中觀論疏 6.12

6.12

From "All the eye and other faculties" downwards is the second [section], which examines within the six faculties to show there is no prior entity. Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, the refutation; next, the rescue; and third, the refutation of the rescue. The upper half of the verse presents the absence, while the lower half explains the absence; since searching both in terms of being separate and not separate shows neither exists, it says "all are absent." Furthermore, all faculties do not exceed the twenty-two faculties; herein both the noble and the ordinary are entirely subsumed, yet in reality no prior entity is seen, which is why it says "all are absent." Moreover, above it sought the prior entity prior to the six faculties and could not find it, which is absence outside the faculties; now it seeks it within the six faculties, and likewise cannot find it. In addition, the first verse reproached the characteristics, and the next two verses reproached the substantial entity. Now it refutes the function: generally, when an ātman is posited, it has three aspects—characteristics, substantial entity, and function; when these three are refuted, then all is empty. As for reproaching the function, now we only see the six functions [of the faculties], and there is no function of an ātman. Furthermore, if the ātman possessed the six functions, then the six consciousnesses would lack function; lacking function, the six consciousnesses should be like wood or stone. If the six consciousnesses possess function, then the ātman lacks function, and the ātman is like wood or stone. Furthermore, above was a direct refutation; now, conceding for the sake of argument that it exists, one further seeks it in terms of the apprehending and the apprehended. The apprehending faculties are simply the six faculties, and within the six faculties there is no ātman; the apprehended objects are solely the six sensory dusts, so we know there is no ātman. From "The question says" downwards is the second [part], the rescue. The upper half cites the treatise master's claim that there is no ātman; the lower half challenges the treatise master's absence in order to establish its own existence. The five faculties are insentient phenomena and should not be able to cognize dusts; yet now they can cognize them, so this is the function of the ātman, and therefore we know that the ātman exists. This is just like the Tattvasiddhi and Vātsīputrīya systems, which posit that there is a person who governs the functions of the six faculties. From "The answer says" downwards is the third [part], the refutation of the rescue. In the text there are four divisions: "If that is so" is the first, citing [the opponent]; from "is it within each faculty" downwards is the second, defining [the alternatives]; from "both have faults" downwards is the third, generally negating them; from "Why is this?" downwards is the fourth, adducing the verses to pose the challenges. The two verses comprise two parts: the first verse refutes [the position of] a single ātman, and the second verse refutes [the position of] multiple ātmans. In the refutation of a single ātman: if a single ātman is in the six faculties, then there would be the error of reciprocal function; for example, if within the eye it could both see visible forms and hear sounds, then within this very eye all six sensory dusts would be fully experienced. If so, this very eye faculty would possess the six faculties, and thus the faculties would be thrown into confusion; and since there is confusion in the faculties, there would also be confusion in the sensory dusts. The upper half of the verse cites [the position] and the lower half refutes it, as in the text. In the second verse refuting multiple ātmans: since it is said that six ātmans are within the six faculties, then a single person would possess six ātmans, and there would further be the error of simultaneously apprehending the six sensory dusts. The upper half likewise cites [the position] and the lower half refutes it. The ancient Dilun masters asserted that all sentient beings share the same ālaya[-vijñāna]. If so, when one person severed defilements, all persons would sever them. If each person individually possessed the principle of Buddhahood, then it would be an impermanent, enumerable phenomenon. Furthermore, if a single mind were within the six faculties, it would also be refuted in this way. Svāti said, "A single consciousness comes and goes through birth and death"—how is this different from the Tattvasiddhi? Moreover, if all sentient beings shared the same prior entity, they should share the same obscurations; if their obscurations are individual, then each has its own prior entity. Again, if they shared the same prior entity, they would attain Buddhahood at the same time and should all be of sharp faculties; and if there were six ātmans, each should attain Buddhahood separately and should also have existence and demise, because multiple ātmans are countable phenomena. From "Furthermore, the faculties such as eye and ear" downwards: above, it sought and found no ātman in two places: first, seeking outside the six faculties and finding no ātman; next, examining within the faculties in terms of a single ātman or multiple ātmans and finding none. Now, in the third, it no longer looks within or outside the faculties, but examines the atoms and great elements that constitute the faculties to show there is no ātman. Why is this? Although there is no ātman inside or outside the faculties, the four great elements that constitute the faculties might perhaps exist, so it questions this again. Furthermore, the above was examining within the result to find no ātman, while now it examines within the cause to find no ātman; therefore the three Dharma seals say that all phenomena are without self. Moreover, this is a refutation through parallel absurdity. If the outsider says that the eye can see, but it must be governed by an ātman before it can see, and without being directed it does not see, then fire should also be able to burn only when directed by an ātman, and without being directed it would not burn. Yet if the four great elements are naturally capable without relying on an ātman, the six faculties should be the same. Furthermore, the faculties arise from the four great elements, and the four great elements arise from the sensory dusts; from what do the sensory dusts arise? If they arise from something, it is infinite regress; if they do not arise from anything, there is neither cause nor result, and there should be no prior entity. From "The question says" downwards: this introduces the second [major section], refuting the faculties to clarify the emptiness of all phenomena. First comes the question, next the answer. The Sarvāstivādins say: The sixteen views of a knower and seer, such as the prior entity, are arbitrary imputations of the outsiders and can be non-existent; but the eye and so forth are conventional phenomena, and these must exist. Therefore, it is now clarified that both are arbitrary imputations. Now the Sarvāstivādins hold that the eye is definitely composed of the ten subtle atoms and its entity is substantially real. The masters of the treatise [Tattvasiddhi] say the eye is composed of the four great elements and is a provisional phenomenon, so it is not non-existent. Now it is clarified that if one clings determinately as the Sarvāstivādins do, this phenomenon does not exist either. Furthermore, the above refuted external delusions, while this refutes internal attachments. Moreover, the above used phenomena to refute the person: there are only the six faculties along with the atoms and four great elements—where is a self? Now it uses the self to refute phenomena: if there were a self, there could be phenomena; without a self, how could there be phenomena? Moreover, the above was a direct refutation, while this is an exclusionary refutation. The Sarvāstivādin says: I also refute the outsiders in this way; how am I different from you? Therefore it now explains: Your refutation is not exhaustive; you still retain the faculties down to matter at the limit of subtlety, so it is not ultimate emptiness. Furthermore, above, searching and finding no prior entity was simply the Buddha-nature as the support; now, there being no faculties means there is no birth-and-death that is supported; therefore the gate of the Path has never known birth-and-death, nor is it nirvāṇa. The Avataṃsaka says: "Birth-and-death and nirvāṇa—both are illusory, both are ungraspable." Furthermore, those who have something to attain determinately claim that there is a Buddha-nature that is the support and that there is birth-and-death that is supported; both of these are merely birth-and-death. Only when one does not perceive either the supported or the support is there nirvāṇa. Moreover, those who have something to attain see a supported and a support; this is the conception of intrinsic nature, whereas in true principle such a phenomenon does not exist at all. Only after refuting such an illness of intrinsic nature can one speak of the provisional meanings of the supported and the support in the sūtras. "Furthermore, the eye and so forth have no prior entity": this is the third [section], the rebuke. The upper half concludes the absence of an ātman; the lower half rebukes them. "The eye and so forth lack it" clarifies that there is no prior entity before the eye and so forth. What is meant by "now" clarifies that there is no prior entity in the present. "After" means there is no prior entity in the future. Question: Positing a prior entity before the faculties exist is the doctrine of outsiders. Whose doctrines are the other two? Answer: The treatise master comprehensively searches for a prior entity throughout the three times so that ultimately nothing remains; it is not necessary that there must be actual proponents for each. Furthermore, among the followers of the Tattvasiddhi there are two masters: one says that only when the five aggregates are complete is a sentient being constituted, so phenomena exist before and the person exists after; this is the doctrine of a prior entity in the future. The second says that as soon as there is a single mind and a single form, a sentient being is constituted, so the sentient being and phenomena exist simultaneously; this means that the prior entity and the faculties exist at the same time, which is the doctrine of a prior entity in the present. If one posits an intrinsically existing Buddha-nature or true ātman, that is the doctrine of a prior entity before the faculties exist. Furthermore, this concludes what preceded: "the eye and so forth have no prior entity" concludes the preceding two verses on reproaching the characteristics and so forth, which showed there is no prior entity before the eye and so forth; the single character "now" concludes the preceding two verses following the rescue, showing there is no prior entity within the six faculties; the single character "after" concludes the preceding refutation within the four great elements. Outsiders claim that the four great elements constitute the aggregate of form, and because there is the aggregate of form a person is constituted; thus the body of the four great elements exists before, and the prior entity exists after, just as five fingers exist before and there is a fist, or ridgebeams and rafters exist before and there is a house. The lower half rebukes them, saying "to make conceptual distinctions without existence": this rebukes the opening two verses of the chapter. The first verse proved the person by means of phenomena, which was distinguishing the person by means of phenomena; the second verse proved phenomena by means of the person, which was distinguishing phenomena by means of the person. When the prose says "there should be no objection," it rebukes their challenge to the treatise master at the beginning of the chapter: "If there is no prior entity, who possesses the eye, ear, and so forth?" As for "Such questions, answers, and prapañca are extinguished": in the opening verse of the chapter, the upper three lines are the question, and the lower line is the answer. In the second verse, the upper half is the question, and the lower half is the answer. Such questions and answers are entirely prapañca; seeking them above yielded no basis, so it says "are extinguished."