中觀論疏 5.12

5.12

「復次今當以一異法破」下，第三兩偈一異門破。上前後一時並是一異，今欲相對，更作一異破耳。又今作一異，通破前後一時。又上三門直責人無起染之功、染無染人之用，今即破無人法之體。若一若異俱無人法之體，云何有相染用耶？又前三門就人法前後竪破，今就一異橫破。就兩偈為二：前偈奪一異、後偈縱一異。又前是章門、後偈解釋。又初直明不合、後出合過。初偈上半牒人法體一，一法云何合？此破人法之用。人法既一，即無異染之人起染，故人不與染合。無異人之染，以染於人故，染不與人合。下半牒人法體異，即二體各成，不須合也。問：一異是誰義？答：莊嚴云有假人體異實法體，是人染異義。開善云別有人用異實用，亦是異義。數義無別有人，但有人名起於五陰上，即是一義。又假有即實義、假有異實義，具通一異。問：若人法悉有別體用即人法並應是實，若一假一實即一有體一無體。次問開善：若假無體而有用，用本附體，無體何所附？若假用附實體，隨體相有實用而假無用。又假用附實體，亦應實體附假用，若互相附則應互假互實也。又若假用異實用，以實為假體者，亦應香用異色用，以色為香體。若色不成香，非色為香體者，色不成香可言其異，實既成假應不得異。「若一有合者」，第二偈縱一異也。上半縱一有合、下半縱異有合。上偈明一法無合，故是奪；今許一有合以顯其過，故是縱關。「離伴應有合」者，正難一合也。伴有親疎，人為染伴、染為人伴，此親伴也；因六根六塵而起貪，此是疎伴。又依毘曇，諸心相依共起，亦是伴。人染若一而言合者，則唯是人、無有染伴，此應有合；不爾則唯是染、無有人伴，此亦應合也；不爾則非是人亦非是染，直名一物，都無人染二伴，此應有合也。下半破異有合者，凡有二過：一者既異染，而人自有體，不須染伴；異人有染自體，染不須人伴。二者近異相須而遂合者，東西遠異亦應合也。問：一異俱稱離伴，有何異耶？答：一明離伴，此是獨合，以無伴故言其離。異明離伴，此是各合，有伴而合、離伴各自合，有二伴而相離也。又一既無伴，應與空合，而空不可合也。人與染異，遂與染合；人與柱異；應與柱合。又一則無伴、異則非伴，猶如瓶衣，瓶非衣伴，以伴是伴類義故。又問：一物可得相離不？若不可相離，豈得相成合也。又若一有合者，亦應一法有伴；而一法無伴，則一法無合。常解四微成柱，凡有二說：或言有間，謂色處無香故也。復言無間，謂色處有香。今問：若言有間，則色處無香，云何共合？以各二處故。若言無間，則色處有香，便是一物，云何言異而共合耶？又人法二名得是一者，善惡亦二名、色心二名亦應一也。長行云「餘因緣」者，人是染餘、染是人餘。又假內根外塵故生於染，此亦是餘因緣也。所以作此破者，既異染自有人體，則不須根塵因緣生染成人體也。

From "Furthermore, now we shall refute by means of the properties of identity and difference" onward, the third [section] refutes through the approach of identity and difference in two verses. Prior, posterior, and simultaneous above are all cases of identity and difference; here, addressing them directly, [the author] further refutes by identity and difference. Furthermore, by constructing identity and difference now, he comprehensively refutes prior, posterior, and simultaneous. Furthermore, the three approaches above merely censured the person for lacking the capacity to generate defilement and defilement for lacking the function of defiling the person, whereas here he directly refutes the nonexistence of the substantial entities of the person and the dharma. If both identity and difference lack the substantial entities of person and dharma, how could there be a mutual function of defilement? Furthermore, the previous three approaches refuted [them] vertically with regard to the sequence of person and dharma, whereas here he refutes [them] horizontally with regard to identity and difference. This is divided into two parts for the two verses: the first verse negates identity and difference; the second verse concedes identity and difference. Furthermore, the former is the thematic proposition, and the latter verse is the explanation. Furthermore, the first directly explains the impossibility of union, and the second exposes the faults of union. The upper half of the first verse cites the substantial identity of person and dharma: how could a single dharma unite? This refutes the functions of person and dharma. Since person and dharma are one, there is no person distinct from defilement to generate defilement; hence the person does not unite with defilement. Nor is there defilement distinct from the person to defile the person; hence defilement does not unite with the person. The lower half cites the substantial difference between person and dharma: then the two substantial entities are each established on their own, and do not need to unite. Question: Whose doctrines are identity and difference? Answer: Zhuangyan says there is a provisional entity of the person distinct from the substantial entity of real dharmas, which is the doctrine of the difference between person and defilement. Kaishan says there is a distinct provisional function [of the person] distinct from the real function, which is also a doctrine of difference. The Abhidharma position is that there is no separate person, only the designation of a person arising upon the five aggregates, which is the doctrine of identity. Furthermore, the doctrine that the provisional is identical to the real, and the doctrine that the provisional is different from the real, both fully cover identity and difference. Question: If person and dharma each have distinct entities and functions, then both person and dharma must be real; if one is provisional and one is real, then one has an entity and one lacks an entity. Next, questioning Kaishan: if the provisional has no entity but has function, function essentially attaches to an entity; with no entity, to what does it attach? If the provisional function attaches to the real entity, then in accord with the substantial characteristic there would be a real function, but the provisional would have no function. Furthermore, if the provisional function attaches to the real entity, the real entity should also attach to the provisional function; if they mutually attach, then they should be mutually provisional and mutually real. Furthermore, if the provisional function is different from the real function, and the real is taken as the provisional entity, then fragrance function should also be different from visible form function, taking visible form as the entity of fragrance. If form does not constitute fragrance, and non-form is taken as the entity of fragrance: that form does not constitute fragrance allows one to speak of their difference, but since the real constitutes the provisional, it ought not to be different. "If there is union in identity," the second verse concedes identity and difference. The upper half concedes that there is union in identity; the lower half concedes that there is union in difference. The preceding verse explained that a single dharma has no union, hence it was a negation; here, granting that identity has union to reveal its fault, it is an approach of concession. "There should be union apart from a companion" directly challenges union in identity. Companions may be intimate or distant: the person is the companion of defilement, and defilement is the companion of the person—this is an intimate companion; greed arising dependent on the six faculties and six sense-objects—this is a distant companion. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharma, the various minds mutually dependent and co-arising are also companions. If person and defilement are one yet spoken of as uniting, then there is only the person, without the companion of defilement, and this ought to possess union; otherwise, there is only defilement, without the companion of the person, and this too ought to possess union; otherwise, it is neither the person nor defilement, just a single thing completely lacking the two companions of person and defilement, and this ought to possess union. As for the lower half refuting that difference has union, there are altogether two faults: first, since it is different from defilement, the person has its own entity and does not need the companion of defilement; being different from the person, defilement has its own entity, and defilement does not need the companion of the person. Second, if things proximate and different require each other and consequently unite, then east and west, being distant and different, should also unite. Question: If both identity and difference are called "apart from a companion," what is the difference? Answer: Identity explaining "apart from a companion" is an isolated union: because there is no companion, it is said to be apart. Difference explaining "apart from a companion" is a separate union: there being a companion they unite, but apart from a companion they each unite separately, there being two companions that are separated from each other. Furthermore, since identity has no companion, it should unite with space, yet space cannot be united with. If a person, being different from defilement, consequently unites with defilement, then the person, being different from a pillar, should unite with a pillar. Furthermore, identity means having no companion, and difference means not being a companion, just like a jar and a robe: a jar is not the companion of a robe, because "companion" has the meaning of being of the same kind. Furthermore, it may be asked: can a single thing be separated from itself? If it cannot be separated, how could it form a union? Furthermore, if identity has union, then a single dharma should also have a companion; yet a single dharma has no companion, so a single dharma has no union. It is commonly explained that the four subtle atoms compose a pillar, of which there are two explanations: some say there is an interval, meaning that at the location of visible form there is no fragrance; others say there is no interval, meaning that at the location of visible form there is fragrance. Now we ask: if one says there is an interval, then at the location of visible form there is no fragrance, so how do they combine together, since each is in two separate locations? If one says there is no interval, then at the location of visible form there is fragrance, which then becomes a single thing; how could one say they are different yet combine together? Furthermore, if the two names "person" and "dharma" can be one, then good and evil are also two names, and visible form and mind are two names, so they should also be one. The prose commentary says "other causes and conditions": the person is the remainder of defilement, and defilement is the remainder of the person. Furthermore, relying on internal faculties and external objects gives rise to defilement, which is also an "other cause and condition." The reason for making this refutation is that, since there is an entity of the person in itself distinct from defilement, it does not require the conditions of faculties and objects to generate defilement to constitute the entity of the person.