中觀論疏 5.34

5.34

「未生法亦不生」下，第二破未生生。又開三別：一破、二救、三破救。破中三：一總唱不生。「何以故」下，釋不生。「是故」下，結不生法不生也。釋中三：第一以緣徵果、第二乘名責、三廣倒難。以緣徵果者，果既未生，即緣未合，緣未合果云何生耶？此即奪破也。「若法未與生緣和合」下，第二乘名責，即縱開也。若稱未生即是生，亦應無去即是去、無癡即是癡。以未即是無之異名，故作此破也。「復次」下，第三廣舉並例。初就大乘門難；「不壞羅漢」下，就小乘門難；「兔等無角」，就世間門難。此三總攝一切事盡也。此三異者，初一令當生者即時現生，後二畢竟不生者令其生也。「問曰」下，第二救，為二：初正義宗，通論主前二難；次結呵論主，通第三並類難。我明未生法不得即生，待緣合未生方生，云何前難云緣未合令果即生耶？通第二難云：我不言未生即是生，何得云無去法去、無癡法癡耶？待生緣方生，亦待去緣合方去。「是故若說」下，第二呵論主，通第三難。未生法有二種：一有緣合即生，如凡夫菩提等；二未生法無緣合，故不得生，如不壞羅漢及兔角等。故知未生法有生有不生，汝不應言一切未生法悉應生，亦不應言一切法悉不生也。問：未生法得緣合方生，此是誰義？答：如《成論》未來當有，若得緣合方起。亦如數人有性有在未來，待現在緣和合方生。若是靈味法師云：已有法身體，但用未圓，若除煩惱盡，解脫波若方圓也。又如《地論》體用具足，妄覆故不見，除妄即見。光宅云：本有，如井中七寶。全同《地論》。「答曰」下，第三破救。縱有待緣合而生，更開三門責，易見。又難舊義云：汝生待緣合方有、未合未有，體亦待緣合方有，未合應未有；若體不待緣而本有者，生亦應爾，是故生已不生。第二總結已未無生，即欲攝生時不離已未，已未既無生，生時亦無生也。

From "an unarisen dharma also does not arise" onward is the second [section], refuting the arising of what is unarisen. This again divides into three: first, the refutation; second, the defense; third, the refutation of the defense. Within the refutation there are three parts: first, universally proclaiming non-arising; from "Why is this?" onward, explaining non-arising; from "Therefore" onward, concluding that an unarisen dharma does not arise. Within the explanation there are three parts: first, interrogating the effect by means of conditions; second, taking advantage of the designation to cross-examine; third, broadly presenting an absurd consequence. As for interrogating the effect by means of conditions: since the effect has not yet arisen, the conditions have not yet combined; if the conditions have not yet combined, how could the effect arise? This is a refutation through deprivation. From "If a dharma has not yet combined with the conditions for arising" onward is the second part, taking advantage of the designation to cross-examine, which is a concession and opening up: if designating what has not yet arisen is itself arising, then non-going should also be going, and non-delusion should also be delusion. Because "not yet" is another name for "non-existent," this refutation is made. From "Furthermore" onward is the third part, broadly adducing parallel cases: first, challenging in terms of the Mahāyāna approach; from "an indestructible arhat" onward, challenging in terms of the Hīnayāna approach; "the horns of a hare and the like," challenging in terms of the worldly approach. These three completely encompass all things. The difference among these three is that the first would cause what is yet to arise to arise presently, while the latter two would cause what definitively does not arise to arise. From "Question:" onward is the second [part], the defense, comprising two sections: first, presenting their doctrine properly to resolve the author's previous two challenges; next, concluding with a reprimand of the author to resolve the third challenge of parallel cases. [The opponent says:] "I explain that an unarisen dharma cannot arise immediately, but awaits the combination of conditions before what is unarisen arises; why did your previous challenge say that when conditions have not yet combined the effect is made to arise immediately?" Resolving the second challenge, [they say:] "I did not say that what has not yet arisen is itself arising; how can you say that a dharma devoid of going goes, or a dharma devoid of delusion is deluded? It awaits conditions for arising before it arises, just as it awaits the combination of conditions for going before it goes." From "Therefore, if one says" onward is the second section, reprimanding the author and resolving the third challenge: "Unarisen dharmas are of two kinds: one is that when there is a combination of conditions it arises, such as the bodhi of ordinary beings and so forth; the second is that unarisen dharmas without the combination of conditions cannot arise, such as an indestructible arhat, the horns of a hare, and the like. Therefore one knows that among unarisen dharmas some arise and some do not arise; you should not say that all unarisen dharmas should arise, nor should you say that all dharmas do not arise at all." Question: Waiting for the combination of conditions before arising—whose doctrine is this? Answer: According to the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, it will exist in the future, and arises only if it obtains the combination of conditions. It is also like the Sarvāstivādins, who hold that intrinsic natures exist in the future and arise awaiting the combination of present conditions. If it is Master Lingwei, he says that the substance of the Dharmakāya already exists, but its function is not yet complete; if the defilements are completely removed, liberation and prajñā are then completed. It is also like the Daśabhūmika-śāstra[-śāstra], where substance and function are fully endowed, but obscured by delusion and therefore not seen; when delusion is removed, they are seen. Guangzhai says: originally existent, like the seven treasures in a well. This is entirely identical to the Daśabhūmika-śāstra. From "Answer:" onward is the third [part], refuting the defense. Even granting that it arises awaiting the combination of conditions, three doors of cross-examination are further opened, which are easy to see. Furthermore, refuting the old doctrine: your arising exists only awaiting the combination of conditions, and before they combine it does not exist; the substance should likewise exist only awaiting the combination of conditions, and before they combine it should not exist. If the substance does not await conditions but is originally existent, arising should also be like this; therefore, already having arisen, it does not arise. Second, generally concluding that there is no arising in the already arisen or the unarisen seeks to encompass the time of arising as not separate from the already arisen and the unarisen; since there is no arising in the already arisen and the unarisen, there is also no arising in the time of arising.