中觀論疏 3.21

3.21

The prose commentary has three parts: first, explaining the verse text; second, revealing the meaning of the verse; third, retroactively explaining the preceding line. In explaining the verse, he first explains the first half and next explains the second half. As for "the intrinsic nature of phenomena is not in the conditions," it is like the substance of a person not being in the aggregates, or the substance of a pillar not being in the subtle atoms. As for "there are only names because of the coming together of conditions," this has two [purposes]: First, it comes to resolve doubt. If there is no person-substance in the five aggregates, why is there the name 'person' when the five aggregates come together, and why is there the name 'pillar' when the four subtle atoms come together? Since there is a distinct name, one would know that there is separately an intrinsic nature within the conditions; therefore, he explains that there are only names because of the coming together of conditions, but in truth there is no substance within the conditions. Second, this uses [the concept of] name to criticize the positions of four schools: first, non-Buddhists who hypothesize a real person in the five aggregates; second, the Vātsīputrīyas who hypothesize that the self is in the five aggregates and the visual faculty is in the four great elements; third, the Abhidharmikas [who claim] there is the nature of fire in wood; fourth, Zhuangyan who says: when conditions come together, there is separately a provisional substance and function. Therefore, he refutes [them] by saying: when conditions come together there is only a name, without substance or function. Since substance does not exist, name has nothing to attach to. If refuting the position of Kaishan, one says: before your five aggregates came together, there was not yet the function of a person; as soon as they came together, there was the function of a person. This function belongs to the conditions; how can there be a function of a person separate from the five [aggregates]? If there were a distinct function, it would be intrinsic nature. As for "intrinsic nature is self-substance," this line explains the preceding chapter's criticism of heterodox views. The preceding chapter refuted self-substance, and the present text refutes [intrinsic] nature; fearing people might not understand, he synthesizes them again. What the verse calls 'intrinsic nature' (zixing) is nature in the sense of substantial nature (tixing), not nature in the sense of principle-nature (lixing). Moreover, some cling to substance while avoiding nature, and others avoid nature while clinging to principle; here it is explained that nature, substance, and principle are still just different names. As for "because there is no intrinsic nature..." and below, this explains the second half. There are two meanings: first, [the term] 'other' is stated in dependence on 'self'; because there is no self, there is no other; second, other is itself self; because there is no self, there is no other. As for "if intrinsic nature and other-nature are refuted..." and below, this is the second [part], revealing the meaning of the verse. There should be a question: Since the thematic verse fully stated all four, why does the subsequent verse only explain self and other, and not explain both [co-production] and uncaused? In answer to this question, he says: refuting self and other is itself refuting both [co-production], so it is not necessary to explain both. If [a cause] with causes can still be refuted, how much more so uncaused; hence it is not necessary to explain uncaused. Furthermore, uncaused does not mean absence of non-existence; it only means absence of a cause, hence it is called uncaused. Since one ultimately does not see any cause, what is there to lack a cause? Refuting Zhuangzi's notion of spontaneity (ziran), one says: you obtain spontaneity by cause of what is not spontaneous, which means depending on a cause and not self-[originating]; how can it be called spontaneous? Furthermore, one asks: if you have what is not spontaneous, then the principle of spontaneity is not all-pervasive; if there is no non-spontaneous, how can there be spontaneity? If you say it is truly spontaneous, and it is only erroneous clinging that makes it non-spontaneous, this is also not so. This erroneous clinging is itself spontaneous; how could there be anything non-spontaneous? "In the four propositions, seeking arising cannot be attained": this is the third [part], retroactively explaining the initial verse's "therefore know there is no arising." Because it was not previously summarized, it could not yet be explained; now that both the enunciations and the explanations are complete, it can finally be explained. Furthermore, it intends to bring forth the point of the subsequent rescue, because through the lack of arising in the four propositions, the meaning of arising is exhausted.