中觀論疏 6.12

6.12

「一切眼等根」下，第二就六根內檢無本住。就文為三：初破、次救、三破救。上半標無、下半釋無，以上離不離覓並無，故云一切無。又一切根不出二十二根，此中若聖若凡悉攝盡也，而實不見本住，故云一切無。又上就六根之前覓本住不得，是根外無；今就六根內求，亦不得也。又初偈責相、次兩偈責體。今破用，凡立神有相、體、用三，破此三則一切空矣。言責用者，今唯見六用，無有神用。又神有六用，則六識無用，六識無用應如木石；若六識有用，則神無用，神如木石。又上來奪破，今縱言有，更就能所中覓之。能取即是六根，六根中無神，所取唯有六塵，故知無神。「問曰」下，第二救。上半牒論主無神；下半難論主之無，以成己有。五根是無知之法，不應能知塵；而今能知，此是神用，故知有神。即如成實、犢子等計有人御六根之用也。「答曰」下，第三破救。就文為四：「若爾者」，第一牒也；「為一一根中」下，第二定也；「二俱有過」下，第三總非也；「何以故」下，第四舉偈作難也。兩偈為二：初偈一神破、第二偈就多神破。一神破者，若一神在六根中，則有互用之過，如就眼中既能見色聞聲，即此眼中備得六塵。若爾者，即此眼根具六根，是則根亂；在根既亂，即在塵亦亂也。偈上半牒、下半破，如文。第二偈多神破者，既言六神在六根中，則一人有於六神，復有並取六塵之過。亦上半牒、下半破也。舊地論人計一切眾生同一梨耶。若爾，一人斷惑，眾人悉斷。若人人各有佛理，則是無常可算數法。又一心在六根中，亦作此破。莎提云：「一識往來生死，與《成實》一何異？」又一切眾生同一本住則應同障，若各各障則各有本住。又若同一本住則一時作佛，應同是利根；又若六神則應各各作佛，亦應存亡，以多神是數法故。「復次眼耳等諸根」下，上以兩處覓無神：一謂六根之外覓無有神、次一神多神就根內檢無。今第三不復就根之內外，就成根諸微諸大檢無有神。所以然者，根之內外雖復無神，成根四大或可應有，故復責之。又上來即是果內撿無神，今就因內撿無神，故三法印云一切法無我也。又此是並決破。外人若言眼能見，要是神御方見，不使不見者，亦應火能燒，神使方燒，不使則不燒。而今四大自能、不假神者，六根亦應爾也。又根從四大，四大從塵，塵復從誰？若有從則無窮；若無從即無因亦無果，應無本住。「問曰」下，此生第二次破諸根明諸法空義。前問、次答。數論人云：本住等十六知見外道橫計，可得是無；眼等是世諦法，此即應有。是故今明俱是橫計。今數人眼定十微所成，體是實有。論人云眼是四大所成，此是假法，則不無也。今明若如數論決定執者，亦無此法。又上來是破外迷，今此破內執。又上來是借法破人，唯有六根并諸微四大，何處有我？今即是借我破法，有我可有法，無我何有法？又上來是正破，今是簡破。數論人云：我亦作如此破外道，與汝何異？故今釋云：汝破不盡，猶留諸根乃至隣虛之色，非畢竟空也。又上來求無本住，即是無所依之佛性；今無有諸根，則無能依之生死，故道門未曾生死，亦非涅槃。《華嚴》云「生死及涅槃，二俱是虛妄，二俱不可得。」又有所得人決定謂有佛性是所依、有生死是能依，此並是生死耳；今亦不見能依所依，方是涅槃。又有所得人見能依所依，此是性義，道理畢竟無有此法；今破如此性病竟，始得說經中假名能依所依義耳。「復次眼等無本住」，第三呵責。上半結無神、下半呵責之。眼等無者，明眼等前無本住。所言「今」者，明現在無本住。「後」者，未來中無本住。問：未有諸根前有本住，此是外道義。餘二是誰義耶？答：論主具就三世內遍推覓本住，令畢竟無遺，不必須有其人也。又成實者有二師：一云具五陰方成眾生，則前有於法、後有於人，此是未來有本住義。二云隨有一心一色即成眾生，眾生與法俱有，此是本住諸根，是一時而有，此是現在有本住義。若計本有佛性真神，則是未有諸根前有本住義也。又此是結前。眼等無本住，結前責相等二偈明眼等前無本住，今之一字結前救後二偈六根中無本住，後之一字結前四大中無本住。外人謂由四大成色陰，有色陰故成人。故前有四大身、後有本住，亦如前有五指有捲、前有梁椽有舍。下半呵責云「無有無分別」者，呵其品初兩偈：初偈以法證人，此是以法分別人；第二偈將人證法，此是以人分別法也。長行云「不應有難」者，呵其品初難論主：若無本住，誰有眼耳等也。「如是問答戲論則滅」者，品初偈上三句是問、下一句是答。第二偈上半是問、下半是答。如是問答並是戲論，上求之無從，故云則滅也。

From "All the eye and other faculties" downwards is the second [section], which examines within the six faculties to show there is no prior entity. Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, the refutation; next, the rescue; and third, the refutation of the rescue. The upper half of the verse presents the absence, while the lower half explains the absence; since searching both in terms of being separate and not separate shows neither exists, it says "all are absent." Furthermore, all faculties do not exceed the twenty-two faculties; herein both the noble and the ordinary are entirely subsumed, yet in reality no prior entity is seen, which is why it says "all are absent." Moreover, above it sought the prior entity prior to the six faculties and could not find it, which is absence outside the faculties; now it seeks it within the six faculties, and likewise cannot find it. In addition, the first verse reproached the characteristics, and the next two verses reproached the substantial entity. Now it refutes the function: generally, when an ātman is posited, it has three aspects—characteristics, substantial entity, and function; when these three are refuted, then all is empty. As for reproaching the function, now we only see the six functions [of the faculties], and there is no function of an ātman. Furthermore, if the ātman possessed the six functions, then the six consciousnesses would lack function; lacking function, the six consciousnesses should be like wood or stone. If the six consciousnesses possess function, then the ātman lacks function, and the ātman is like wood or stone. Furthermore, above was a direct refutation; now, conceding for the sake of argument that it exists, one further seeks it in terms of the apprehending and the apprehended. The apprehending faculties are simply the six faculties, and within the six faculties there is no ātman; the apprehended objects are solely the six sensory dusts, so we know there is no ātman. From "The question says" downwards is the second [part], the rescue. The upper half cites the treatise master's claim that there is no ātman; the lower half challenges the treatise master's absence in order to establish its own existence. The five faculties are insentient phenomena and should not be able to cognize dusts; yet now they can cognize them, so this is the function of the ātman, and therefore we know that the ātman exists. This is just like the Tattvasiddhi and Vātsīputrīya systems, which posit that there is a person who governs the functions of the six faculties. From "The answer says" downwards is the third [part], the refutation of the rescue. In the text there are four divisions: "If that is so" is the first, citing [the opponent]; from "is it within each faculty" downwards is the second, defining [the alternatives]; from "both have faults" downwards is the third, generally negating them; from "Why is this?" downwards is the fourth, adducing the verses to pose the challenges. The two verses comprise two parts: the first verse refutes [the position of] a single ātman, and the second verse refutes [the position of] multiple ātmans. In the refutation of a single ātman: if a single ātman is in the six faculties, then there would be the error of reciprocal function; for example, if within the eye it could both see visible forms and hear sounds, then within this very eye all six sensory dusts would be fully experienced. If so, this very eye faculty would possess the six faculties, and thus the faculties would be thrown into confusion; and since there is confusion in the faculties, there would also be confusion in the sensory dusts. The upper half of the verse cites [the position] and the lower half refutes it, as in the text. In the second verse refuting multiple ātmans: since it is said that six ātmans are within the six faculties, then a single person would possess six ātmans, and there would further be the error of simultaneously apprehending the six sensory dusts. The upper half likewise cites [the position] and the lower half refutes it. The ancient Dilun masters asserted that all sentient beings share the same ālaya[-vijñāna]. If so, when one person severed defilements, all persons would sever them. If each person individually possessed the principle of Buddhahood, then it would be an impermanent, enumerable phenomenon. Furthermore, if a single mind were within the six faculties, it would also be refuted in this way. Svāti said, "A single consciousness comes and goes through birth and death"—how is this different from the Tattvasiddhi? Moreover, if all sentient beings shared the same prior entity, they should share the same obscurations; if their obscurations are individual, then each has its own prior entity. Again, if they shared the same prior entity, they would attain Buddhahood at the same time and should all be of sharp faculties; and if there were six ātmans, each should attain Buddhahood separately and should also have existence and demise, because multiple ātmans are countable phenomena. From "Furthermore, the faculties such as eye and ear" downwards: above, it sought and found no ātman in two places: first, seeking outside the six faculties and finding no ātman; next, examining within the faculties in terms of a single ātman or multiple ātmans and finding none. Now, in the third, it no longer looks within or outside the faculties, but examines the atoms and great elements that constitute the faculties to show there is no ātman. Why is this? Although there is no ātman inside or outside the faculties, the four great elements that constitute the faculties might perhaps exist, so it questions this again. Furthermore, the above was examining within the result to find no ātman, while now it examines within the cause to find no ātman; therefore the three Dharma seals say that all phenomena are without self. Moreover, this is a refutation through parallel absurdity. If the outsider says that the eye can see, but it must be governed by an ātman before it can see, and without being directed it does not see, then fire should also be able to burn only when directed by an ātman, and without being directed it would not burn. Yet if the four great elements are naturally capable without relying on an ātman, the six faculties should be the same. Furthermore, the faculties arise from the four great elements, and the four great elements arise from the sensory dusts; from what do the sensory dusts arise? If they arise from something, it is infinite regress; if they do not arise from anything, there is neither cause nor result, and there should be no prior entity. From "The question says" downwards: this introduces the second [major section], refuting the faculties to clarify the emptiness of all phenomena. First comes the question, next the answer. The Sarvāstivādins say: The sixteen views of a knower and seer, such as the prior entity, are arbitrary imputations of the outsiders and can be non-existent; but the eye and so forth are conventional phenomena, and these must exist. Therefore, it is now clarified that both are arbitrary imputations. Now the Sarvāstivādins hold that the eye is definitely composed of the ten subtle atoms and its entity is substantially real. The masters of the treatise [Tattvasiddhi] say the eye is composed of the four great elements and is a provisional phenomenon, so it is not non-existent. Now it is clarified that if one clings determinately as the Sarvāstivādins do, this phenomenon does not exist either. Furthermore, the above refuted external delusions, while this refutes internal attachments. Moreover, the above used phenomena to refute the person: there are only the six faculties along with the atoms and four great elements—where is a self? Now it uses the self to refute phenomena: if there were a self, there could be phenomena; without a self, how could there be phenomena? Moreover, the above was a direct refutation, while this is an exclusionary refutation. The Sarvāstivādin says: I also refute the outsiders in this way; how am I different from you? Therefore it now explains: Your refutation is not exhaustive; you still retain the faculties down to matter at the limit of subtlety, so it is not ultimate emptiness. Furthermore, above, searching and finding no prior entity was simply the Buddha-nature as the support; now, there being no faculties means there is no birth-and-death that is supported; therefore the gate of the Path has never known birth-and-death, nor is it nirvāṇa. The Avataṃsaka says: "Birth-and-death and nirvāṇa—both are illusory, both are ungraspable." Furthermore, those who have something to attain determinately claim that there is a Buddha-nature that is the support and that there is birth-and-death that is supported; both of these are merely birth-and-death. Only when one does not perceive either the supported or the support is there nirvāṇa. Moreover, those who have something to attain see a supported and a support; this is the conception of intrinsic nature, whereas in true principle such a phenomenon does not exist at all. Only after refuting such an illness of intrinsic nature can one speak of the provisional meanings of the supported and the support in the sūtras. "Furthermore, the eye and so forth have no prior entity": this is the third [section], the rebuke. The upper half concludes the absence of an ātman; the lower half rebukes them. "The eye and so forth lack it" clarifies that there is no prior entity before the eye and so forth. What is meant by "now" clarifies that there is no prior entity in the present. "After" means there is no prior entity in the future. Question: Positing a prior entity before the faculties exist is the doctrine of outsiders. Whose doctrines are the other two? Answer: The treatise master comprehensively searches for a prior entity throughout the three times so that ultimately nothing remains; it is not necessary that there must be actual proponents for each. Furthermore, among the followers of the Tattvasiddhi there are two masters: one says that only when the five aggregates are complete is a sentient being constituted, so phenomena exist before and the person exists after; this is the doctrine of a prior entity in the future. The second says that as soon as there is a single mind and a single form, a sentient being is constituted, so the sentient being and phenomena exist simultaneously; this means that the prior entity and the faculties exist at the same time, which is the doctrine of a prior entity in the present. If one posits an intrinsically existing Buddha-nature or true ātman, that is the doctrine of a prior entity before the faculties exist. Furthermore, this concludes what preceded: "the eye and so forth have no prior entity" concludes the preceding two verses on reproaching the characteristics and so forth, which showed there is no prior entity before the eye and so forth; the single character "now" concludes the preceding two verses following the rescue, showing there is no prior entity within the six faculties; the single character "after" concludes the preceding refutation within the four great elements. Outsiders claim that the four great elements constitute the aggregate of form, and because there is the aggregate of form a person is constituted; thus the body of the four great elements exists before, and the prior entity exists after, just as five fingers exist before and there is a fist, or ridgebeams and rafters exist before and there is a house. The lower half rebukes them, saying "to make conceptual distinctions without existence": this rebukes the opening two verses of the chapter. The first verse proved the person by means of phenomena, which was distinguishing the person by means of phenomena; the second verse proved phenomena by means of the person, which was distinguishing phenomena by means of the person. When the prose says "there should be no objection," it rebukes their challenge to the treatise master at the beginning of the chapter: "If there is no prior entity, who possesses the eye, ear, and so forth?" As for "Such questions, answers, and prapañca are extinguished": in the opening verse of the chapter, the upper three lines are the question, and the lower line is the answer. In the second verse, the upper half is the question, and the lower half is the answer. Such questions and answers are entirely prapañca; seeking them above yielded no basis, so it says "are extinguished."