中觀論疏 6.32

6.32

The chapter is divided into two parts: first the question, and next the answer. The question has two points: first, citing the sūtra; next, questioning the author of the treatise. Question: The chapter is titled "Refuting the Prior Limit"; why does it cite the Sūtra on Having No Prior Limit? Answer: There are two meanings. First, the outsider initially posited that there is a prior limit, and the Buddha preached the Sūtra on Having No Prior Limit to refute it; because [the outsider] does not accept this statement, he questions the author of the treatise. Second, the outsider doubts the Buddha's sūtra saying there is no prior limit, [thinking:] how is it that having already stated that there are birth and death, there must be a prior limit? Now, [the author] elucidates the sūtra's [teaching of] no prior limit to refute the outsider's claim that there is a prior limit; hence it is called the chapter on "Refuting the Prior Limit." "In this it is said that there are sentient beings and there is birth-and-death": in the second part, the outsider cites the Buddha's sūtra to challenge the author of the treatise: when the sūtra says there are sentient beings, there are persons; when it says there is birth-and-death, there are dharmas. "For what reason was this spoken?": this doubts the sūtra—if there are sentient beings and there is birth-and-death, why is there no prior limit? Second, it challenges the author of the treatise regarding his words of rebuke at the end of the previous chapter: since the sūtra has already spoken of persons and dharmas, how can you rebuke [others], saying that positing persons and dharmas fails to attain the flavor of the Buddha's Dharma? If seeing persons and dharmas means failing to attain the flavor of the Buddha's Dharma, for what reason did the sūtra speak of the eight dharmas? "Answer:", divided into two: first, refuting [the view] that there is a prior limit to birth-and-death; second, the final two verses analogously refute [the view] that there is a prior limit to all dharmas. The first has two parts: one refutes [the existence of] a beginning, an end, or a middle of birth-and-death; from "Therefore, herein" onward, the second refutes [the existence of] birth-and-death itself. Within the first, there are again two: the preceding verse clarifies that there is neither beginning nor end; the subsequent half-verse explains that there is no middle. The first half clarifies that there is no beginning; the second half explains that there is no end. This then elucidates the Buddha's sūtra clarifying that there is no beginning in order to refute the outsider's positing that birth-and-death has a beginning; that is, it refutes the prior limit. Question: Hīnayāna adherents also say that birth-and-death has no beginning; how does their refutation of having a beginning differ from that of the author of the treatise? Answer: The author of the treatise explains "having no beginning" with four meanings: First, Hīnayāna adherents say that birth-and-death exists, and its vast and remote beginning cannot be known. The author of the treatise elucidates the Buddha's intention: when the Buddha's sūtras speak of "having no beginning," it is not because birth-and-death is vast and remote that it has no beginning; it clarifies that a beginning to birth-and-death is unfindable, which means birth-and-death has no root or basis. Second, the Buddha's intention in clarifying "having no beginning" is twofold abandonment. Clarifying that it has no beginning explains that it has no beginning, not that there is an existent "beginninglessness"; thus neither beginning nor beginninglessness can function across the five propositions, thereby causing one to awaken to and enter the real mark. Third, when the Buddha's sūtra clarifies having no beginning, there is neither an end nor a middle, just as a tree without roots also has no branches or leaves. Because there is neither beginning nor middle, there is no birth-and-death; and because there is no end, there is no nirvāṇa. This reveals that the six destinies originally do not arise and at present do not perish, neither birth-and-death nor nirvāṇa; yet practitioners of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna fail to understand this intention. Fourth, one may also speak of birth-and-death as vast and remote to cause followers of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna to give rise to revulsion, diligently cultivate contemplative practice, and sever all afflictions. Question: What are the beginning and the end? Answer: Mahāyāna adherents say that the initial grade of ignorance is the beginning of birth-and-death, and the diamond-like mind (vajracitta) is the end of birth-and-death. However, there is also the case where the beginning of birth-and-death is the end of nirvāṇa, the beginning of nirvāṇa is the end of birth-and-death, the end of birth-and-death is the beginning of great nirvāṇa, and the beginning of nirvāṇa is the end of birth-and-death. That the beginning of birth-and-death is the end of nirvāṇa is explained based on deluded sentiments: as soon as a single thought of a grasping mind arises, that is the beginning of birth-and-death, and correct contemplation does not manifest, which is therefore the end of nirvāṇa. If one attains a single thought of correct contemplation, that is the beginning of nirvāṇa and the end of birth-and-death. Now we generally examine it: is "beginning" spoken in dependence on "end", or without dependence? If it is a beginning in dependence on an end, at the first thought of ignorance the diamond-like mind does not yet exist; what does it depend upon? If at the first thought there is the diamond-like mind, then the beginning and the end would be simultaneous; how could beginning and end be established? Furthermore, in the diamond-like mind there is no longer an initial grade of ignorance; what does it depend upon? If there is the initial grade, there is no diamond-like mind; who is made to depend on whom? Therefore, one should know that there is neither beginning nor end. The second half-verse refuting the middle is easy to understand; that is, it refutes the meaning of the "middle." Originally, the middle exists in opposition to biased errors; if there are no two extremes, what middle could be found? The same applies by analogy to birth-and-death and nirvāṇa, truth and delusion. When the Buddha simply uttered the single phrase "having no beginning," according to the present treatise's text it refutes four attachments: since he says "no beginning," it refutes a beginning. Second, since he says "no beginning," because a beginning does not exist he says "no beginning," not that there is an existent beginninglessness; this refutes the view of beginninglessness. Third, since a beginning does not exist and beginninglessness also does not exist, then there is no end; this refutes the view of an end. Fourth, since neither of the two parts exists, there is also no coming and going in between; this refutes the view of a middle. Having refuted these four views, it causes one to awaken to and enter the real mark and attain liberation from birth-and-death. Nāgārjuna's elucidation of the Buddha's intention in speaking of having no beginning is like this; yet nowadays students of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna do not recognize the Buddha's intention in speaking of having no beginning. How could they argue with the author of the treatise? The Sūtra on Resolving Doubts in the Semblance Dharma says: "Dharma masters in the final age grasp meanings according to the letter, contrary to the real mark." This is precisely the case. From "Therefore, herein" onward is the second section, refuting birth-and-death. The refutation of birth-and-death has two purposes in all: first, to summarize and explain the meaning of having no beginning, end, or middle. If there were birth-and-death, there could be a beginning, an end, and a middle; but ultimately there is no birth-and-death, so how could there be a beginning or an end? Second, it specifically explains the meaning of having no middle. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The prior limits of birth-and-death are two in all: first, ignorance; second, craving for existence. Between these two, there are birth, aging, illness, and death." Therefore, now seeking birth-and-death through the three gates fails to find it, explaining that there is no middle.