中觀論疏 4.33

4.33

Next, "similar and dissimilar": this is the third refutation via the approach of similarity and dissimilarity. Above, through the approaches of cause and effect being separated or not separated, and having a cause or lacking a cause, [the author] has already investigated [them] exhaustively. Yet because this body of aggregates has existed from beginningless time, the contemplation of emptiness is not achieved and the mind of existence constantly manifests; therefore, the author of the treatise opens two more approaches to contemplate it. Furthermore, the reason this chapter comes up is that an opponent says: "Now we actually see that taking life [leads to] a short lifespan—this is the meaning of similarity; planting ram's horn reeds grows [reeds], and planting cow hair upside down grows bulrushes—this is the meaning of dissimilarity. The reflection of the moon in water and images in a mirror are the meaning of similarity; clay [becoming] a pot and threads [becoming] cloth are dissimilarity. Since all causes and effects have similarity and dissimilarity, cause and effect therefore exist; how can you say they do not exist at all? If there were entirely no cause and effect, one would fall into wrong views." For this reason, [the treatise] now next refutes their similarity and dissimilarity, clarifying that neither is established. Because the opponent erroneously perceives existence, [Nāgārjuna] now searches for their erroneously perceived existence and finds it ungraspable; therefore it is called non-existent. If they then grasp at non-existence, that is still merely an erroneous perception of non-existence. Question: How are similarity and dissimilarity not established? Answer: Regarding the body, looking at the head and feet, the whole and the parts are not the same, and the one and the many are different—how could there be similarity? The distinct individual of a human does not constitute the whole of a beast—how could there be dissimilarity? Furthermore, similarity and dissimilarity are still just the meanings of identity and difference. If the head and feet are one with the body, since the body is one, the head and feet would be one; if the head and feet are different from the body, then apart from the head and feet there should be an aggregate body. From "the aggregate of sensation and the aggregate of perception" onward, secondly, it refutes the other four aggregates by analogy. Form and mind are mutually dependent; above, when form was sought and ungraspable, mind had nothing upon which to depend, and therefore there is no mind. Moreover, since form has already been sought through the three approaches and found to be ungraspable, now seeking mind through the same three approaches likewise finds it ungraspable. The five aggregates have three kinds of order: First, according to the order of grasping objects in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra: consciousness grasps real dharmas, perception grasps provisional designations, sensation experiences agreeable and disagreeable [things], and volition arouses good and evil. According to the Abhidharma, there are two kinds of order: 1. The order of coarseness and subtlety: form is coarsest and therefore explained first; sensation experiences suffering and pleasure and is also coarse, so it follows form; perception grasps characteristics, so it follows sensation; volition arouses greed and anger, which are also coarse, so it follows perception; consciousness only grasps objects such as blue and yellow, so it is the most subtle. 2. The order of meditative practice: from beginningless time, men have been attracted to female form and women to male form, so one first contemplates the aggregate of form. The reason one craves form is due to pleasant sensation; the reason there is pleasant sensation is because perception grasps characteristics; the reason perception grasps characteristics is due to the mental discrimination of volition; the reason there is volition is fundamentally based on mental consciousness—therefore consciousness is explained last. This text precisely conveys the meaning of the order explained in the Abhidharma and various sūtras. From "Now the author of the treatise, wishing to praise the doctrine of emptiness, speaks this verse" onward, secondly, it explains the praise of emptiness. Question: Why is emptiness praised at the end of this chapter? Answer: First, it can appropriately be discussed at the end of any chapter. Second, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras and treatises mostly use the approach of the aggregates to formulate contemplations; hence [the author] takes this chapter to praise it. For instance, in the Abhidharma, because there is no person within the aggregates, it is empty; because there is no autonomy, it is non-self—yet it only empties the person, not the aggregates. In the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, there are two meanings of noble practice: not seeing sentient beings among sentient beings is the practice of emptiness; seeing that the aggregates are also non-existent is the practice of non-self. A bodhisattva knows that both the person and the aggregates fundamentally do not exist originally, nor are they non-existent now. Because both the Great and Small [Vehicles] clarify contemplative practice based on the five aggregates, emptiness is praised particularly with reference to this chapter. Furthermore, because opponents possess [the view of] body and mind, they suffer defeat from the author of the treatise; now, making them contemplate this body and mind as ultimately empty, they will not be defeated by others but can defeat others—therefore, emptiness is praised to cause them to abandon the view of possessing body and mind. Furthermore, the twenty-seven chapters of this treatise largely elucidate the three gates of liberation: from "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" to "Chapter on the Five Aggregates," they all refute existence and elucidate the gate of emptiness; now, wishing to conclude the meaning of emptiness, [the author] therefore praises emptiness at the end of this chapter. From "Chapter on the Six Elements" onward, the gate of signlessness is elucidated; from "Chapter on Agent and Action" onward, the gate of wishlessness is distinguished—this is the primary intention of the text. Question: Above it was clarified that both possessing a cause and lacking a cause are unestablished; now, having an effect within the cause or not having an effect are both ungraspable. If so, both emptiness and existence fail to establish questioning and answering; why do you say that grasping at existence fails to establish questioning and answering, while holding to emptiness can establish questioning and answering? Answer: It is truly as you ask. If emptiness causes a person to attain the Path, existence also causes a person to attain the Path; therefore, in the sūtras, sometimes emptiness is praised to refute existence, and sometimes existence is praised to refute emptiness. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Do not say now that the Tathāgata only cultivates the original empty tranquility of all dharmas; hence, praising great nirvāṇa is called excellent existence." Yet deluded people do not understand and each grasp at one side, claiming that existence is right and emptiness is wrong, or that emptiness is right and existence is wrong, thereby creating disputes. Now it is elucidated that emptiness and existence are non-dual: if existence is right, emptiness is right; if emptiness is wrong, existence is wrong. Since emptiness and existence are non-dual, emptiness-and-existence and neither-emptiness-nor-existence are also non-dual; since when existence is spoken of it is no longer existence, and when emptiness is spoken of it is no longer emptiness, how could one separately grasp at emptiness or existence? What is now called emptiness is the principle of the real mark of all dharmas; not relying on emptiness is defying the principle—how could questioning and answering be established? Question: Since the principle is neither empty nor existent, why is it stated using the name "emptiness"? Answer: Emptying without appropriation is used to refute existence with appropriation—this is a staged refutation. Furthermore, it clarifies that people with appropriation not only grasp existence as existent, but also grasp emptiness as existent; now clarifying that non-appropriating emptiness has neither emptiness nor existence, it is spoken of as emptiness to refute their two views of emptiness and existence. Moreover, the minds of non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna practitioners depend on something, and their words correspond to something, which therefore constitutes existence; now, stating non-dependence and non-appropriation is merely called emptiness, just as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] praises non-appropriation with ten pairs. Non-appropriation possesses the four unhindered knowledges, whereas with appropriation there is none; therefore, with appropriation questioning and answering are not established, while without appropriation questioning and answering are established. Hence the first verse clarifies the fault of Dharma masters with appropriation, such as the ninety-six kinds of non-Buddhists, the lineage of the five hundred Hīnayāna schools, and Mahāyānists with appropriation, who do not realize the real mark of all dharmas: because their minds depend on something and their words correspond to something, their answers do not constitute answers. The next verse clarifies that for debaters with appropriation, their questions do not constitute questions. Furthermore, all Dharma masters possess two functions: first, elucidating the correct; second, refuting the heterodox. The first verse clarifies that the master's answer does not constitute an answer, failing to elucidate the correct; the next verse clarifies that the question does not constitute a question, failing to refute the heterodox. The two verses each have four [lines]. In the first verse, the four are: the first line, "If someone asks a question," posits a hypothetical question; the second line posits the hypothetical intended answer; the third line clarifies that the answer does not constitute an answer; the fourth line shows that the answer shares the same doubt as the question. The second verse also has four meanings: the first line, "If someone poses an objection," posits the intention to question; the second line directly clarifies the posing of the question; the third line shows that the question does not constitute a question; the fourth line shows that the question shares the same doubt as the answer. The prose is twofold: first, it explains the text of the two verses; next, it explains the intention of speaking the two verses. The first is also twofold: first, it clarifies that not relying on emptiness fails to establish questioning and answering; next, it clarifies that relying on emptiness establishes questioning and answering. The first generally explains the two verses; from "Just as someone says a pot is impermanent" onward, it specifically explains the two verses, which is twofold. Grasping at impermanence applies to both internal and external paths, both Great and Small Vehicles, but it specifically refers to internal [Buddhist] persons. "Answer: it is produced from an impermanent cause": a pot is formed from the four subtle atoms, so the pot is impermanent; because it exists due to provisional harmony, it is non-existent when conditions disperse. The Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra (Dichi lun) says: "This is unaccomplished impermanence, which is mostly explained in the Mahāyāna." If answering according to the Abhidharma approach of essence and marks: the pot is shifted by the four characteristics, and is therefore impermanent. According to the proponent of the Tattvasiddhi: due to the defilement of grasping marks, one brings about all impermanent dharmas within birth and death. "There is also doubt in the cause and conditions": this has the two faults of advancing and retreating. If the cause is impermanent, it shares the same doubt as the effect; if the cause is permanent, then the effect is also permanent, which entails the fault of contradicting one's own words. Now we further turn back and interrogate the above three meanings. For example, if it is impermanent because it is formed through the conditions of the four subtle atoms, why are the four subtle atoms impermanent? And so on down to interrogating the grasping of marks as being likewise. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa interrogates the Abhidharma: "If all dharmas arise from the four conditions, what then produces the four conditions? If they are derived from something further, one falls into infinite regress; if they are not derived from anything, one falls into causelessness, and causelessness is permanence." Furthermore, since the conditions do not arise from conditions, the effect also does not arise from conditions. From "If one wishes to state its fault" onward, it explains the second verse. Above, stating that a pot is impermanent was the internal [Buddhist] doctrine. Now it clarifies that people of the Great and Small Vehicles grasp at the impermanence of the pot wishing to refute the non-Buddhist grasp of the pot as permanent, but are instead refuted by the non-Buddhists. Above it clarified the failure to elucidate the correct; now it clarifies the failure to refute the heterodox. Because the Sāṃkhya clarifies that when various effects arise, the various causes are not lost, the pot is therefore permanent. In the Śata-śāstra, "Chapter on Refuting the Effect in the Cause," the opponent says: "If all dharmas are merely permanent and there is no impermanence, what fault is there?" Therefore we know that non-Buddhists assert the pot is permanent. Furthermore, among the twenty-five principles of the non-Buddhists, from subtle to coarse and from coarse to subtle, nothing whatsoever is lost, which is permanence. Since this is their foundational doctrine, one must elucidate it with respect to permanence. "You use impermanence to refute my permanence": the Buddhist says: "We presently see that a pot is impermanent; how could it be permanent?" The non-Buddhist now takes up this Buddhist objection. "I also use permanence to refute your impermanence": asserting that the intrinsic nature is not lost and is therefore permanent, in order to refute the Buddhist [doctrine of] arising-and-ceasing impermanence. If it is arising-and-ceasing impermanence, since the clay perished earlier, what accomplishes the effect of the pot? Therefore karmic retributive cause and effect would be lost. Furthermore, both the eye and the pot perish from moment to moment; how could your eye see that the pot is impermanent? Because our intrinsic nature is not lost, both meanings are established. Furthermore, if the six faculties cannot grasp the six sensory objects, then the twelve sense fields are lost; therefore, if dharmas are definitively impermanent, all dharmas are destroyed. Furthermore, since the eye perishes from moment to moment, how can you see me and wish to object to me? When you wish to object to me, I have already ceased and perished; how could I receive your objection? The mouth is also impermanent; how could you activate verbal karma to engage in debate? Thus one is trapped by the non-Buddhist's objection. From "If relying on emptiness one refutes permanence" onward, secondly, it clarifies that relying on emptiness establishes questioning and answering. This refers to Āryadeva refuting non-Buddhists: speaking without attachment, refuting without grasping, not asserting impermanence, completely refuting non-Buddhists; by completely refuting non-Buddhists, internally one can defeat non-Buddhists, and not asserting impermanence oneself, one is not defeated by outsiders. "Not grasping the marks of emptiness": this comes to resolve a doubt. Since it says that relying on emptiness one refutes permanence, there would then be an emptiness to rely upon, and one would again be defeated by non-Buddhists. For this reason, it now clarifies not grasping the marks of emptiness down to the four propositions, so the mind has nothing upon which to depend. "Therefore, if one wishes to question and answer", secondly, explains the intention of the two verses. If worldly questions and answers must still rely on emptiness, how much more so for seeking the ultimate Path while retaining [the view of] existence? Not only seeking the Path, but whenever one wishes to sit in meditation, pay homage to the Buddha, and repent, one must always rely on non-appropriation. Furthermore, above the gains and losses were discussed with respect to the two meanings of permanence and impermanence; the myriad meanings may be categorized accordingly. Just as each of the five hundred schools has its own attachments and fails to establish questioning and answering; just as each of the ninety-six paths has its own attachments and fails to establish questioning and answering; so too today students of the Great and Small Vehicles each have their attachments and fail to establish questioning and answering.