中觀論疏 9.5

9.5

「問曰因為果」下，第二破與果不與果一雙。前破因與果作因義，次破因不與果作因義。初立、次破。立中外人避前有無二關，以因與果作因，故非是因中都無；而因與竟便滅，不得言因中有果。成論師云：因是有為，凡有二義：一者性滅、二是轉變。以性滅故、因滅果生；以轉變義故，轉因作果。又云：一念之因辨果力足，故能生果；因是有為，故亦生便滅。亦是此義。以感果力足名為與果，性滅之義秤之為滅。故《成論》文云「是因與果作因已，滅報在後生。」又云「作因已滅，而成就力在，故能感果。」亦是此義也。偈上半牒、下半破。且問前性滅轉變義：汝只是一乳因，若言其滅則無可轉之為酪；若言乳轉作酪果，則不得言乳滅。今遂言作而復滅者，則乳有二體：一體滅於前、二乳體轉作酪。本立一乳，何有二耶？又問：因與果者，若有果，何須與耶？如其無者，與誰作因？救云：有果道理，故與果作因也。若理異空則不須與，若不異空則無可與。又汝果若有有理，復有無理。如《百論》「若當有有，若當無無。」又難開善義云：有成就現在，復有現起現在。成就現在為當能緣、為不緣？若能緣則是現起，不名成就；若不能緣，同毘婆闍婆提不相應使。又開善亦是過去過去義。初念謝滅是一過去，成就來現在得果竟便滅復是一過去。同迦葉鞞失已復失。又汝因是一，有滅不滅者，則有二體：一是現起因、二是成就來現在因，故是二體。若言唯是一體經二時者，因法假名時，既有二時則有二法，便有二因二果。又問：若得果竟無復成就者，亦應得果竟不名過去；若過去竟猶名過去，亦應得報竟猶名成就。「問曰若謂因不與果」下，第二破因不與果作因。外人避前二體，但立因滅果生。答中上半牒、下半破。破意云：因滅無果之前是無因，果云何得起？假令果起，則是無因之果。又前偈明果生已而滅，則有二因之過；今明因滅已而果生，則有無因之咎。前是破成實義，後是破毘曇義。亦前破大眾部，後破上座部義。至長安見攝論師立二義：一立聞熏習不滅作報佛、二立聞熏習滅不作報佛。言作佛者，墮二體過：一者聞熏轉作報佛，是無常作常義。二聞熏習是有為，復是滅義，故一聞熏習墮二體。次立滅者，一切諸功德並從真如體上生，聞熏習但為增上緣生，實不作報佛，是故滅。如人工等但為金朴作出金緣，而金自從金朴出。此是因滅失義也。又成實師本執金剛心有二義：一實法性滅、二相續轉作佛義。今聞熏習不滅家，專是成實義。

Below 'The question states: because the cause [gives the effect]...', the second pair refuting bestowing an effect and not bestowing an effect is presented. First is the refutation of the thesis that the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, and next is the refutation of the thesis that the cause does not bestow [being] as a cause on the effect. First is the establishment, and next is the refutation. In the establishment, the opponent avoids the previous two barriers of existence and nonexistence: because the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, it is not completely nonexistent within the cause; and when the cause has finished bestowing, it ceases, so one cannot say that the effect exists within the cause. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi state: A cause is conditioned, and generally has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation; second, transformation. By intrinsic cessation, the cause ceases and the effect arises; by transformation, the cause transforms into the effect. They also state: A single moment of cause is sufficient in its power to produce the effect, and thus can bring forth the effect; the cause is conditioned, and therefore ceases as soon as it arises. This is also of this meaning. Because the power to induce the effect is sufficient, it is called 'bestowing the effect'; the meaning of intrinsic cessation is designated as 'cessation.' Hence the text of the Tattvasiddhi states: 'After this cause acts as cause for the effect, it ceases and the retribution arises subsequently.' It also states: 'Having acted as cause, it ceases, but its capacity to bring fulfillment remains, and so it can induce the effect.' This is also of this meaning. The first half of the verse cites [the position], and the second half refutes it. Let us first question the earlier meaning of intrinsic cessation and transformation: You have only a single cause of milk; if you say that it ceases, then there is nothing that can transform into curd; if you say that the milk transforms into the effect of curd, then you cannot say that the milk ceases. Now if you claim that it acts and then ceases, the milk would have two substances: one substance ceases beforehand, and the second milk-substance transforms into curd. Originally a single milk was posited; how can there be two? One also asks: If the cause bestows on the effect, if the effect exists, why need to bestow? If it does not exist, upon what does it act as a cause? The rescue says: The principle of the effect exists, and therefore it acts as a cause for the effect. If the principle is different from emptiness, there is no need to bestow; if it is not different from emptiness, there is nothing to bestow. Furthermore, if your effect has a principle of existence, it also has a principle of nonexistence. As the Śata-śāstra states: 'If existence is existent, if nonexistence is nonexistent.' One also challenges the doctrine of Kaishan, saying: There is present possession (prāpti), and there is also presently active presence. Is the present possession capable of apprehending an object, or does it not apprehend? If it can apprehend, it is presently active and cannot be called possession; if it cannot apprehend, it is like the non-associated defilements of the Vibhajyavādins. Moreover, Kaishan also holds the meaning of a past-of-the-past. The cessation and passing away of the first moment is one past; the possession coming into the present and ceasing once the effect is obtained is another past. This is the same as the Kaśyapīyas' loss after already being lost. Furthermore, your cause is one, yet has cessation and non-cessation, so it has two substances: one is the presently active cause, and the second is the cause of possession coming into the present; hence there are two substances. If it is said that there is only a single substance that passes through two times, since causal dharmas are designated provisionally as time, once there are two times there are two dharmas, which would result in two causes and two effects. One also asks: If after obtaining the effect there is no longer possession, after obtaining the effect it should also not be called past; if after passing away it is still called past, then after obtaining the retribution it should still be called possession. Below 'The question states: if it is said that the cause does not bestow an effect...', the second refutes that the cause does not act as cause for the effect. The opponent avoids the previous two substances, and posits only that the cause ceases and the effect arises. In the answer, the first half cites [the position] and the second half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: when the cause ceases before the effect [arises], there is no cause; how could the effect arise? Even if the effect arises, it would be an effect without a cause. Furthermore, the previous verse explained that if the effect arises and then [the cause] ceases, there is the fault of two causes; now it is explained that if the cause has ceased and then the effect arises, there is the fault of having no cause. The former refutes the meaning of the Tattvasiddhi; the latter refutes the meaning of the Abhidharma. The former also refutes the Mahāsāṃghika, and the latter refutes the Sthavira doctrine. When going to Chang'an, I saw the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha positing two doctrines: first, positing that hearing-permeation does not cease and becomes the reward Buddha; second, positing that hearing-permeation ceases and does not become the reward Buddha. Saying that it becomes the Buddha falls into the fault of two substances: first, hearing-permeation transforms into the reward Buddha, which is the meaning of the impermanent becoming permanent. Second, hearing-permeation is conditioned, and is also of the meaning of cessation; therefore a single hearing-permeation falls into two substances. Next, positing that it ceases: all virtues arise from the substance of tathatā; hearing-permeation merely serves as a sovereign condition for arising, and does not truly become the reward Buddha, and therefore it ceases. Just as an artisan merely serves as a condition for bringing forth gold from the raw gold ore, while the gold itself comes from the raw gold ore. This is the meaning of the cause ceasing and being lost. Furthermore, the masters of the Tattvasiddhi originally held that the diamond-like mind has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation of the real dharma; second, the meaning of continuity transforming to become Buddha. Now, those who hold that hearing-permeation does not cease are purely adhering to the Tattvasiddhi doctrine.