中觀論疏 9.39

9.39

From "Question: The sūtras state..." onward is the second [section], refuting inversions; first establishing and then refuting. In establishing them there are three parts: first establishing inverted and non-inverted phenomena; from "Because there are inversions..." onward is the second, establishing persons who generate inversions. Those established who generate the former four inversions are ordinary persons; those who generate the latter four inversions are the people of the two vehicles. Since there are persons capable of generating them, there must be inversions that are generated. From "Why do you say there are none at all?" onward is the third, scolding the treatise master. Question: Why are only the former four inversions established and not the latter four? Answer: First, because the former exemplifies the latter; second, what is established here is precisely the doctrine of Hīnayāna practitioners. Hīnayāna practitioners only posit the former four as inversions and the latter four as non-inversions; hence they establish only the former four. Question: If so, this chapter is called 'Refuting Inversions'; it should only refute the former four inversions and not refute the latter inversions. Answer: In terms of the text, it is indeed so—it only refutes the former inversions, but because the former exemplifies the latter, it also refutes the latter inversions. Furthermore, that this chapter is called 'Refuting Inversions' clarifies that for non-Buddhists, both inversion and non-inversion turn out to be inversions. Why is this? Non-Buddhists take seeing permanence in the impermanent to be an inversion, and seeing impermanence in the impermanent to be non-inversion. Now it is shown that there is neither this inversion nor non-inversion; thus we know that inversion and non-inversion are both inversions. Since the former inversion and non-inversion were both inversions, and present inversion and non-inversion are likewise both inversions, they form sixteen inversions. Furthermore, conceptualizing saṃsāra as permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, and neither permanent nor impermanent—all four propositions are inversions. Self, pleasure, and purity are likewise four each, so saṃsāra has sixteen inversions. The Buddha-ground also has sixteen, together making thirty-two inversions. In each proposition there are [inversions of] perception, mind, and view; by calculating them one may know this. Question: Hīnayāna practitioners also refute the four inversions; how does this differ from the present [view]? Answer: Hīnayāna clarifies that the inverted phenomena conceptualized are non-existent, but the mind capable of conceptualizing is existent. Now it is shown that what is capable of conceptualizing is identical to what is conceptualized; since what is conceptualized is already non-existent, that which is capable of conceptualizing is likewise so; therefore they differ. From "Answer:" onward, there are nine verses in three approaches: the first four verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature; the next three verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of the three periods of time; the final two verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of real and unreal. The first is the approach of emptiness; the second is the approach of existence; the third is the approach of reliance on nominal designation. In the first four verses there are four [points]: the first verse refutes inversion; the next refutes non-inversion; the third refutes attachment; the fourth summarizes and refutes. The first half of the first verse cites [the opponent's claim], and the second half refutes it. The approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature is another name for the true mark. In the phenomena of the true mark, the four propositions are cut off; how could there be a permanent phenomenon called an inversion? This clarifies non-existence in terms of the principle. Furthermore, there are two kinds of Hīnayāna practitioners: first, Hīnayāna practitioners who do not believe in the emptiness of phenomena and say that inversions have an ontological substance; second, Hīnayāna practitioners who analyze the emptiness of phenomena and do not know that inversions are fundamentally empty in their intrinsic nature. Now both Hīnayāna practitioners are refuted in order to elucidate the Mahāyāna doctrine; hence it is shown that inversions are fundamentally empty in their intrinsic nature. Furthermore, it causes the former two Hīnayāna practitioners to turn from the small and enter the Great; hence it shows that their intrinsic nature is fundamentally empty. The second verse likewise has the first half citing and the second half refuting. As for why the third verse refutes attachment, the first halves of the preceding two verses both say: regarding the impermanent, attaching to permanence, and regarding the impermanent, attaching to impermanence. This is because there are inversion and non-inversion only due to attachment; within emptiness there is neither this inversion nor non-inversion. The opponent then says: Since inversion and non-inversion exist due to attachment, there must be attachment; therefore it is refuted again. Furthermore, the opponent thinks that the treatise master [holds that] impermanence really exists and merely dispels the mind of human attachment, and for this reason refutes impermanence. Therefore it is now clarified that there is no attachment whatsoever; what could there be to dispel? Furthermore, the previous refutation of inversion and non-inversion was a refutation of derivative afflictions. Attachment is grasping marks, and grasping marks is the fundamental affliction; hence the root is refuted next. The verse has three parts: the first half cites the opponent's doctrine, the third line refutes it, and the fourth line scolds. 'Object of attachment' is the realm of permanence and impermanence; 'attachment' is the affliction of grasping marks; 'the one who attaches' is the person who generates attachment; 'the phenomena used to attach' are the various sense faculties. The prose refers to the four verses in the 'Tathāgata Chapter' regarding impermanence, non-impermanence, etc., in the mark of quiescence. From "If there are no phenomena of attachment..." onward, the fourth verse concludes the refutation. In the verse there are two parts: the first three lines conclude the preceding three sections; the fourth line scolds. 'If there are no phenomena of attachment' concludes the third section immediately preceding it. The statement that error is inversion concludes the first section. The statement that correctness is non-inversion concludes the second section.