中觀論疏 5.33

5.33

九偈開為七門：初偈已未門、次三時門、三寂滅門、四三世門、五並決門、六有無門、七滅不滅門，此就能破作名也。若約所破立名者，初破已未生，乃至第七破滅不滅生。初偈上半作未門破、下半作已門破。此偈破其自生，未破生他。自生是體，生他是用，尚無自體，安有用耶？但自他有二：依《十二門》、即以小生自起為自，能生大生，大生為他。依《成實》等，生相自起為自，法體從生相生為他。已有自體即不須生，未有自體即不可生也。長行為六雙：一雙牒立、二雙定、三雙難、四雙結、五雙呵、六雙類，文處易知也。「生非生已生」者，第二三時門破。有此偈來，凡有二義：一者上雖作已未破之，恐必不受，謂生時生，是故此偈具開三門責無生也。二者欲示觀門通徹。外人於〈去來品〉已解三時無去，猶未知三時無生也。今明生之與去俱是有為法，既三時無去，生亦如此。即引其前悟曉其未通，故指去來破也。〈去來〉、〈六情品〉用三時者，破法體；今用三時破相也。偈為三：初一「生」字是牒；次以三門非之；第三指於前品，上既已說，故今直非也。長行釋三章，即三：初釋上「生」字、次釋三門破、三釋指前品。「生名眾緣和合有」，是釋「生」字也。明此生是因緣假名不生生，非如汝定性生也。「已生中無作故」下，第二釋偈三時門。又開三：初略破、次廣破、後結破，亦是標、釋、結也。「離生法生時不可得」者，外人謂法賴時生，若時法別有二體，可得法賴於時；時無別體，云何得賴？此即破數論人法賴於時。又數論但知因法有時、時無別體，不知因時有法、法無別體，故為今所破。又破開善云：生若是時，即時無自體，便無生也。又時以法為體，法復以何為體？若更有體即無窮，若窮即無體也。「已生法不生」下，第三廣破三時，即三：初門又三，謂標、釋、結。「何以故」下，釋也。凡有三難：一無窮、二不定、三理奪。無窮者，一物經無窮果生，名為無窮。然已生物不應更生，汝遂言已生之物更生者，既得二生即應三四，故生無息時；若最後者遂息，即最初者亦息也。「復次」下，第二不定破。就文為五：一牒、二定、三難、四釋、五結。初是牒也。「以何法生」者，第二定也。有此一破凡有二義：一逆取外意。外云：我言生已生者，從本未生、今始生已即名生，非生已竟更復生。此是未生生，豈有無窮及並例過耶？故更牒本宗而定之，汝於已未兩生中定以何生法生？若言本未經生、今生已即名生，此乃是未生生，乖本宗也；若欲依宗，生已更生，即墮無窮過，故進退成失也。二意云要經初一生名為生已，更第二生名生已生。今但責其初生，此初生為是未生而生、為是生已生耶？初若未生而生，後亦未生而生也；後若生已而生，初亦應爾。而汝立初是未生而生、立後是生已而生，一言之中自相違也。又初生亦不定，汝立初生終是已生生。考此初生本未曾生、今始生，即是未生生，故不定也。又作一種直責之，為是已者生、為非已者生？若是已者生即屬無窮，若非已者生即墮未生生也。問：何人執已生生耶？答：毘曇云未來性有，即是性生已異空，即是空即是已生而復更來現在，即是已者更生，故名已生生。今正破此義也。「復次如燒已」下，第三奪破。前縱，即令無窮過生；今奪，即都無有生也。「如是等」下，第三總結已生不生也。

The nine verses are divided into seven gates: first, the gate of already [originated] and not yet [originated]; next, the gate of the three times; third, the gate of quiescent extinction; fourth, the gate of the three temporal periods; fifth, the gate of mutual decision; sixth, the gate of existence and non-existence; seventh, the gate of cessation and non-cessation. These are named according to that which refutes. If named according to that which is refuted, the first refutes origination that has already or not yet originated, down to the seventh which refutes origination with cessation and without cessation. In the first verse, the first half forms the refutation under the gate of the not yet [originated], and the second half forms the refutation under the gate of the already [originated]. This verse refutes its self-origination, and does not yet refute producing other. Self-origination is the substance; producing other is the function. When there is not yet even a substance of its own, how could there be a function? But self and other have two senses: according to the *Dvādaśamukha-śāstra*, the secondary origination arising by itself is the "self," which can produce the primary origination, and the primary origination is the "other." According to the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* and others, the characteristic of origination arising by itself is the "self," and the substance of the dharma arising from the characteristic of origination is the "other." If it already has its own substance, it does not need to originate; if it does not yet have its own substance, it cannot originate. The prose commentary consists of six pairs: first, a pair stating the thesis; second, a pair determining; third, a pair challenging; fourth, a pair concluding; fifth, a pair rebuking; sixth, a pair drawing analogies; the places in the text are easy to know. "Origination is not that which has already originated" is the second gate, the refutation through the three times. There are two reasons for this verse to appear: first, although above it was refuted by means of the already and the not yet, fearing that the opponent would certainly not accept it and would claim that there is origination at the time of originating, this verse therefore fully opens three gates to interrogate the absence of origination. Second, it intends to show that the gate of contemplation is universally penetrating. The opponent in the chapter "Examination of Going and Coming" had already understood that in the three times there is no going, but still did not know that in the three times there is no origination. Now he explains that origination and going are both conditioned dharmas; since in the three times there is no going, origination is also like this. Thus, citing his previous awakening, he clarifies what he has not yet penetrated, and therefore points to going and coming to refute it. The use of the three times in "Going and Coming" and "Examination of the Six Sense Faculties" refuted the substance of the dharmas; now the three times are used to refute the characteristics. The verse has three parts: the first word "origination" states the topic; next, it negates it through the three gates; third, it points to the previous chapter—since it was already stated above, now he directly negates it. The prose commentary explains the three sections, hence having three parts: first, explaining the word "origination" above; next, explaining the refutation by the three gates; third, explaining the reference to the previous chapter. "Origination is called existing through the harmony of numerous conditions" explains the word "origination." It clarifies that this origination is an origination without origination, a provisional designation through causes and conditions, not an origination with fixed intrinsic nature as you hold. From "Because in what has already originated there is no action" onward is the second part, explaining the verse's gate of the three times. It again divides into three: first, a brief refutation; next, an extensive refutation; finally, a concluding refutation; which are also stating, explaining, and concluding. "Apart from the dharma of origination, the time of originating cannot be found": the opponent considers that dharmas depend on time to originate; if time and dharmas had two distinct substances, it would be possible for dharmas to depend on time, but since time has no distinct substance, how could they depend on it? This refutes the Abhidharma theorists' view that dharmas depend on time. Furthermore, the Abhidharma theorists only know that time exists because of dharmas and that time has no distinct substance, but do not know that dharmas exist because of time and that dharmas have no distinct substance; therefore they are refuted here. Furthermore, it refutes [Master] Kaishan: if origination is time, then time has no substance of its own, and hence there is no origination. Furthermore, time has dharmas as its substance, but what do dharmas have as their substance? If they have a further substance, it is an infinite regress; if [the regress] terminates, there is no substance. From "A dharma that has already originated does not originate" onward is the third part, an extensive refutation of the three times, which has three parts: the first gate again has three, namely stating, explaining, and concluding. From "Why is this?" onward is the explanation. There are three challenges: 1. infinite regress; 2. indefiniteness; 3. rational deprivation. As for infinite regress: one entity undergoing infinite fruit-originations is called infinite regress. A thing that has already originated should not originate again; if you insist that a thing that has already originated originates again, then since it admits of two originations, it should admit of three and four, so there would be no time when origination ceases; if the last one ceases, then the very first one must also cease. From "Furthermore" onward is the second refutation through indefiniteness. In terms of the text, there are five parts: 1. stating; 2. determining; 3. challenging; 4. explaining; 5. concluding. The first states the topic. "By what dharma does it originate?" is the second, determining. This single refutation has two intentions: first, anticipating the opponent's view. The opponent says: "When I say that what has already originated originates, from originally not having originated, now it has just originated and is then called origination; it does not mean that having already originated, it originates yet again. This is origination of the not-yet-originated; how could there be the fault of infinite regress and equal application?" Therefore, stating again his original thesis, he determines it: between the two originations of the already and the not-yet, by what origination-dharma do you definitively hold that it originates? If you say that it had not originally undergone origination, and now having originated it is called origination, this is the origination of the not-yet-originated, which contradicts your original thesis; if you wish to rely on your thesis that having already originated it originates again, then you fall into the fault of infinite regress; thus whether advancing or retreating, it is a failure. The second intention is: it must undergo a first origination to be called "already originated," and then undergoes a second origination called "what has already originated originates." Now we merely examine its first origination: is this first origination an origination of the not-yet-originated, or an origination of what has already originated? If the first is an origination of the not-yet-originated, the subsequent must also be an origination of the not-yet-originated; if the subsequent is an origination of what has already originated, the first should also be so. Yet you establish that the first is an origination of the not-yet-originated and establish that the subsequent is an origination of what has already originated, which is a contradiction within a single statement. Furthermore, the first origination is also indefinite: you establish that the first origination is ultimately an origination of what has already originated; examining this first origination, originally it had never originated, and only now originates, which is an origination of the not-yet-originated, hence it is indefinite. Furthermore, making another direct interrogation: does that which has already [originated] originate, or does that which has not already [originated] originate? If it is that which has already [originated] that originates, it belongs to infinite regress; if it is that which has not already [originated] that originates, it falls into the origination of the not-yet-originated. Question: Who clings to the origination of what has already originated? Answer: The Abhidharma says that future nature exists, which means that its nature having already originated is distinct from emptiness—this very emptiness is already originated—and it further comes into the present, which means that what has already [originated] originates again; hence it is called "what has already originated originates." Now we specifically refute this meaning. From "Furthermore, just as what is burnt" onward is the third, refutation by deprivation. The former was concessive, causing the fault of infinite regress to arise; now he deprives, so there is no origination at all. From "Such as these" onward is the third part, the general conclusion that what has already originated does not originate.