論相望者，《百論》依觀門次第，故先破神、次破法。以外道未識佛法觀門，故示之以漸。又外道計神為主，故先破其主也。《中論》破內學人，內學人多已知人空、少信法空，已知人空故不先破人，未知法空故先破法。問：內道既知人空，何須破？答：復有不知者，如犢子是也。又此論正破內、傍破外，正破內故先破法，傍破外故後破人。又會法成人，法為人本，故先破其本也。問：云何名去者去耶？答：總論去有二種，一者法去、二者人去。前章已破法去，今次破人去，人法俱無去，即一切去盡矣。又去有二種：一非眾生類去，如風行水流；二眾生類去，如從此到彼。上破法去，兼破非眾生類去；今正破眾生類去。又上破法去，破內道；今破人去，破外道。又上破法去，破無我部；今破人去，破有我部。或開為四：一立、二破、三救、四重破。今就文有二：初問、次答。問有二：一領前無法、二立後有人。然此問意因論主生。論主上難云：離法無人，以法二故人亦應二。此是借人破法。又所以借人破法者，欲借法破人，人法病乃息耳。外人即云：離法無人，以人有故法即有也。「答曰」下，五偈為二：初開奪破、第二縱破。初奪破為二：上半牒其所受、下半正奪其立者。此不離之言，凡三處用之：初用為難離法無人，法二人亦二；次外人用為立，人有法即有；今還用為破法，無人即無也。然外云：人有法有。論主云：法無人無。論主之言已顯於前，外人之立未彰於後，故有屈申也。「去者即不去」，此第二縱破。又開為二：初偈開三門而總非之、後三偈解章門以釋非。人多釋云：此偈猶是以三時破也。初句為已、次句為末、下半為去時。今謂不然。下外人救還救初句，豈得救已去耶？今所釋者，此就三者門破。初句明去者於去時中不能用去法去、次句明不去者亦不能用去法去，離此已外無第三去也，下當釋之。今且就此門破者，上來求去若得，可言去者用去法而去，名去者去。上來求去無從，者何所用？又上明法無人即無，云何於無人法中而謂人用法去？又既稱去者，即者無自體，云何能用法去耶？又去者宛然而不去，如肇公云「觀方知彼去，去者不至方」，亦如江河競注而實不流，故去者宛然而實不去也。「不去者不去」，破第二句，此是面目相違。不去人云何去？若不去人而去，如無罪人有罪、無施人有施。又因去者有不去者，上求去者不可得，云何有不去者？尚無不去者，云何不去者去耶？又去者尚不去，不去者云何去，如明尚非明，暗云何是明耶？去既不去、不去亦不去，豈可亦去亦不去為去，乃至非去不非去為去耶？此即破不有有義。他有既不得為有，不有云何得有？若言不有有者，應不去者去。即屈此破也。然去不得去、不去亦不得去，即有不得為有、不有亦不得為有，亦有亦不有、非不有並不成有也。

From "Question: It may be granted that apart from a goer there is no dharma of going" downward is the second part, refuting the goer. Question: Does this section refute the goer, or does it refute the goer's going? Answer: It has both meanings: first, refuting the goer; second, refuting the goer's going. Question: Following the sequence of contemplation methods, emptiness of persons is easy to attain and should be explained first; emptiness of dharmas is difficult to attain and should be analyzed later. Why now is the dharma refuted first and the person refuted later? Answer: Comparing the two treatises now, the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* and the *Śata-śāstra*, the *Śata-śāstra* follows the sequence of contemplation methods, so it first refutes the ātman and next refutes dharmas. Because non-Buddhists do not yet know the contemplation methods of the Buddha's Dharma, it shows them gradually. Furthermore, non-Buddhists hold the ātman to be primary, so it first refutes their primary [principle]. The *Madhyamaka-śāstra* refutes internal students [of Buddhism]; most internal students already know the emptiness of persons but few believe in the emptiness of dharmas. Because they already know the emptiness of persons, it does not refute the person first; because they do not yet know the emptiness of dharmas, it refutes dharmas first. Question: Since those within the Buddhist path already know the emptiness of persons, why is there a need to refute it? Answer: There are also those who do not know it, such as the Vātsīputrīyas. Moreover, this treatise primarily refutes internal [schools] and secondarily refutes external [schools]; primarily refuting internal ones, it refutes dharmas first, and secondarily refuting external ones, it refutes persons later. Furthermore, assembling dharmas forms a person; dharmas are the basis of the person, so it refutes their basis first. Question: What is meant by 'the goer's going'? Answer: In general, going is of two kinds: first, the going of dharmas; second, the going of persons. The preceding section has already refuted the going of dharmas; now it next refutes the going of persons. When both person and dharma are without going, then all going is completely negated. Furthermore, going is of two kinds: first, the going of non-sentient beings, like wind blowing or water flowing; second, the going of sentient beings, like proceeding from here to there. Above, the refutation of the going of dharmas also refuted the going of non-sentient beings; now it directly refutes the going of sentient beings. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted internal schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes external schools. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted non-self schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes self-affirming schools. Or it may be divided into four: first, proposition; second, refutation; third, rescue; fourth, re-refutation. Now in the text there are two parts: first the question, next the answer. The question has two parts: first, accepting the previous non-existence of dharmas; second, establishing that subsequently there is a person. However, the intention of this question arises on account of the treatise master. Above, the treatise master challenged: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because dharmas are two, persons should also be two.' This is borrowing the person to refute the dharma. Furthermore, the reason for borrowing the person to refute the dharma was to borrow the dharma to refute the person, so that errors regarding both person and dharma would cease. The opponent then says: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because the person exists, dharmas therefore exist.' From "Answer:" downward, the five verses have two parts: first, opening with a refutation by deprivation; second, concessive refutation. The first, refutation by deprivation, has two parts: the upper half repeats what was accepted, and the lower half directly deprives him of his proposition. These words 'not apart from' are used in three places altogether: first, used as a challenge that apart from dharmas there is no person, so if dharmas are two, persons are also two; next, used by the opponent to establish that if the person exists, dharmas exist; now, used again to refute dharmas: if there is no person, there are none. However, the opponent says: 'The person exists, so dharmas exist.' The treatise master says: 'Dharmas do not exist, so the person does not exist.' The treatise master's words have already been made manifest above; the opponent's thesis has not yet been demonstrated below; thus there is a concession and an extension. 'The goer does not go' is the second part, concessive refutation. This is again divided into two: the first verse opens three gates and rejects them generally; the subsequent three verses explain the chapter topics to elucidate the rejection. Many people explain: 'This verse still refutes using the three times. The first line is what has already gone, the second line is what has not yet gone, and the lower half is the time of going.' We now maintain that this is not so. Below, the opponent's rescue is a rescue of the first line; how could it be a rescue of what has already gone? As explained now, this refutes according to the gate of the three [agents]. The first line explains that a goer in the time of going cannot use a dharma of going to go; the second line explains that a non-goer also cannot use a dharma of going to go; apart from these there is no third going, as will be explained below. Now, proceeding to refute by this gate: previously, if going could be found, one could say that a goer uses the dharma of going to go, which is called 'the goer's going.' But previously, seeking going yielded nothing; what would the goer use? Furthermore, above it was explained that without the person dharmas do not exist; how could one say, within a dharma that lacks a person, that a person uses a dharma to go? Furthermore, since one is called a 'goer', the goer has no self-substance; how could it be able to use a dharma to go? Moreover, the goer is vividly evident and yet does not go; as Master Zhao said, 'Observing the direction, one knows that he goes, / Yet the goer does not arrive at the direction,' and just as river currents race along yet truly do not flow; therefore the goer is vividly evident and yet truly does not go. 'The non-goer does not go' refutes the second line; this is a direct contradiction. How could a non-going person go? If a non-going person were to go, it would be like a sinless person having sin, or a non-giving person giving. Furthermore, dependent on a goer there is a non-goer; above, seeking a goer proved impossible, so how could there be a non-goer? Since there is not even a non-goer, how could a non-goer go? Moreover, even a goer does not go; how could a non-goer go? Just as light is not yet light, how could darkness be light? Since going does not go and not-going also does not go, how could both going and not-going be going, or even neither going nor not-going be going? This directly refutes the meaning of non-existent being being existent. Since another existence cannot be existent, how could non-existence be existent? If one says that non-existence is existent, the non-goer should go. That immediately succumbs to this refutation. Thus, going cannot go, and not-going also cannot go; that is, existence cannot be existent, non-existence also cannot be existent, and both-existence-and-non-existence as well as neither-existence-nor-non-existence likewise do not constitute existence.