中觀論疏 7.20

7.20

「問曰」下，第三章一切破也。文為二：初問次答。問有二：一牒論主前偈；「若爾者」下，第二外人難。又開二：初標無待無執二章門、次釋二門。無有無空名為空空，故對有之空名為小空。無有無空，空有俱破，乃是大空。如撥無二諦，是大邪見也。「但無相待」者，無待有之空耳。「不應有執」者，次標無執章門。實有無待之空，但不許我執著耳。「若有對」下，第二釋上章門也。前釋無待、次釋無執。「有對」者，對有說空也。「無對」者，無待有之空也。「相待無故」下，第二釋無執章門。以無空相無有相，故無相可取著也。「答曰」下，第二論主破。若就單空及以重空分破意者，外人前云破是破異應有空在，此立單空，論主前偈破單空也。次問曰明空與不空二種俱空，則是立於重空，今破其重空也。若就十八空及獨空義者，外人前立十八空，論主前偈破十八空。有十八不空可有十八空，竟無十八不空，云何有十八空？次外人立於獨空。何以知然？《智度論》云「十八空是相待空，獨空是不待空。」外人前立無相待義，故知立於獨空，今偈即是破於獨空。上半序佛說空意，明佛說單空及與重空為離諸見，說單空為離有見、說於重空為破空見也。佛說十八空為破有見，說於獨空破於相待亦是破於空見。下半明佛不化者，以著單空，不可以單空化之。又著重空，不可以重空化之。著十八空，不可以十八空化之。又著獨空，不可以獨空化之。故云佛不化之。問：說空云何離愛見？答：眾生計有人法故起愛見，諸佛說人法皆空，則無起愛見處也。問：云何不化？答：向於有起愛見，今於空起愛見，乃至於絕四句復起愛見，是佛不化也。又序此偈意來者，從〈因緣品〉至於此偈，凡有四節破意：一者外人本立有實人法，自上已來求之無從。二者〈觀行品〉初立有虛妄人法，論主求之亦不可得。第三轉意，外人云：若無實無虛，此即是空，便應有空。論主答云：既無有法，云何有空？第四轉意，外人復云：無有無空乃是大空。是故今云：大聖說空，本離諸見；若如此而著，則佛不能化。又有四門：借異破性是無常門、以空門破異是名空門、以相待破空是空空門、復著空空是不可化門。以說此不可化，即以化外人也。問：論主何故不云非待非絕、非伴非獨以破之耶？答：彼既著非空非有，聞說非待非絕、非伴非獨彌復是空，則轉更生著，故不作此破之。問：《智度論》釋菩薩住二諦中為眾生說法，為著有者說空、為著空者說有。今既著空，何故不說有化之？答：外人初本著有，故言有實人實法及以虛妄人法，故不可以有化之；今復著空，故不可以空化之。

From "The opponent asks:" downward is the third section, which refutes all [views]. The text has two parts: first the question, next the reply. The question has two parts: first, it cites the author's preceding verse; from "If that is so" downward is the second part, the opponent's objection. This also divides into two: first, setting forth the two chapter headings of "having no counterpart" and "having no grasping"; next, explaining the two headings. The absence of both existence and emptiness is called the emptiness of emptiness; therefore, an emptiness opposed to existence is called a minor emptiness. When there is neither existence nor emptiness, and both emptiness and existence are refuted, that is the great emptiness. This is like negating both truths, which is a great wrong view. "There is simply no mutual dependence": this means only an emptiness without dependence on existence. "There should be no grasping": this next sets forth the chapter heading of having no grasping. An emptiness without dependence truly exists, but I am merely not permitted to grasp at it. From "If there is an opposition" downward is the second part, explaining the above chapter headings. First it explains "having no counterpart," and next explains "having no grasping." "Having an opposition" means speaking of emptiness in opposition to existence. "Having no opposition" means an emptiness without dependence on existence. From "Because mutual dependence is absent" downward is the second part, explaining the chapter heading of having no grasping. Because there is neither a characteristic of emptiness nor a characteristic of existence, there is no characteristic that can be grasped. From "The author replies:" downward is the second part, the author's refutation. If one analyzes the intent of the refutation in terms of single emptiness and layered emptiness: the opponent previously said that refuting identity and refuting difference implies that emptiness must exist; this posits single emptiness, and the author's preceding verse refuted single emptiness. Next, the question clarifies that both emptiness and non-emptiness are empty, which is positing layered emptiness; now he refutes this layered emptiness. If [analyzed] in terms of the meanings of the eighteen emptinesses and solitary emptiness: the opponent previously posited the eighteen emptinesses, and the author's preceding verse refuted the eighteen emptinesses. If there were eighteen non-emptinesses, there could be eighteen emptinesses; but since in the end there are no eighteen non-emptinesses, how could there be eighteen emptinesses? Next, the opponent posits solitary emptiness. How is this known? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "The eighteen emptinesses are relative emptiness; solitary emptiness is non-relative emptiness." The opponent previously posited the meaning of non-dependence; hence we know he posits solitary emptiness. The present verse is precisely a refutation of solitary emptiness. The first half of the verse introduces the Buddha's intent in teaching emptiness, explaining that the Buddha taught single emptiness and layered emptiness in order to leave all views behind: he taught single emptiness to leave behind the view of existence, and taught layered emptiness to break the view of emptiness. The Buddha taught the eighteen emptinesses to break the view of existence, and taught solitary emptiness to break mutual dependence, which is also breaking the view of emptiness. The second half clarifies that the Buddhas do not transform [such a person]: because one is attached to single emptiness, one cannot be transformed by means of single emptiness; moreover, being attached to layered emptiness, one cannot be transformed by means of layered emptiness; being attached to the eighteen emptinesses, one cannot be transformed by means of the eighteen emptinesses; and being attached to solitary emptiness, one cannot be transformed by means of solitary emptiness. Therefore it says that the Buddhas do not transform him. Question: How does speaking of emptiness cause one to leave behind craving and views? Answer: Sentient beings conceive of persons and phenomena and therefore give rise to craving and views; the Buddhas teach that persons and phenomena are all empty, so there is no place for craving and views to arise. Question: Why are they not transformed? Answer: Formerly they gave rise to craving and views toward existence; now they give rise to craving and views toward emptiness; and ultimately they give rise again to craving and views toward the cessation of the four propositions—this is why the Buddhas do not transform them. Furthermore, regarding the lineage of meaning in this verse: from the "Examination of Conditions" up to this verse, there are altogether four stages of refutation: First, the opponent originally posited real persons and phenomena, but searching for them from the beginning onward has yielded nothing. Second, at the beginning of the "Examination of Action," he posited deceptive persons and phenomena, but the author's search for them also found none. In the third turn of thought, the opponent said: "If there is neither real nor deceptive, this is emptiness itself, so emptiness must exist." The author replied: "Since there is no phenomenon, how can there be emptiness?" In the fourth turn of thought, the opponent said again: "The absence of both existence and emptiness is the great emptiness." Therefore it is now said: "The Great Sage taught emptiness originally to leave behind all views; if one is attached in this manner, then the Buddhas cannot transform him." Furthermore, there are four gates: borrowing difference to refute intrinsic nature is the gate of impermanence; using the gate of emptiness to refute difference is called the gate of emptiness; using mutual dependence to refute emptiness is the gate of the emptiness of emptiness; and becoming attached again to the emptiness of emptiness is the gate of being untransformable. By speaking of this untransformability, he transforms the opponent. Question: Why did the author not refute it by saying "neither dependent nor absolute, neither accompanied nor solitary"? Answer: Since the other person is already attached to neither emptiness nor existence, hearing it said that it is "neither dependent nor absolute, neither accompanied nor solitary" would make it seem even more like emptiness, and he would become still more attached; therefore he did not use this refutation. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa explains that when a bodhisattva abides in the two truths to preach the Dharma for sentient beings, he preaches emptiness to those attached to existence, and preaches existence to those attached to emptiness. Now that he is attached to emptiness, why not transform him by preaching existence? Answer: The opponent originally was attached to existence, and therefore spoke of real persons and real phenomena as well as deceptive persons and phenomena; hence he could not be transformed with existence. Now he is attached to emptiness again; hence he cannot be transformed with emptiness.