中觀論疏 4.11

4.11

“Question: If the goer goes, what fault is there?” Below this is the second [section], which explains the chapter's rubric through a refutation by concession. It explains only the first rubric and does not explain the latter two, because once the first is refuted, the latter two collapse on their own. Furthermore, the first rubric is a general establishment and a general refutation: establishing that there is a goer in the three times is called a general establishment; refuting that there is going in the three times is called a general refutation. From this text onward, it is a specific refutation and a specific establishment: specifically establishing that the goer goes is the specific establishment; refuting that the goer goes is the specific refutation. In the preceding refutation of the dharma, there were likewise the two approaches of concession and deprivation, and the two senses of general and specific. First comes the question, followed by the answer. This question represents the doctrines of the non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and so forth, which all explain that there is a person who directs the dharma of going and thereby goes. However, there are two masters of the *Tattvasiddhi*: one says that there is a distinct personal entity and personal function; the other says there is no entity, only a provisional function. Here both explanations are encompassed.

From “Answer” onward, the three verses constitute three [arguments]: first, refutation through lack of an entity; second, refutation through two dharmas; third, refutation through separate entities. In the first [verse], the first half takes up [the thesis] without accepting it, and the second half directly constitutes the refutation through lack of an entity. If, apart from the dharma, there were a separate personal entity, then the person could direct the dharma and go; since apart from the dharma there is no personal entity, how could the person direct the dharma and go?

Question: Does the author of the treatise use lack of an entity to refute [the opponent]?

Answer: It is not so. Since you say “goer,” you use going to establish the goer; hence the goer has no intrinsic entity. Just as one uses fingers to form a fist, and the fist has no intrinsic entity, it is not using lack of an entity to refute the opponent's assertion of an entity. Furthermore, it is like a person making a lion: the lion cannot go on its own and requires a person to direct it before it goes. Here it is shown that this can only be so if the two are distinct from each other; apart from the movement of the two feet there is no separate person, and therefore [the person] cannot go. This generally refutes the positions of the non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and so forth. Since this is easy to understand, there is no need to elaborate further.

The second verse, the refutation through two dharmas: the preceding verse was a refutation by deprivation, whereas these two verses are both checkpoints of concession. The first half takes up [the thesis] and the second half refutes it. The meaning of the refutation is: if, to avoid the preceding lack of an entity, one says there is an entity, now, conceding that there is an entity, it falls into two goings: the going prior to the goer serves as the goer's entity, and the going subsequent to the goer serves as what is employed by the goer.

Question: What fault is there in two goings?

Answer: The two dharmas of going are two form aggregates, which means the movements of two bodies; one person having two bodies is a great fault. Furthermore, person and dharma are not separate from each other: if the dharma is twofold, the person is also twofold; if the person is one, the dharma is also one. If you have one person and two dharmas, it would also be possible to have two persons and one dharma. Moreover, if the dharma is twofold, then the person is twofold; these two persons would go to the east and west respectively, and the goers to the east and west would again use the dharma of going to go, so that there would also be two goings. Since there are two dharmas, they would again constitute two persons, and in this manner one person would become immeasurable persons, entirely as explained before. In the prose commentary there are two editions of the treatise. One edition says: first, by the dharma of going the goer is established; second, once the goer is established, only then does it employ the dharma of going. This text is correct; the other editions are all incorrect. Why is this? The first explains using one dharma of going as the personal entity, and the next explains using one dharma of going as the personal function; hence it incurs the fault of one person and two dharmas.

The third verse is the refutation through separate entities, also called the refutation of solitary going. The first half takes up [the thesis] and indicates the fault; the second half directly clarifies separate entities. “If apart from going there is a goer”: you explain that the goer employs the dharma of going; there must first be a goer and only afterward does it employ the dharma of going, which means that apart from the dharma of going there is an entity of the goer. “Stating that the goer has going”: the master said, “'Apart from going there is a goer'—in the opponent's mind this is understood as: apart from going there is distinctly a goer, and one states that the goer has going. With their mouth they further state: the goer directs the dharma of going and goes. Therefore it is said they are separate entities.” Moreover, the sense of this line is to designate the opponent's doctrine as incurring the preceding fault of separation. You first have the entity of the goer, and state that the goer employs the dharma; therefore we know that apart from the dharma there is distinctly an entity of the goer. This verse is identical to the refutation through separate entities in the refutation of the dharma of going, with the sole difference that the earlier [verse] explained separate entities of time and dharma, whereas the present [verse] explains separate entities of person and dharma.

Question: Earlier, the refutation through separate entities and the refutation through lack of an entity were adjacent; why is it placed after the two entities here?

Answer: This is likely an error by the translator of the treatise. How is this known? The opponent earlier established that there is a goer in the three times; after Piṅgala had already concluded in the refutation through two dharmas that there is no goer in the three times, to speak this verse again must be recognized as an error. If it is not an error by the translator of the treatise, then it is a defect in the Sanskrit text.