中觀論疏 9.6

9.6

「問曰眾緣合時」下，第三雙破一時前後。初偈破一時。問意云：眾緣合時即有果生，故無有無因之過。亦是成實五陰一時成人，薩婆多八相一時共起義。又數人未來已有因果，即是一時，但來現在生而因前果後耳。「答曰」下，上半牒、下半破。破意云：夫相生之道以能生為有，故能生他；所生為無，故從他生。若立一時，有則俱有、無則俱無。俱無則唯是所生，失於能生；俱有則唯是能生，失於所生。故若一時則失能所，得能所則失一時。破由來義者，而汝人陰既一時，何不說人為陰、因際為人果？又《涅槃》云「眾生名色更互相縛」，應更互作因、更互為體。又二法一時，離法無別時，時一則法一、法二則時二。若時一法二，亦應時二法一。又他云：因滅時是果生時者，生則是有、滅則是無，云何一時？又一時言因果者，亦可一時有前後。破數義云：因法假名時，若九法共起則有九時，若言共一時亦應共一法。因果不得一法，亦因果不得一時。「問曰若先有果生」下，至此已來凡有三義：初二雙破前因後果、次一番破因果一時、今破前果後因，此之三義攝一切也。前立、次破。經中及義並有斯執，如須達未修精舍之因，以有天堂之果；難陀實未持犯，而有苦樂之報。豈非前果後因？又影公云：「前有舍法而後備柱樑」，亦是此義。又經中云「本有涅槃之果，而後修行取之。」「答曰」，上半牒、下半破。破意云：本由因有果，未有因何得有果？若未有因已有果者，則名無因之果。問：經中親作此說，何以破之？其論破經不應說耶？答：經說別有深意，為勸人修福故說須達之事，為誡惡勸善故說難陀事，為對生死始有是無常故說涅槃本有是常耳。涅槃未曾常無常，何曾是本始二有耶？又前果後因，如數人命根獨生，而後用十使中隨一使潤生令一期堅固，命根是果報正主，通六道三界。今問：命根因何而來？答：由業故生。問：若爾，則是前因後果。又前因滅，命根果後生，則是無因有果。又若前有果，後起煩惱潤，即是倒潤。又已有命根等，竟何須十使隨一潤耶？又若前果後因，則果生於因，因果倒亂。

From "Question: When the manifold conditions assemble" downwards is the third pair, refuting simultaneity and non-simultaneity (prior and posterior). The first verse refutes simultaneity. The meaning of the question is: when the manifold conditions assemble, the effect immediately arises; thus, there is no error of being causeless or of existence [prior to the cause]. This is also the doctrine of the Chengshi [school] that the five aggregates simultaneously form a person, and of the Sarvāstivādins that the eight characteristics arise simultaneously together. Furthermore, for the Sarvāstivādins (Abhidharmikas), causes and effects already exist in the future, which is precisely simultaneity, but coming into the present they arise with the cause prior and the effect posterior. Under "Reply", the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis] and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: the way of mutual generation requires that the generator is existent, and so it can generate the other; and that the generated is non-existent, and so it is generated from the other. If one posits simultaneity, then if existent, both are existent; if non-existent, both are non-existent. If both are non-existent, there is only the generated, losing the generator; if both are existent, there is only the generator, losing the generated. Therefore, if they are simultaneous, one loses the generator and the generated; if one preserves the generator and the generated, one loses simultaneity. Refuting the traditionally accepted doctrine: as your person and aggregates are simultaneous, why do you not say that the person is the aggregates, and the boundary of the cause is the effect of the person? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Sentient beings and name-and-form bind one another"; they should then serve as causes for each other and serve as substances for each other. Furthermore, if two dharmas are simultaneous, apart from the dharmas there is no separate time: if time is one, dharmas must be one; if dharmas are two, times must be two. If time is one while dharmas are two, time should also be two while dharmas are one. Moreover, others say: the time when the cause ceases is the time when the effect arises. But arising is existence, and cessation is non-existence—how could they be simultaneous? Furthermore, if one speaks of cause and effect being simultaneous, then simultaneity could also have prior and posterior. Refuting the Abhidharmika doctrine: time is provisionally designated on the basis of dharmas; if nine dharmas arise together, there must be nine times; if one says they share one time, they should also share one dharma. Cause and effect cannot be one dharma, nor can cause and effect be simultaneous. From "Question: If an effect arises first" downwards: up to this point there are three doctrines altogether: the first two pairs refuted prior cause and posterior effect; the next single instance refuted cause and effect being simultaneous; now this refutes prior effect and posterior cause. These three doctrines encompass everything. First it is posited, and next refuted. Both in the sūtras and in theoretical treatises there is this attachment. For example, before Sudatta had cultivated the cause of the vihāra, the effect of the heavenly realm already existed; before Nanda had actually observed or broken [precepts], he already had the retribution of pain or pleasure. Are these not prior effect and posterior cause? Master [Tan]ying also said: "First there is the structure of the house, and later the pillars and beams are provided"; this is also the same sense. Moreover, a sūtra states: "The effect of nirvāṇa originally exists, and later one cultivates practice to attain it." "Reply": the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis], and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: fundamentally an effect exists by virtue of a cause; when the cause does not yet exist, how could an effect be attained? If an effect already exists when the cause does not yet exist, it is called an effect without a cause. Question: The sūtras themselves make this statement; why refute it? Would the treatise refute what the sūtras should not state? Answer: The sūtras have a different, profound intent: to encourage people to cultivate merit, they speak of the affair of Sudatta; to admonish against evil and encourage good, they speak of the affair of Nanda; to counter the view that the beginning of birth-and-death is impermanent, they speak of nirvāṇa being originally existent and permanent. Nirvāṇa has never been permanent or impermanent; how could it ever be an original or beginning existence? Furthermore, regarding prior effect and posterior cause, just as for the Abhidharmikas the life-faculty arises alone, and later any one of the ten fetters is used to moisten the rebirth to make that single life-period firm: the life-faculty is the principal master of karmic retribution, extending through the six destinies and the three realms. Now we ask: whence does the cause of the life-faculty come? Answer: It arises due to karma. Question: If so, then it is prior cause and posterior effect. Furthermore, if the prior cause has ceased and the effect of the life-faculty arises later, it is an effect existing without a cause. Furthermore, if the effect exists first and defilements arise later to moisten it, that is an inverted moistening. Moreover, if the life-faculty and the rest already exist, what need is there ultimately for any one of the ten fetters to moisten them? Furthermore, if there is a prior effect and posterior cause, then the effect generates the cause, and cause and effect are inverted and disordered.