中觀論疏 9.5

9.5

Below 'The question states: because the cause [gives the effect]...', the second pair refuting bestowing an effect and not bestowing an effect is presented. First is the refutation of the thesis that the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, and next is the refutation of the thesis that the cause does not bestow [being] as a cause on the effect. First is the establishment, and next is the refutation. In the establishment, the opponent avoids the previous two barriers of existence and nonexistence: because the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, it is not completely nonexistent within the cause; and when the cause has finished bestowing, it ceases, so one cannot say that the effect exists within the cause. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi state: A cause is conditioned, and generally has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation; second, transformation. By intrinsic cessation, the cause ceases and the effect arises; by transformation, the cause transforms into the effect. They also state: A single moment of cause is sufficient in its power to produce the effect, and thus can bring forth the effect; the cause is conditioned, and therefore ceases as soon as it arises. This is also of this meaning. Because the power to induce the effect is sufficient, it is called 'bestowing the effect'; the meaning of intrinsic cessation is designated as 'cessation.' Hence the text of the Tattvasiddhi states: 'After this cause acts as cause for the effect, it ceases and the retribution arises subsequently.' It also states: 'Having acted as cause, it ceases, but its capacity to bring fulfillment remains, and so it can induce the effect.' This is also of this meaning. The first half of the verse cites [the position], and the second half refutes it. Let us first question the earlier meaning of intrinsic cessation and transformation: You have only a single cause of milk; if you say that it ceases, then there is nothing that can transform into curd; if you say that the milk transforms into the effect of curd, then you cannot say that the milk ceases. Now if you claim that it acts and then ceases, the milk would have two substances: one substance ceases beforehand, and the second milk-substance transforms into curd. Originally a single milk was posited; how can there be two? One also asks: If the cause bestows on the effect, if the effect exists, why need to bestow? If it does not exist, upon what does it act as a cause? The rescue says: The principle of the effect exists, and therefore it acts as a cause for the effect. If the principle is different from emptiness, there is no need to bestow; if it is not different from emptiness, there is nothing to bestow. Furthermore, if your effect has a principle of existence, it also has a principle of nonexistence. As the Śata-śāstra states: 'If existence is existent, if nonexistence is nonexistent.' One also challenges the doctrine of Kaishan, saying: There is present possession (prāpti), and there is also presently active presence. Is the present possession capable of apprehending an object, or does it not apprehend? If it can apprehend, it is presently active and cannot be called possession; if it cannot apprehend, it is like the non-associated defilements of the Vibhajyavādins. Moreover, Kaishan also holds the meaning of a past-of-the-past. The cessation and passing away of the first moment is one past; the possession coming into the present and ceasing once the effect is obtained is another past. This is the same as the Kaśyapīyas' loss after already being lost. Furthermore, your cause is one, yet has cessation and non-cessation, so it has two substances: one is the presently active cause, and the second is the cause of possession coming into the present; hence there are two substances. If it is said that there is only a single substance that passes through two times, since causal dharmas are designated provisionally as time, once there are two times there are two dharmas, which would result in two causes and two effects. One also asks: If after obtaining the effect there is no longer possession, after obtaining the effect it should also not be called past; if after passing away it is still called past, then after obtaining the retribution it should still be called possession. Below 'The question states: if it is said that the cause does not bestow an effect...', the second refutes that the cause does not act as cause for the effect. The opponent avoids the previous two substances, and posits only that the cause ceases and the effect arises. In the answer, the first half cites [the position] and the second half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: when the cause ceases before the effect [arises], there is no cause; how could the effect arise? Even if the effect arises, it would be an effect without a cause. Furthermore, the previous verse explained that if the effect arises and then [the cause] ceases, there is the fault of two causes; now it is explained that if the cause has ceased and then the effect arises, there is the fault of having no cause. The former refutes the meaning of the Tattvasiddhi; the latter refutes the meaning of the Abhidharma. The former also refutes the Mahāsāṃghika, and the latter refutes the Sthavira doctrine. When going to Chang'an, I saw the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha positing two doctrines: first, positing that hearing-permeation does not cease and becomes the reward Buddha; second, positing that hearing-permeation ceases and does not become the reward Buddha. Saying that it becomes the Buddha falls into the fault of two substances: first, hearing-permeation transforms into the reward Buddha, which is the meaning of the impermanent becoming permanent. Second, hearing-permeation is conditioned, and is also of the meaning of cessation; therefore a single hearing-permeation falls into two substances. Next, positing that it ceases: all virtues arise from the substance of tathatā; hearing-permeation merely serves as a sovereign condition for arising, and does not truly become the reward Buddha, and therefore it ceases. Just as an artisan merely serves as a condition for bringing forth gold from the raw gold ore, while the gold itself comes from the raw gold ore. This is the meaning of the cause ceasing and being lost. Furthermore, the masters of the Tattvasiddhi originally held that the diamond-like mind has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation of the real dharma; second, the meaning of continuity transforming to become Buddha. Now, those who hold that hearing-permeation does not cease are purely adhering to the Tattvasiddhi doctrine.