中觀論疏 9.6

9.6

From "Question: When the manifold conditions assemble" downwards is the third pair, refuting simultaneity and non-simultaneity (prior and posterior). The first verse refutes simultaneity. The meaning of the question is: when the manifold conditions assemble, the effect immediately arises; thus, there is no error of being causeless or of existence [prior to the cause]. This is also the doctrine of the Chengshi [school] that the five aggregates simultaneously form a person, and of the Sarvāstivādins that the eight characteristics arise simultaneously together. Furthermore, for the Sarvāstivādins (Abhidharmikas), causes and effects already exist in the future, which is precisely simultaneity, but coming into the present they arise with the cause prior and the effect posterior. Under "Reply", the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis] and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: the way of mutual generation requires that the generator is existent, and so it can generate the other; and that the generated is non-existent, and so it is generated from the other. If one posits simultaneity, then if existent, both are existent; if non-existent, both are non-existent. If both are non-existent, there is only the generated, losing the generator; if both are existent, there is only the generator, losing the generated. Therefore, if they are simultaneous, one loses the generator and the generated; if one preserves the generator and the generated, one loses simultaneity. Refuting the traditionally accepted doctrine: as your person and aggregates are simultaneous, why do you not say that the person is the aggregates, and the boundary of the cause is the effect of the person? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Sentient beings and name-and-form bind one another"; they should then serve as causes for each other and serve as substances for each other. Furthermore, if two dharmas are simultaneous, apart from the dharmas there is no separate time: if time is one, dharmas must be one; if dharmas are two, times must be two. If time is one while dharmas are two, time should also be two while dharmas are one. Moreover, others say: the time when the cause ceases is the time when the effect arises. But arising is existence, and cessation is non-existence—how could they be simultaneous? Furthermore, if one speaks of cause and effect being simultaneous, then simultaneity could also have prior and posterior. Refuting the Abhidharmika doctrine: time is provisionally designated on the basis of dharmas; if nine dharmas arise together, there must be nine times; if one says they share one time, they should also share one dharma. Cause and effect cannot be one dharma, nor can cause and effect be simultaneous. From "Question: If an effect arises first" downwards: up to this point there are three doctrines altogether: the first two pairs refuted prior cause and posterior effect; the next single instance refuted cause and effect being simultaneous; now this refutes prior effect and posterior cause. These three doctrines encompass everything. First it is posited, and next refuted. Both in the sūtras and in theoretical treatises there is this attachment. For example, before Sudatta had cultivated the cause of the vihāra, the effect of the heavenly realm already existed; before Nanda had actually observed or broken [precepts], he already had the retribution of pain or pleasure. Are these not prior effect and posterior cause? Master [Tan]ying also said: "First there is the structure of the house, and later the pillars and beams are provided"; this is also the same sense. Moreover, a sūtra states: "The effect of nirvāṇa originally exists, and later one cultivates practice to attain it." "Reply": the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis], and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: fundamentally an effect exists by virtue of a cause; when the cause does not yet exist, how could an effect be attained? If an effect already exists when the cause does not yet exist, it is called an effect without a cause. Question: The sūtras themselves make this statement; why refute it? Would the treatise refute what the sūtras should not state? Answer: The sūtras have a different, profound intent: to encourage people to cultivate merit, they speak of the affair of Sudatta; to admonish against evil and encourage good, they speak of the affair of Nanda; to counter the view that the beginning of birth-and-death is impermanent, they speak of nirvāṇa being originally existent and permanent. Nirvāṇa has never been permanent or impermanent; how could it ever be an original or beginning existence? Furthermore, regarding prior effect and posterior cause, just as for the Abhidharmikas the life-faculty arises alone, and later any one of the ten fetters is used to moisten the rebirth to make that single life-period firm: the life-faculty is the principal master of karmic retribution, extending through the six destinies and the three realms. Now we ask: whence does the cause of the life-faculty come? Answer: It arises due to karma. Question: If so, then it is prior cause and posterior effect. Furthermore, if the prior cause has ceased and the effect of the life-faculty arises later, it is an effect existing without a cause. Furthermore, if the effect exists first and defilements arise later to moisten it, that is an inverted moistening. Moreover, if the life-faculty and the rest already exist, what need is there ultimately for any one of the ten fetters to moisten them? Furthermore, if there is a prior effect and posterior cause, then the effect generates the cause, and cause and effect are inverted and disordered.