中觀論疏 5.35

5.35

「生時亦不生」下，第三破生時生。四難：一指前破、二無體破、三二法破、四無依破。初一是奪，謂無有生時還同已未，即〈去來品〉中最初偈也。已出空即屬已、未出空即屬未，已入有屬已、未入有即屬未，故無生時也。「復次」下，第二無體破。時若有體，法可賴之而生；今因生法有時，時無自體，法何所賴？同〈去來品〉第二偈無體破也。「復次」下，第三二法破。既云生時生，即以一法為時體、一法賴時生，即墮二法。故避上無體即墮二體，同〈去來品〉二法破。「復次生法未發」下，第四無依破。無依破者，若避二生，言時前無生者，即時無所依，時無所依即無時。既無時，時後之生復何所附？故避於二生，仍墮無生之咎，同〈去來品〉破初發偈。此文少〈去來品〉二破，一獨去、二並決，而引取破初發偈作無依破也。問：何故引破初發偈破耶？答：評此中四難二關，前三明因法有時，時無自體即無時，故不得生；後不因法有時，亦空無時，故不得生。此二攝一切破盡，故為二也。「如是推求」，第三總結。總結為四：初結法無生、次例住滅、後類法體、次舉偈怙。

From "at the time of arising, it also does not arise" onward is the third [section], refuting arising at the time of arising. There are four challenges: first, pointing to the prior refutation; second, refutation through lack of substance; third, refutation through two dharmas; fourth, refutation through lack of locus. The first is deprivation, meaning that there is no time of arising, which returns to being identical with the already arisen and the unarisen; this is the very first verse in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." Having emerged from emptiness pertains to the already; not yet having emerged from emptiness pertains to the not-yet; having entered into existence pertains to the already; not yet having entered into existence pertains to the not-yet; therefore, there is no time of arising. From "Furthermore" onward is the second, refutation through lack of substance: if time had a substance, a dharma could rely upon it to arise; now, because of the dharma that arises there is time, but time has no intrinsic substance, so upon what could the dharma rely? This is identical to the refutation through lack of substance in the second verse of the "Chapter on Going and Coming." From "Furthermore" onward is the third, refutation through two dharmas: since one says "it arises at the time of arising," one takes one dharma as the substance of time and one dharma as relying on time to arise, which falls into two dharmas. Thus, avoiding the above lack of substance, one falls into two substances; this is identical to the refutation through two dharmas in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." From "Furthermore, when the dharma of arising has not yet been initiated" onward is the fourth, refutation through lack of locus. The refutation through lack of locus means: if, avoiding two arisings, one says that before time there is no arising, then time has no locus; if time has no locus, there is no time. Since there is no time, upon what would the arising after time depend? Therefore, avoiding two arisings, one still falls into the fault of non-arising; this is identical to the verse refuting initial commencement in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." This passage lacks two refutations from the "Chapter on Going and Coming"—first, going alone, and second, parallel determination—and instead cites and takes up the verse refuting initial commencement to make the refutation through lack of locus. Question: Why is the verse refuting initial commencement cited to refute it? Answer: Appraising the four challenges here as two barriers: the first three explain that time exists because of dharmas, and since time has no intrinsic substance, there is no time, so it cannot arise; the latter [explains that] time does not exist because of dharmas, and is likewise empty without time, so it cannot arise. These two encompass all refutations completely, which is why there are two. "Investigating in this way" is the third [part], the general conclusion. The general conclusion comprises four parts: first, concluding that dharmas have no arising; next, drawing an analogy to abiding and cessation; after that, drawing a parallel to the substance of dharmas; next, citing the verse as reliance.