中觀論疏 5.13

5.13

「問曰一不合可爾」者，此生下第四重破異。衛世四合知生，是異合義。又外道染是無常、人是常而共合，求那諦中義正爾也。又成論師云：境無淺深生滅，智自有淺深生滅，故智會於境亦是異合義。數人根塵異而共合。成實云：人是假、染為實，是故合亦是異合。前問、次答。問為二：一領上；次舉眼見異合者，舌立已窮，故舉眼救也。答中為二：初偈縱異有合，合則無用；後偈明無用故無合，即是奪異合也。就前有二：上半牒而責。「何事」者，若染不能自有、須人起染，則人有起染之事；人不能自成，須染成人，染有成人之事。今染既自有，不須人起，故人無起染之事；人亦自有，不須染成，故染無成人之事。又人染異義已成，何事須合？此是直責之辭耳。下半釋成也。又異則水火何相預事。「若染及染者」下，此第二奪異合也。上半牒異、下半破合，易見也。

"Question: That identity does not unite may be so": this introduces the fourth section below, which refutes difference once again. The Vaiśeṣika doctrine that cognition arises from fourfold conjunction is an instance of union in difference. Furthermore, the non-Buddhists hold that defilement is impermanent and the person is permanent, and they unite together; this is precisely the doctrine found in the *Guṇātīta*. Furthermore, the masters of the *Tattvasiddhi* say: the object has neither shallowness nor depth, neither arising nor ceasing, whereas wisdom in itself has shallowness, depth, arising, and ceasing; hence wisdom meeting the object is also an instance of union in difference. The Abhidharma masters hold that faculties and sense-objects are different yet unite together. The *Tattvasiddhi* says: the person is provisional and defilement is real, therefore their union is also a union in difference. First the question, then the answer. The question has two parts: first, it recapitulates the above; next, it adduces the visible union of different things: the tongue's arguments already being exhausted, it therefore adduces the eye to rescue [the position]. The answer has two parts: the first verse concedes that difference has union, but union is then purposeless; the subsequent verse explains that because it is purposeless there is no union, which is the negation of union in difference. In the former there are two parts: the upper half cites and challenges it. "To what purpose": if defilement could not exist of itself and required a person to generate defilement, then the person would have the function of generating defilement; if the person could not be established of itself and required defilement to constitute the person, then defilement would have the function of constituting the person. Now, since defilement exists of itself and does not require a person to generate it, the person has no function of generating defilement; the person also exists of itself and does not require defilement to be established, so defilement has no function of constituting the person. Furthermore, the difference between person and defilement already being established, to what purpose must they unite? These are simply words of direct challenge. The lower half explains and establishes this. Furthermore, if they are different, like water and fire, what business do they have with each other? From "If defilement and the defiled" onward, this is the second part, negating union in difference. The upper half cites difference, and the lower half refutes union, which is easy to see.