中觀論疏 5.35

5.35

From "at the time of arising, it also does not arise" onward is the third [section], refuting arising at the time of arising. There are four challenges: first, pointing to the prior refutation; second, refutation through lack of substance; third, refutation through two dharmas; fourth, refutation through lack of locus. The first is deprivation, meaning that there is no time of arising, which returns to being identical with the already arisen and the unarisen; this is the very first verse in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." Having emerged from emptiness pertains to the already; not yet having emerged from emptiness pertains to the not-yet; having entered into existence pertains to the already; not yet having entered into existence pertains to the not-yet; therefore, there is no time of arising. From "Furthermore" onward is the second, refutation through lack of substance: if time had a substance, a dharma could rely upon it to arise; now, because of the dharma that arises there is time, but time has no intrinsic substance, so upon what could the dharma rely? This is identical to the refutation through lack of substance in the second verse of the "Chapter on Going and Coming." From "Furthermore" onward is the third, refutation through two dharmas: since one says "it arises at the time of arising," one takes one dharma as the substance of time and one dharma as relying on time to arise, which falls into two dharmas. Thus, avoiding the above lack of substance, one falls into two substances; this is identical to the refutation through two dharmas in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." From "Furthermore, when the dharma of arising has not yet been initiated" onward is the fourth, refutation through lack of locus. The refutation through lack of locus means: if, avoiding two arisings, one says that before time there is no arising, then time has no locus; if time has no locus, there is no time. Since there is no time, upon what would the arising after time depend? Therefore, avoiding two arisings, one still falls into the fault of non-arising; this is identical to the verse refuting initial commencement in the "Chapter on Going and Coming." This passage lacks two refutations from the "Chapter on Going and Coming"—first, going alone, and second, parallel determination—and instead cites and takes up the verse refuting initial commencement to make the refutation through lack of locus. Question: Why is the verse refuting initial commencement cited to refute it? Answer: Appraising the four challenges here as two barriers: the first three explain that time exists because of dharmas, and since time has no intrinsic substance, there is no time, so it cannot arise; the latter [explains that] time does not exist because of dharmas, and is likewise empty without time, so it cannot arise. These two encompass all refutations completely, which is why there are two. "Investigating in this way" is the third [part], the general conclusion. The general conclusion comprises four parts: first, concluding that dharmas have no arising; next, drawing an analogy to abiding and cessation; after that, drawing a parallel to the substance of dharmas; next, citing the verse as reliance.