中觀論疏 4.33

4.33

復次相似不相似者，此第三似不似門破。上因果相離不相離及有因無因門窮之已遍，但無始來有此陰身，空觀不成、有心常現，故論主更開二門以觀察之。又此章來者，外人云：今實見殺生短壽，是相似義；種羊角葦生、倒種牛毛蒲生，是不似義。水月鏡像是相似義，泥瓶縷布是不相似。一切因果既有似不似，即有因果，何得言都無耶？若都無因果，墮邪見。是故今次破其似不似，明二俱不成。由外人倒見有，今求其倒見有不得，故名無所有；若復執無，還是倒見無耳。問：似不似云何不成？答：見身望頭足總別不同、一多為異，云何相似？人別不成畜生之總，云何不似？又似不似猶是一異義耳。頭足與身一，身一即頭足一；若頭足與身異，除頭足應有總身。「受陰及想陰」下，第二倒破四陰。色心相依，上求色不得即心無所依，是故無心。又既已三門求色不可得，今還以三門求心亦不可得。五陰有三種次第：一依《成論》取境次第者，識得實法、想得假名、受領納好惡、行起善惡。依毘曇有二種次第：一麁細次第，色最麁故前說，受覺苦樂亦麁故次色，想取像貌故次受，行起貪瞋亦麁故次想，識唯得青黃境故最細。二觀行次第，無始已來男為女色、女為男色，故前觀色陰。所以貪色者，由樂受故；所以有樂受者，以想取像貌故；所以想取像貌者，由行心分別故；所以有行者，根本由心識，故最後說識。今此文正是毘曇及諸經明次第義也。「今造論者欲歎美空義而說偈」下，第二次明歎美空。問：何故就此品末歎美空耶？答：一者隨寄一品末並得論之。二者大小乘經論多就陰門以作觀門，故就此品以歎美之。如毘曇陰內無人故空、不自在故無我，但空人不空陰。成實二聖行義，於眾生中不見眾生為空行，見陰亦無為無我行。菩薩知人與陰本自不有、今亦不無。以大小俱就五陰明觀行，故偏約此品歎空。又外人以有身心故受論主之屈，今令其觀此身心畢竟空，不受他屈而能屈他，是故歎空，令捨有身心見。又此論二十七品大明三解脫門，從〈因緣品〉至〈五陰品〉並是破有明空門，今欲結於空義，故就此品末歎美於空。從〈六種品〉去明無相門，〈作作者品〉已下辨無作門，蓋是文正意也。問：上明有因無因二俱不成，今因中有果無果皆不可得。若爾，空之與有不成問答，云何言執有不成問答、執空能成問答？答：實如所問。若空令人得道、有亦令人得道，故經中或時歎空破有、或時歎有破空。如《涅槃》云「汝今勿謂如來唯修諸法本性空寂，故歎大涅槃名為善有。」而惑者不了各執一邊，故謂有是而空非、或謂空是而有非，故成於諍論。今明空有不二，有是即空是、空非即有非。空有既不二，空有與非空有亦不二，既言有即非復有、言空即非復空，寧可各執空有耶？今言空者，是諸法實相理，不依空即是違理，問答豈得成耶？問：理既非空有，何故作空名說耶？答：以無所得空為破有所得有，此是隔節破也。又明有所得人非但執有是有、執空亦是有，今明無所得空無空亦無有故說為空，破其空有二見。又外道小乘大乘人心有所依、言有所當故為有，今說無依無所得故名空耳，如《涅槃》十對歎無所得。無所得有四無礙，有所得即無，故有所得不成問答、無所得成問答也。故初偈明有所得法師過失，如九十六種外道、小乘五百部之流，及有所得大乘，不悟諸法實相，心有所依、言有所當，故答不成答。次偈明有所得論義人問不成問。又諸法師具二種義：一者申正、二者破邪。初偈明法師答不成答，不能申正；次偈明問不成問，不能破邪。二偈各四。初偈四者，初句「若人有問者」，假設問辭；第二句假設答意；第三句明答不成答；第四句答同問疑。第二偈亦有四意：初句「若人有難問」，假設欲問；第二句正明發問；第三句問不成問；第四句問同答疑。長行為二：初釋兩偈文、次釋說兩偈意。初又二：前明不依空不成問答、次明依空成問答。前總釋二偈；「如人言瓶是無常」下，別釋兩偈，即兩也。執無常是內外二道、大小兩乘人，而正是內人也。「答從無常因生」者，瓶從四微成，故瓶是無常，以假和合故有，即緣離故無。《地持論》云「此是不成實無常，多是大乘明也。」若就毘曇體相門答者，瓶為四相遷之，是故無常。依成實人答者，由取相煩惱，感得生死中一切無常法也。「因緣中亦疑」者，此有進退二過：因若無常，即與果同疑；因若是常，即果亦是常，即有違言之失。今更却責上三義也。如由四微緣成故無常，四微何故無常耶？乃至責取相亦爾。如《智度論》責毘曇云「諸法從四緣生者，誰復生四緣耶？若更有所從即墮無窮，若無所從即墮無因，無因即常。」又緣既不從緣，即果亦不從緣。「若欲說其過」下，釋第二偈。上明瓶是無常，是內道義。今明大小乘人執瓶無常，欲破外道執瓶是常，而反受外道破。上明不能申正，今明不能破邪。以僧佉人明種種果生時，種種因不失，故瓶是常。《百論．破因有果品》外人云「若諸法但是常、無有無常，有何過耶？」故知外道立瓶是常也。又外道二十五諦，從細至麁、從麁至細，都無所失即常。是彼大宗，故須就常以明之。「汝因無常破我常」者，內道云：現見瓶無常，云何是常？外道今牒內此難也。「我亦因常破汝無常」者，立有性不失故常，以破內生滅無常也。若生滅無常者，泥滅於前，誰成瓶果？故是失業果報。又眼與瓶俱念念滅，汝眼云何能見瓶是無常耶？以我有性不失，故二義俱成也。又六根不能取六塵即失十二入，故諸法定無常，一切法壞也。又眼念念滅，汝云何得見我、欲難我耶？汝欲難我，我畢已謝滅，云何受汝難耶？口亦無常，云何得動口業而論義耶？故著外道難也。「若依空破常」下，第二明依空成問答也。即是提婆破外道，言而無當、破而不執，不立無常、逈破外道，以逈破外道則內能屈外道，不自立無常不為外所屈。「不取空相」者，此釋疑故來。既言依空破常，即有空可依，還為外道所屈。是故今明不取空相乃至四句，心無所依。「是故若欲問答」，第二釋兩偈意。世間問答尚須依空，況求至道而存有耶？非但求道，凡欲坐禪禮佛懺悔，並須依無所得也。又上就常無常二義論得失，萬義類之。如五百部各有所執，不成問答；九十六道各有所執，不成問答；如今世大小乘學人各有所執，不成問答。

Next, "similar and dissimilar": this is the third refutation via the approach of similarity and dissimilarity. Above, through the approaches of cause and effect being separated or not separated, and having a cause or lacking a cause, [the author] has already investigated [them] exhaustively. Yet because this body of aggregates has existed from beginningless time, the contemplation of emptiness is not achieved and the mind of existence constantly manifests; therefore, the author of the treatise opens two more approaches to contemplate it. Furthermore, the reason this chapter comes up is that an opponent says: "Now we actually see that taking life [leads to] a short lifespan—this is the meaning of similarity; planting ram's horn reeds grows [reeds], and planting cow hair upside down grows bulrushes—this is the meaning of dissimilarity. The reflection of the moon in water and images in a mirror are the meaning of similarity; clay [becoming] a pot and threads [becoming] cloth are dissimilarity. Since all causes and effects have similarity and dissimilarity, cause and effect therefore exist; how can you say they do not exist at all? If there were entirely no cause and effect, one would fall into wrong views." For this reason, [the treatise] now next refutes their similarity and dissimilarity, clarifying that neither is established. Because the opponent erroneously perceives existence, [Nāgārjuna] now searches for their erroneously perceived existence and finds it ungraspable; therefore it is called non-existent. If they then grasp at non-existence, that is still merely an erroneous perception of non-existence. Question: How are similarity and dissimilarity not established? Answer: Regarding the body, looking at the head and feet, the whole and the parts are not the same, and the one and the many are different—how could there be similarity? The distinct individual of a human does not constitute the whole of a beast—how could there be dissimilarity? Furthermore, similarity and dissimilarity are still just the meanings of identity and difference. If the head and feet are one with the body, since the body is one, the head and feet would be one; if the head and feet are different from the body, then apart from the head and feet there should be an aggregate body. From "the aggregate of sensation and the aggregate of perception" onward, secondly, it refutes the other four aggregates by analogy. Form and mind are mutually dependent; above, when form was sought and ungraspable, mind had nothing upon which to depend, and therefore there is no mind. Moreover, since form has already been sought through the three approaches and found to be ungraspable, now seeking mind through the same three approaches likewise finds it ungraspable. The five aggregates have three kinds of order: First, according to the order of grasping objects in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra: consciousness grasps real dharmas, perception grasps provisional designations, sensation experiences agreeable and disagreeable [things], and volition arouses good and evil. According to the Abhidharma, there are two kinds of order: 1. The order of coarseness and subtlety: form is coarsest and therefore explained first; sensation experiences suffering and pleasure and is also coarse, so it follows form; perception grasps characteristics, so it follows sensation; volition arouses greed and anger, which are also coarse, so it follows perception; consciousness only grasps objects such as blue and yellow, so it is the most subtle. 2. The order of meditative practice: from beginningless time, men have been attracted to female form and women to male form, so one first contemplates the aggregate of form. The reason one craves form is due to pleasant sensation; the reason there is pleasant sensation is because perception grasps characteristics; the reason perception grasps characteristics is due to the mental discrimination of volition; the reason there is volition is fundamentally based on mental consciousness—therefore consciousness is explained last. This text precisely conveys the meaning of the order explained in the Abhidharma and various sūtras. From "Now the author of the treatise, wishing to praise the doctrine of emptiness, speaks this verse" onward, secondly, it explains the praise of emptiness. Question: Why is emptiness praised at the end of this chapter? Answer: First, it can appropriately be discussed at the end of any chapter. Second, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras and treatises mostly use the approach of the aggregates to formulate contemplations; hence [the author] takes this chapter to praise it. For instance, in the Abhidharma, because there is no person within the aggregates, it is empty; because there is no autonomy, it is non-self—yet it only empties the person, not the aggregates. In the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, there are two meanings of noble practice: not seeing sentient beings among sentient beings is the practice of emptiness; seeing that the aggregates are also non-existent is the practice of non-self. A bodhisattva knows that both the person and the aggregates fundamentally do not exist originally, nor are they non-existent now. Because both the Great and Small [Vehicles] clarify contemplative practice based on the five aggregates, emptiness is praised particularly with reference to this chapter. Furthermore, because opponents possess [the view of] body and mind, they suffer defeat from the author of the treatise; now, making them contemplate this body and mind as ultimately empty, they will not be defeated by others but can defeat others—therefore, emptiness is praised to cause them to abandon the view of possessing body and mind. Furthermore, the twenty-seven chapters of this treatise largely elucidate the three gates of liberation: from "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" to "Chapter on the Five Aggregates," they all refute existence and elucidate the gate of emptiness; now, wishing to conclude the meaning of emptiness, [the author] therefore praises emptiness at the end of this chapter. From "Chapter on the Six Elements" onward, the gate of signlessness is elucidated; from "Chapter on Agent and Action" onward, the gate of wishlessness is distinguished—this is the primary intention of the text. Question: Above it was clarified that both possessing a cause and lacking a cause are unestablished; now, having an effect within the cause or not having an effect are both ungraspable. If so, both emptiness and existence fail to establish questioning and answering; why do you say that grasping at existence fails to establish questioning and answering, while holding to emptiness can establish questioning and answering? Answer: It is truly as you ask. If emptiness causes a person to attain the Path, existence also causes a person to attain the Path; therefore, in the sūtras, sometimes emptiness is praised to refute existence, and sometimes existence is praised to refute emptiness. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Do not say now that the Tathāgata only cultivates the original empty tranquility of all dharmas; hence, praising great nirvāṇa is called excellent existence." Yet deluded people do not understand and each grasp at one side, claiming that existence is right and emptiness is wrong, or that emptiness is right and existence is wrong, thereby creating disputes. Now it is elucidated that emptiness and existence are non-dual: if existence is right, emptiness is right; if emptiness is wrong, existence is wrong. Since emptiness and existence are non-dual, emptiness-and-existence and neither-emptiness-nor-existence are also non-dual; since when existence is spoken of it is no longer existence, and when emptiness is spoken of it is no longer emptiness, how could one separately grasp at emptiness or existence? What is now called emptiness is the principle of the real mark of all dharmas; not relying on emptiness is defying the principle—how could questioning and answering be established? Question: Since the principle is neither empty nor existent, why is it stated using the name "emptiness"? Answer: Emptying without appropriation is used to refute existence with appropriation—this is a staged refutation. Furthermore, it clarifies that people with appropriation not only grasp existence as existent, but also grasp emptiness as existent; now clarifying that non-appropriating emptiness has neither emptiness nor existence, it is spoken of as emptiness to refute their two views of emptiness and existence. Moreover, the minds of non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna practitioners depend on something, and their words correspond to something, which therefore constitutes existence; now, stating non-dependence and non-appropriation is merely called emptiness, just as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] praises non-appropriation with ten pairs. Non-appropriation possesses the four unhindered knowledges, whereas with appropriation there is none; therefore, with appropriation questioning and answering are not established, while without appropriation questioning and answering are established. Hence the first verse clarifies the fault of Dharma masters with appropriation, such as the ninety-six kinds of non-Buddhists, the lineage of the five hundred Hīnayāna schools, and Mahāyānists with appropriation, who do not realize the real mark of all dharmas: because their minds depend on something and their words correspond to something, their answers do not constitute answers. The next verse clarifies that for debaters with appropriation, their questions do not constitute questions. Furthermore, all Dharma masters possess two functions: first, elucidating the correct; second, refuting the heterodox. The first verse clarifies that the master's answer does not constitute an answer, failing to elucidate the correct; the next verse clarifies that the question does not constitute a question, failing to refute the heterodox. The two verses each have four [lines]. In the first verse, the four are: the first line, "If someone asks a question," posits a hypothetical question; the second line posits the hypothetical intended answer; the third line clarifies that the answer does not constitute an answer; the fourth line shows that the answer shares the same doubt as the question. The second verse also has four meanings: the first line, "If someone poses an objection," posits the intention to question; the second line directly clarifies the posing of the question; the third line shows that the question does not constitute a question; the fourth line shows that the question shares the same doubt as the answer. The prose is twofold: first, it explains the text of the two verses; next, it explains the intention of speaking the two verses. The first is also twofold: first, it clarifies that not relying on emptiness fails to establish questioning and answering; next, it clarifies that relying on emptiness establishes questioning and answering. The first generally explains the two verses; from "Just as someone says a pot is impermanent" onward, it specifically explains the two verses, which is twofold. Grasping at impermanence applies to both internal and external paths, both Great and Small Vehicles, but it specifically refers to internal [Buddhist] persons. "Answer: it is produced from an impermanent cause": a pot is formed from the four subtle atoms, so the pot is impermanent; because it exists due to provisional harmony, it is non-existent when conditions disperse. The Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra (Dichi lun) says: "This is unaccomplished impermanence, which is mostly explained in the Mahāyāna." If answering according to the Abhidharma approach of essence and marks: the pot is shifted by the four characteristics, and is therefore impermanent. According to the proponent of the Tattvasiddhi: due to the defilement of grasping marks, one brings about all impermanent dharmas within birth and death. "There is also doubt in the cause and conditions": this has the two faults of advancing and retreating. If the cause is impermanent, it shares the same doubt as the effect; if the cause is permanent, then the effect is also permanent, which entails the fault of contradicting one's own words. Now we further turn back and interrogate the above three meanings. For example, if it is impermanent because it is formed through the conditions of the four subtle atoms, why are the four subtle atoms impermanent? And so on down to interrogating the grasping of marks as being likewise. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa interrogates the Abhidharma: "If all dharmas arise from the four conditions, what then produces the four conditions? If they are derived from something further, one falls into infinite regress; if they are not derived from anything, one falls into causelessness, and causelessness is permanence." Furthermore, since the conditions do not arise from conditions, the effect also does not arise from conditions. From "If one wishes to state its fault" onward, it explains the second verse. Above, stating that a pot is impermanent was the internal [Buddhist] doctrine. Now it clarifies that people of the Great and Small Vehicles grasp at the impermanence of the pot wishing to refute the non-Buddhist grasp of the pot as permanent, but are instead refuted by the non-Buddhists. Above it clarified the failure to elucidate the correct; now it clarifies the failure to refute the heterodox. Because the Sāṃkhya clarifies that when various effects arise, the various causes are not lost, the pot is therefore permanent. In the Śata-śāstra, "Chapter on Refuting the Effect in the Cause," the opponent says: "If all dharmas are merely permanent and there is no impermanence, what fault is there?" Therefore we know that non-Buddhists assert the pot is permanent. Furthermore, among the twenty-five principles of the non-Buddhists, from subtle to coarse and from coarse to subtle, nothing whatsoever is lost, which is permanence. Since this is their foundational doctrine, one must elucidate it with respect to permanence. "You use impermanence to refute my permanence": the Buddhist says: "We presently see that a pot is impermanent; how could it be permanent?" The non-Buddhist now takes up this Buddhist objection. "I also use permanence to refute your impermanence": asserting that the intrinsic nature is not lost and is therefore permanent, in order to refute the Buddhist [doctrine of] arising-and-ceasing impermanence. If it is arising-and-ceasing impermanence, since the clay perished earlier, what accomplishes the effect of the pot? Therefore karmic retributive cause and effect would be lost. Furthermore, both the eye and the pot perish from moment to moment; how could your eye see that the pot is impermanent? Because our intrinsic nature is not lost, both meanings are established. Furthermore, if the six faculties cannot grasp the six sensory objects, then the twelve sense fields are lost; therefore, if dharmas are definitively impermanent, all dharmas are destroyed. Furthermore, since the eye perishes from moment to moment, how can you see me and wish to object to me? When you wish to object to me, I have already ceased and perished; how could I receive your objection? The mouth is also impermanent; how could you activate verbal karma to engage in debate? Thus one is trapped by the non-Buddhist's objection. From "If relying on emptiness one refutes permanence" onward, secondly, it clarifies that relying on emptiness establishes questioning and answering. This refers to Āryadeva refuting non-Buddhists: speaking without attachment, refuting without grasping, not asserting impermanence, completely refuting non-Buddhists; by completely refuting non-Buddhists, internally one can defeat non-Buddhists, and not asserting impermanence oneself, one is not defeated by outsiders. "Not grasping the marks of emptiness": this comes to resolve a doubt. Since it says that relying on emptiness one refutes permanence, there would then be an emptiness to rely upon, and one would again be defeated by non-Buddhists. For this reason, it now clarifies not grasping the marks of emptiness down to the four propositions, so the mind has nothing upon which to depend. "Therefore, if one wishes to question and answer", secondly, explains the intention of the two verses. If worldly questions and answers must still rely on emptiness, how much more so for seeking the ultimate Path while retaining [the view of] existence? Not only seeking the Path, but whenever one wishes to sit in meditation, pay homage to the Buddha, and repent, one must always rely on non-appropriation. Furthermore, above the gains and losses were discussed with respect to the two meanings of permanence and impermanence; the myriad meanings may be categorized accordingly. Just as each of the five hundred schools has its own attachments and fails to establish questioning and answering; just as each of the ninety-six paths has its own attachments and fails to establish questioning and answering; so too today students of the Great and Small Vehicles each have their attachments and fail to establish questioning and answering.