中觀論疏 5.12

5.12

From "Furthermore, now we shall refute by means of the properties of identity and difference" onward, the third [section] refutes through the approach of identity and difference in two verses. Prior, posterior, and simultaneous above are all cases of identity and difference; here, addressing them directly, [the author] further refutes by identity and difference. Furthermore, by constructing identity and difference now, he comprehensively refutes prior, posterior, and simultaneous. Furthermore, the three approaches above merely censured the person for lacking the capacity to generate defilement and defilement for lacking the function of defiling the person, whereas here he directly refutes the nonexistence of the substantial entities of the person and the dharma. If both identity and difference lack the substantial entities of person and dharma, how could there be a mutual function of defilement? Furthermore, the previous three approaches refuted [them] vertically with regard to the sequence of person and dharma, whereas here he refutes [them] horizontally with regard to identity and difference. This is divided into two parts for the two verses: the first verse negates identity and difference; the second verse concedes identity and difference. Furthermore, the former is the thematic proposition, and the latter verse is the explanation. Furthermore, the first directly explains the impossibility of union, and the second exposes the faults of union. The upper half of the first verse cites the substantial identity of person and dharma: how could a single dharma unite? This refutes the functions of person and dharma. Since person and dharma are one, there is no person distinct from defilement to generate defilement; hence the person does not unite with defilement. Nor is there defilement distinct from the person to defile the person; hence defilement does not unite with the person. The lower half cites the substantial difference between person and dharma: then the two substantial entities are each established on their own, and do not need to unite. Question: Whose doctrines are identity and difference? Answer: Zhuangyan says there is a provisional entity of the person distinct from the substantial entity of real dharmas, which is the doctrine of the difference between person and defilement. Kaishan says there is a distinct provisional function [of the person] distinct from the real function, which is also a doctrine of difference. The Abhidharma position is that there is no separate person, only the designation of a person arising upon the five aggregates, which is the doctrine of identity. Furthermore, the doctrine that the provisional is identical to the real, and the doctrine that the provisional is different from the real, both fully cover identity and difference. Question: If person and dharma each have distinct entities and functions, then both person and dharma must be real; if one is provisional and one is real, then one has an entity and one lacks an entity. Next, questioning Kaishan: if the provisional has no entity but has function, function essentially attaches to an entity; with no entity, to what does it attach? If the provisional function attaches to the real entity, then in accord with the substantial characteristic there would be a real function, but the provisional would have no function. Furthermore, if the provisional function attaches to the real entity, the real entity should also attach to the provisional function; if they mutually attach, then they should be mutually provisional and mutually real. Furthermore, if the provisional function is different from the real function, and the real is taken as the provisional entity, then fragrance function should also be different from visible form function, taking visible form as the entity of fragrance. If form does not constitute fragrance, and non-form is taken as the entity of fragrance: that form does not constitute fragrance allows one to speak of their difference, but since the real constitutes the provisional, it ought not to be different. "If there is union in identity," the second verse concedes identity and difference. The upper half concedes that there is union in identity; the lower half concedes that there is union in difference. The preceding verse explained that a single dharma has no union, hence it was a negation; here, granting that identity has union to reveal its fault, it is an approach of concession. "There should be union apart from a companion" directly challenges union in identity. Companions may be intimate or distant: the person is the companion of defilement, and defilement is the companion of the person—this is an intimate companion; greed arising dependent on the six faculties and six sense-objects—this is a distant companion. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharma, the various minds mutually dependent and co-arising are also companions. If person and defilement are one yet spoken of as uniting, then there is only the person, without the companion of defilement, and this ought to possess union; otherwise, there is only defilement, without the companion of the person, and this too ought to possess union; otherwise, it is neither the person nor defilement, just a single thing completely lacking the two companions of person and defilement, and this ought to possess union. As for the lower half refuting that difference has union, there are altogether two faults: first, since it is different from defilement, the person has its own entity and does not need the companion of defilement; being different from the person, defilement has its own entity, and defilement does not need the companion of the person. Second, if things proximate and different require each other and consequently unite, then east and west, being distant and different, should also unite. Question: If both identity and difference are called "apart from a companion," what is the difference? Answer: Identity explaining "apart from a companion" is an isolated union: because there is no companion, it is said to be apart. Difference explaining "apart from a companion" is a separate union: there being a companion they unite, but apart from a companion they each unite separately, there being two companions that are separated from each other. Furthermore, since identity has no companion, it should unite with space, yet space cannot be united with. If a person, being different from defilement, consequently unites with defilement, then the person, being different from a pillar, should unite with a pillar. Furthermore, identity means having no companion, and difference means not being a companion, just like a jar and a robe: a jar is not the companion of a robe, because "companion" has the meaning of being of the same kind. Furthermore, it may be asked: can a single thing be separated from itself? If it cannot be separated, how could it form a union? Furthermore, if identity has union, then a single dharma should also have a companion; yet a single dharma has no companion, so a single dharma has no union. It is commonly explained that the four subtle atoms compose a pillar, of which there are two explanations: some say there is an interval, meaning that at the location of visible form there is no fragrance; others say there is no interval, meaning that at the location of visible form there is fragrance. Now we ask: if one says there is an interval, then at the location of visible form there is no fragrance, so how do they combine together, since each is in two separate locations? If one says there is no interval, then at the location of visible form there is fragrance, which then becomes a single thing; how could one say they are different yet combine together? Furthermore, if the two names "person" and "dharma" can be one, then good and evil are also two names, and visible form and mind are two names, so they should also be one. The prose commentary says "other causes and conditions": the person is the remainder of defilement, and defilement is the remainder of the person. Furthermore, relying on internal faculties and external objects gives rise to defilement, which is also an "other cause and condition." The reason for making this refutation is that, since there is an entity of the person in itself distinct from defilement, it does not require the conditions of faculties and objects to generate defilement to constitute the entity of the person.