中觀論疏 4.23

4.23

‘The answer is: no.’ This is the second part, the author of the treatise refuting [the opponent]. In terms of the text, there are two parts: first, the prose states the negation; second, the root verse explains the negation. Question: The opponent cites scriptures to clarify that the six faculties exist; the author of the treatise clarifies that they do not exist—is this not refuting the Buddha's scriptures? Answer: The opponent posits that the self and the six faculties are both false, thinking that the Buddha intended to borrow the six falsities to stop the falsity of the self; those who grasp at the teaching thereupon claim that the six faculties truly exist, and thus fail to understand the Buddha's intention. Furthermore, when the Buddha said the six faculties are false, his intention was to clarify that the six are empty; yet the opponent thinks that falsity exists, and thus likewise does not recognize the Buddha's intention. Moreover, the Buddha's intention in speaking of the six was conventional truth; examining the Tathāgata's intention, he spoke of conventional truth in order to bring about awakening to the ultimate truth; but people of the Hīnayāna think that the six truly exist, not knowing the ultimate truth. Now, to say there are no six in meaning is precisely to elucidate the Buddha's intention in speaking of the six. Hence the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* says: 'In order to cause sentient beings to deeply understand the ultimate truth, he speaks of conventional truth. If sentient beings did not enter the ultimate truth by means of conventional truth, the Buddhas would never speak of conventional truth.' When the Buddha spoke of the six, this clarified the meaning of the non-six six, wishing to cause sentient beings to awaken to the non-six by means of the six. But the opponent considers them to be fixed faculties, turning it into six because of six; not only do they fail to know the non-six six, they are also unable to awaken to the six as non-six. Therefore, it is the opponent who refutes the scriptures. When the author of the treatise clarifies the non-six six, this is precisely elucidating conventional truth; when he clarifies awakening to the non-six by means of the six, this is precisely elucidating ultimate truth. Having elucidated the two truths, the two wisdoms are generated. Furthermore, the Buddha spoke of these six to bring about awakening to the non-six, so that within the six no afflictions would arise. Yet the opponent has had these six bases from beginningless time and generated afflictions; and having received the Buddha's teaching, they further dispute and contend over the six bases, so old delusions are not removed and new ailments arise—this is called refuting the Buddha. The author of the treatise is contrary to this, and therefore it is called elucidating the teaching. Question: When treatises expound the Dharma, they do not depart from the two truths; now in saying there are no six, upon which truth does it rely? Answer: Within both of the two truths, these six are absent: in conventional truth, there are no substantially real six with intrinsic nature; in the ultimate truth, there are no provisional six; therefore he says 'no'. The root verse is precisely the explanation of the prose. Broadly speaking, there are four formulas: first, a verse explains a verse; second, prose explains a verse; third, prose explains prose; fourth, a verse explains prose. In the second part, the seven verses of refutation are divided into two: first, there are six verses directly refuting the visual faculty; next, there is one verse analogously examining the remaining five. The six verses are divided into six: the first verse directly refutes; the second refers to the previous to refute; the third refutes again; the fourth shows that because dharmas do not exist, a person does not exist; the fifth shows that because a person does not exist, dharmas do not exist; the sixth verse shows that because causes do not exist, effects do not exist. Now, we bundle these six verses into two: the first five verses directly refute the meaning of the cause of seeing; the second single verse refutes the fruit produced by seeing. Within the five verses, there are again three classes: the first three verses refute the eye seeing; the second half verse refutes form seeing; the third verse and a half refutes a person seeing. The three verses are threefold: the first verse adduces not seeing itself to refute seeing another by comparison; the second verse refutes seeing another through the approach of the three times; the third verse refutes seeing another with respect to the meaning of confronting form. Here, it is adducing not seeing itself to refute seeing another. Question: Above, five schools established seeing; whom is he refuting now? Answer: He refutes all universally. Because all masters agree that the eye does not see itself yet can see another, adducing not seeing itself to refute seeing another by comparison universally refutes all of them. The intention of the refutation is: your intrinsic entity is the eye, so it should see its own entity; if it does not see its own entity, then its own entity is not the eye. Furthermore, if it is not seeing yet is an eye, then seeing would be a non-eye. If so, there should be an eye apart from seeing, and one should also say there is seeing apart from the eye. Furthermore, this objection presses most urgently against the Abhidharma: they clarify that the base is form; since it can see another, it should also see itself. They rescue [their position] saying: 'The visual base is invisible, resistant form, and therefore cannot be seen.' Now he refutes them, saying: 'Since the entity of the eye is not seen by another, how could it see another? As the *Śata-śāstra* says: "The four great elements are not seen by the eye; how could they produce the eye's seeing?"' Next, objecting to the view that consciousness sees: if consciousness can see another, consciousness should be able to see itself; if one says consciousness is not a visible dharma, how could it see itself? If so, not being a visible dharma, how could it see another? The refutation of a person seeing is analogous to this. Furthermore, in a general objection to all masters who hold that the eye does not see itself yet can see another: this would be half seeing and half not seeing, and should be half eye and half non-eye. If one names it from the half seeing, calling it seeing and calling it an eye, one should also name it from the half not seeing, calling it non-seeing and calling it non-eye. Why is this? The self is proximate, while the other is distant; since it is named seeing from seeing the distant, it should be named non-seeing from not seeing the proximate. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the eye possesses ten subtle atoms, among which there is separately an eye subtle atom. The refutation says: 'The eye is produced by many conditions and has no intrinsic nature; how can you say that there is a real eye that does not see itself yet can see another?' In the *Tattvasiddhi*, the eye is a provisional designation, without intrinsic nature. If it has no intrinsic nature, it is precisely quiescent extinction; how can one grasp at the eye as definitely able to see? 'Objection: Although the eye does not see itself...'—the opponent's rescue means: a lamp's agent and object are both the form āyatana, so it illuminates itself and also illuminates another. The eye that can see is the visual āyatana, and what is seen is the form āyatana; therefore it sees another and does not see itself. This is the Abhidharma rescue. According to the treatise masters' rescue: the eye that can see is consciousness, and what is seen is form, so it can see another without seeing itself. The Vātsīputrīyas and the external paths agree in saying: the person is what can see, and form is what is seen; both clarifying that the person is invisible and form is visible, which is why it only sees another and does not see itself. In citing fire: according to the Sarvāstivādins, what can burn is tangible, and what is burned possesses four subtle atoms, so fire cannot burn itself but can burn another. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* also says: 'Possessing form, it can illuminate; possessing tangibility, it can burn.' This is broadly the same as the Sarvāstivādins. In the answer, there are two parts: the first half clarifies that fire cannot establish the dharma of seeing. Why is this? The eye gazes from a distance, whereas fire burns firewood only upon reaching it; one should not cite contact to rescue separation. Furthermore, it says: examining this doctrine of yours, it should burn itself and not burn another, or see itself and not see another. Why? When fire burns firewood, the firewood is self to the fire, which is why it can burn the firewood. If it were other, why does it not burn other firewood? Being equally other, it should burn it equally; otherwise, it should equally not burn it. But since it burns the burned firewood and does not burn other firewood, then the burned firewood is not other, which is precisely the meaning of burning itself. The meaning of seeing is also like this: the eye sees form, and form is self to the eye, so the eye can see form. If it were other, it could not see it. If one says it is other and yet can see it, why does the eye not see invisible form? Since it does not see invisible form and only sees visible form, one should know that form is self to the eye and is therefore seen, while to the other it is not seen; this is actually seeing self and not seeing other—how can it be called seeing other and not seeing self? Furthermore, the analogy of fire cannot establish the dharma of the eye seeing: apart from the eye there is form, but apart from the eye there is no fire; therefore, one should not cite non-separation to rescue the meaning of separation. As the *Śata-śāstra* says: 'Apart from clay there is no vase, but eye and form are distinct.' The second half explains why it cannot establish it. Adducing the refutation through the approach of the three times has three purposes: first, to block subsequent rescues: the author of the treatise adduced the lamp as a parallel, the opponent cited fire to rescue, and now having refuted fire, they might further cite a knife or a finger having no efficacy upon itself yet having utility upon another; therefore he adduces the approach of the three times to universally refute everything that is powerless upon itself yet capable upon another. Second, wishing to cause the opponent to penetrate what follows by means of the previous approach of contemplation, he refers to the former to refute the latter. Third, above he negated [the position] that not seeing itself entails not seeing another; now he concedes seeing another and opens up the three times to press the question; this is first negating and then conceding.