中觀論疏 4.23

4.23

「答曰無也」，第二論主破。就文為二：初長行標無、次偈本釋無。問：外人引經明有六情，論主明無，豈非破佛經耶？答：然外計我與六情俱是妄，謂佛欲借於六妄止於我妄；執教之流遂言實有六情，故不解佛意。又佛說六情是妄者，意欲明六是空；而外人謂有妄，故亦不識佛意。又佛意說六是世諦，尋如來意，欲令悟第一義故說世諦；而小乘人謂實有六，不知第一義。今言無六意，乃申佛說六意也。故《涅槃》云「為令眾生深識第一義，故說世諦。若眾生不因世諦入第一義，諸佛終不說世諦也。」佛說六者，此明不六六義，欲令眾生因六悟不六。而外人謂是定情，便成六故六，非但不知不六六，亦不能悟六不六，故外人是破經。論主明不六六，即是申於世諦；明因六悟不六，即是申第一義諦。既申二諦，即發二智也。又佛說此六令悟不六，即於六內不起諸煩惱。而外人無始已來有此六根起諸煩惱；而稟佛教更復推斥諍於六根，故惑不除、新病更起名破佛。論主與此相違，故名申教。問：夫論說法不離二諦，今言無六依何諦耶？答：二諦之中並無此六，世諦文中無性實六，第一義中無有假六，故云無也。偈本即是釋長行。汎論有四句：一偈釋偈、二長行釋偈、三長行釋長行、四偈釋長行。第二七偈破，為二：初有六偈正破眼情、次有一偈類觀餘五。六偈即分為六：第一偈正破、第二指前破、第三重破、第四法無故人無、第五人無故法無、第六偈因無故果無。今束此六偈為二：初之五偈正破見因義、第二一偈破見所生果。就五偈中復為三類：初三偈破眼見、第二半偈破色見、第三一行半破人見。三偈即三：初一偈舉不自見況破見他、第二偈三時門破見他、第三偈就對色義破見他。今是舉不自見以破見他。問：上有五家立見，今破何人？答：遍破一切。以一切師同明眼不自見而能見他，故舉不自見以況破見他，即遍破一切也。破意云：汝自體是眼，應見自體；若不見自體，即自體非眼。又若非見而是眼，便見非眼也。若爾，應有離見之眼，亦應云離眼之見。又此難毘曇最切，彼明根是色，既能見他者亦應自見。彼救云：眼根是不可見有對色，故不可見。今破云：眼體既不為他所見，云何能見他？如《百論》云「四大非眼見，云何生眼見」也。次難識見者，識能見他，識應能自見；若言識非是可見法，云何能自見？若爾，非是可見法，云何能見他？破人見亦類同之。又總難眾師眼不自見能見他者，此即半見半不見，應半眼半不眼。若從半見作名，名為見、名為眼者，亦應從半不見作名，名為不見、名為不眼。所以然者，自即為親、他即為疎，既從見疎名為見者，從不見親應名不見。又數人明眼具十微，而別有眼微。破云：眼是眾緣所成、無有自性，云何言實有眼不自見而能見他？《成論》眼是假名，無有自性。若無自性即是寂滅，云何執眼定能見耶？「問曰眼雖不自見」者，救意云：燈能所俱是色入，故自照復照他。眼能見是眼入、所見是色入，是故見他不自見。此毘曇救也。依論人救者，眼能見是識、所見為色，故能見他而不自見。犢子及外道同云：人是能見、色是所見，同明人不可見、色可見故，所以但見他不自見也。引火者，依數人能燒是觸、所燒具四微，故火不能自燒而能燒他。《智度論》亦云「色具能照、觸具能燒。」與數人大同也。答中為二：上半明火不能成見法。所以然者，眼即懸矚火到薪方燒，不應舉合而救離也。又云：觀汝此義，應是自燒不燒他、自見不見他。何者？火燒薪，薪於火是自，所以能燒薪耳。若是他者，何故不燒餘薪耶？等是他，等燒應；不爾，等應不燒。而燒被燒之薪、不燒餘薪，即被燒之薪非他，即是自燒義也。見義亦爾，眼見於色，色於眼是自，故眼能見色。若是他者，即不能見。若言是他而能見者，眼何故不見非見之色耶？而不見非見之色、但見於見色，當知色於眼是自故見、於他即不見，此乃是見自不見他，何名見他不見自？又火喻不能成眼見法者，離眼有色、離眼無火，故不應舉不離以救離義。如《百論》云「離泥無瓶，而眼色異故」也。下半釋不能成。舉三時門破者，一欲遮其後救，論主引燈為並。外人舉火來救，今破火竟，或可更引刀指於自無能、於他有用，故舉三時門遍破一切於自不能於他能也。二者欲令外人因前觀門通徹於後，是故指前而破於後。三者上奪不自見即不見他，今縱見他故開三時責，即前奪、後縱也。

‘The answer is: no.’ This is the second part, the author of the treatise refuting [the opponent]. In terms of the text, there are two parts: first, the prose states the negation; second, the root verse explains the negation. Question: The opponent cites scriptures to clarify that the six faculties exist; the author of the treatise clarifies that they do not exist—is this not refuting the Buddha's scriptures? Answer: The opponent posits that the self and the six faculties are both false, thinking that the Buddha intended to borrow the six falsities to stop the falsity of the self; those who grasp at the teaching thereupon claim that the six faculties truly exist, and thus fail to understand the Buddha's intention. Furthermore, when the Buddha said the six faculties are false, his intention was to clarify that the six are empty; yet the opponent thinks that falsity exists, and thus likewise does not recognize the Buddha's intention. Moreover, the Buddha's intention in speaking of the six was conventional truth; examining the Tathāgata's intention, he spoke of conventional truth in order to bring about awakening to the ultimate truth; but people of the Hīnayāna think that the six truly exist, not knowing the ultimate truth. Now, to say there are no six in meaning is precisely to elucidate the Buddha's intention in speaking of the six. Hence the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* says: 'In order to cause sentient beings to deeply understand the ultimate truth, he speaks of conventional truth. If sentient beings did not enter the ultimate truth by means of conventional truth, the Buddhas would never speak of conventional truth.' When the Buddha spoke of the six, this clarified the meaning of the non-six six, wishing to cause sentient beings to awaken to the non-six by means of the six. But the opponent considers them to be fixed faculties, turning it into six because of six; not only do they fail to know the non-six six, they are also unable to awaken to the six as non-six. Therefore, it is the opponent who refutes the scriptures. When the author of the treatise clarifies the non-six six, this is precisely elucidating conventional truth; when he clarifies awakening to the non-six by means of the six, this is precisely elucidating ultimate truth. Having elucidated the two truths, the two wisdoms are generated. Furthermore, the Buddha spoke of these six to bring about awakening to the non-six, so that within the six no afflictions would arise. Yet the opponent has had these six bases from beginningless time and generated afflictions; and having received the Buddha's teaching, they further dispute and contend over the six bases, so old delusions are not removed and new ailments arise—this is called refuting the Buddha. The author of the treatise is contrary to this, and therefore it is called elucidating the teaching. Question: When treatises expound the Dharma, they do not depart from the two truths; now in saying there are no six, upon which truth does it rely? Answer: Within both of the two truths, these six are absent: in conventional truth, there are no substantially real six with intrinsic nature; in the ultimate truth, there are no provisional six; therefore he says 'no'. The root verse is precisely the explanation of the prose. Broadly speaking, there are four formulas: first, a verse explains a verse; second, prose explains a verse; third, prose explains prose; fourth, a verse explains prose. In the second part, the seven verses of refutation are divided into two: first, there are six verses directly refuting the visual faculty; next, there is one verse analogously examining the remaining five. The six verses are divided into six: the first verse directly refutes; the second refers to the previous to refute; the third refutes again; the fourth shows that because dharmas do not exist, a person does not exist; the fifth shows that because a person does not exist, dharmas do not exist; the sixth verse shows that because causes do not exist, effects do not exist. Now, we bundle these six verses into two: the first five verses directly refute the meaning of the cause of seeing; the second single verse refutes the fruit produced by seeing. Within the five verses, there are again three classes: the first three verses refute the eye seeing; the second half verse refutes form seeing; the third verse and a half refutes a person seeing. The three verses are threefold: the first verse adduces not seeing itself to refute seeing another by comparison; the second verse refutes seeing another through the approach of the three times; the third verse refutes seeing another with respect to the meaning of confronting form. Here, it is adducing not seeing itself to refute seeing another. Question: Above, five schools established seeing; whom is he refuting now? Answer: He refutes all universally. Because all masters agree that the eye does not see itself yet can see another, adducing not seeing itself to refute seeing another by comparison universally refutes all of them. The intention of the refutation is: your intrinsic entity is the eye, so it should see its own entity; if it does not see its own entity, then its own entity is not the eye. Furthermore, if it is not seeing yet is an eye, then seeing would be a non-eye. If so, there should be an eye apart from seeing, and one should also say there is seeing apart from the eye. Furthermore, this objection presses most urgently against the Abhidharma: they clarify that the base is form; since it can see another, it should also see itself. They rescue [their position] saying: 'The visual base is invisible, resistant form, and therefore cannot be seen.' Now he refutes them, saying: 'Since the entity of the eye is not seen by another, how could it see another? As the *Śata-śāstra* says: "The four great elements are not seen by the eye; how could they produce the eye's seeing?"' Next, objecting to the view that consciousness sees: if consciousness can see another, consciousness should be able to see itself; if one says consciousness is not a visible dharma, how could it see itself? If so, not being a visible dharma, how could it see another? The refutation of a person seeing is analogous to this. Furthermore, in a general objection to all masters who hold that the eye does not see itself yet can see another: this would be half seeing and half not seeing, and should be half eye and half non-eye. If one names it from the half seeing, calling it seeing and calling it an eye, one should also name it from the half not seeing, calling it non-seeing and calling it non-eye. Why is this? The self is proximate, while the other is distant; since it is named seeing from seeing the distant, it should be named non-seeing from not seeing the proximate. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the eye possesses ten subtle atoms, among which there is separately an eye subtle atom. The refutation says: 'The eye is produced by many conditions and has no intrinsic nature; how can you say that there is a real eye that does not see itself yet can see another?' In the *Tattvasiddhi*, the eye is a provisional designation, without intrinsic nature. If it has no intrinsic nature, it is precisely quiescent extinction; how can one grasp at the eye as definitely able to see? 'Objection: Although the eye does not see itself...'—the opponent's rescue means: a lamp's agent and object are both the form āyatana, so it illuminates itself and also illuminates another. The eye that can see is the visual āyatana, and what is seen is the form āyatana; therefore it sees another and does not see itself. This is the Abhidharma rescue. According to the treatise masters' rescue: the eye that can see is consciousness, and what is seen is form, so it can see another without seeing itself. The Vātsīputrīyas and the external paths agree in saying: the person is what can see, and form is what is seen; both clarifying that the person is invisible and form is visible, which is why it only sees another and does not see itself. In citing fire: according to the Sarvāstivādins, what can burn is tangible, and what is burned possesses four subtle atoms, so fire cannot burn itself but can burn another. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* also says: 'Possessing form, it can illuminate; possessing tangibility, it can burn.' This is broadly the same as the Sarvāstivādins. In the answer, there are two parts: the first half clarifies that fire cannot establish the dharma of seeing. Why is this? The eye gazes from a distance, whereas fire burns firewood only upon reaching it; one should not cite contact to rescue separation. Furthermore, it says: examining this doctrine of yours, it should burn itself and not burn another, or see itself and not see another. Why? When fire burns firewood, the firewood is self to the fire, which is why it can burn the firewood. If it were other, why does it not burn other firewood? Being equally other, it should burn it equally; otherwise, it should equally not burn it. But since it burns the burned firewood and does not burn other firewood, then the burned firewood is not other, which is precisely the meaning of burning itself. The meaning of seeing is also like this: the eye sees form, and form is self to the eye, so the eye can see form. If it were other, it could not see it. If one says it is other and yet can see it, why does the eye not see invisible form? Since it does not see invisible form and only sees visible form, one should know that form is self to the eye and is therefore seen, while to the other it is not seen; this is actually seeing self and not seeing other—how can it be called seeing other and not seeing self? Furthermore, the analogy of fire cannot establish the dharma of the eye seeing: apart from the eye there is form, but apart from the eye there is no fire; therefore, one should not cite non-separation to rescue the meaning of separation. As the *Śata-śāstra* says: 'Apart from clay there is no vase, but eye and form are distinct.' The second half explains why it cannot establish it. Adducing the refutation through the approach of the three times has three purposes: first, to block subsequent rescues: the author of the treatise adduced the lamp as a parallel, the opponent cited fire to rescue, and now having refuted fire, they might further cite a knife or a finger having no efficacy upon itself yet having utility upon another; therefore he adduces the approach of the three times to universally refute everything that is powerless upon itself yet capable upon another. Second, wishing to cause the opponent to penetrate what follows by means of the previous approach of contemplation, he refers to the former to refute the latter. Third, above he negated [the position] that not seeing itself entails not seeing another; now he concedes seeing another and opens up the three times to press the question; this is first negating and then conceding.