中觀論疏 5.13

5.13

"Question: That identity does not unite may be so": this introduces the fourth section below, which refutes difference once again. The Vaiśeṣika doctrine that cognition arises from fourfold conjunction is an instance of union in difference. Furthermore, the non-Buddhists hold that defilement is impermanent and the person is permanent, and they unite together; this is precisely the doctrine found in the *Guṇātīta*. Furthermore, the masters of the *Tattvasiddhi* say: the object has neither shallowness nor depth, neither arising nor ceasing, whereas wisdom in itself has shallowness, depth, arising, and ceasing; hence wisdom meeting the object is also an instance of union in difference. The Abhidharma masters hold that faculties and sense-objects are different yet unite together. The *Tattvasiddhi* says: the person is provisional and defilement is real, therefore their union is also a union in difference. First the question, then the answer. The question has two parts: first, it recapitulates the above; next, it adduces the visible union of different things: the tongue's arguments already being exhausted, it therefore adduces the eye to rescue [the position]. The answer has two parts: the first verse concedes that difference has union, but union is then purposeless; the subsequent verse explains that because it is purposeless there is no union, which is the negation of union in difference. In the former there are two parts: the upper half cites and challenges it. "To what purpose": if defilement could not exist of itself and required a person to generate defilement, then the person would have the function of generating defilement; if the person could not be established of itself and required defilement to constitute the person, then defilement would have the function of constituting the person. Now, since defilement exists of itself and does not require a person to generate it, the person has no function of generating defilement; the person also exists of itself and does not require defilement to be established, so defilement has no function of constituting the person. Furthermore, the difference between person and defilement already being established, to what purpose must they unite? These are simply words of direct challenge. The lower half explains and establishes this. Furthermore, if they are different, like water and fire, what business do they have with each other? From "If defilement and the defiled" onward, this is the second part, negating union in difference. The upper half cites difference, and the lower half refutes union, which is easy to see.