中觀論疏 3.20.4

3.20.4

Second, within conditions there is no self-nature, nor are there the remaining three natures; third, there is no self to be depended upon, and therefore there are no three [others]. As for 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions': this line can be explained through three meanings: first, refutation based on provisionality through conditions; second, refutation confronting provisionality through conditions; third, refutation by equivalent deduction. Refutation based on provisionality through conditions: examining within the conditions, there is no self, just as within the five aggregates there is no person, and within the four subtle atoms there is no pillar. When there is not even a self-nature, how can one say that it arises from self-nature? Second, confronting provisionality through conditions: using the conditions, self, and sprout, we dismiss both: if there were a self-nature, it would not depend on conditions; if it must depend on conditions, it has no self-nature. Third, refutation by equivalent deduction: since having an inherent self-substance would not depend on conditions to exist, it would also follow that the self-substance inherently arises without depending on conditions to arise. And in saying 'as [with] phenomena': if phenomena genuinely had intrinsic nature and one said they lacked it, that would not accord with phenomena; but now they truly lack intrinsic nature and one says they lack it, hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. This shows that the heterodox notion of an intrinsic nature does not accord with phenomena. Furthermore, turning back to your conditions of the five aggregates, there is no substance or nature of a person; hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. As for 'because of lacking self-nature': the lower half [of the verse] is not a refutation of 'other', but rather reveals that there is no need to refute 'other'. Why is there no need to refute 'other'? Because since self is non-existent, other is non-existent; thus calling this the refutation of other is also admissible. Since within conditions there is no self-nature, pointing to self as other means there is no other-nature; pointing to self and other as both means there is no both-nature; pointing to what exists as non-existent means there is no uncaused-nature. This is a rigorous discussion of the non-existence of the four propositions, and in each case demonstrates the non-existence of the four propositions from the standpoint of the fruit. In a broader discussion: depending on the self of the person, there is the other of the five aggregates; since there is no self of the person, what is there to depend upon so that the other of the aggregates exists? Combining the person and the aggregates is called 'both'; since in the end there is neither a self of the person nor an other of the aggregates, how could there be 'both'? The self of the person is caused by the person, and is further caused by the aggregates, which is termed 'having a cause'; since in the end these two causes do not exist, how could there be 'uncausedness'? Explained from yet another perspective: the first half of this verse uses conditions to refute self, and the second half uses self to refute conditions. The first half uses conditions to refute self, clarifying that if conditions exist, then self does not exist; the second half clarifies that because self is non-existent, conditions are non-existent. Using conditions to refute self is using existence to refute non-existence; using self to refute conditions is using non-existence to refute existence; hence it says 'because self is non-existent, other is also non-existent.' Explained from yet another perspective: this verse is illustrated by taking a fist. A fist exists through fingers, so the fist lacks self-nature. If one says that because the fist exists through fingers it is other-nature, this is also not so. Fingers viewed from the perspective of a fist cannot be 'other', because there is no separate substance. If the fist viewed from the fingers is 'other', and the fist depends on fingers, then since the fist viewed from a pillar is 'other', it should arise from the pillar. Therefore, establishing 'other' loses 'self', and establishing 'self' loses 'other'. Furthermore, a fist in relation to a fist is self, yet the fist lacks self-nature; fingers in relation to fingers are self, yet fingers also lack self-nature; lacking self-nature, there are no fingers—how then could fingers be the 'other' to the fist?