中觀論疏 9.4

9.4

The chapter is divided into two parts: first, refuting specifically the causes and effects of the ten schools; second, refuting generally all causes and effects. Refuting the causes and effects of the ten schools comprises ten sections, which can also be subsumed under five pairs: the first pair is existence and nonexistence; the second pair is bestowing and not bestowing, also called cessation and non-cessation; the third pair is simultaneous and sequential; the fourth pair is cessation-transformation and non-cessation-transformation; the fifth pair is pervasive and non-pervasive. The initial pair of existence and nonexistence comprises four verses in total, making four distinct points: The first verse clarifies: if the effect exists within the cause, why rely on conditions to arise? The second verse: if the effect does not exist within the cause, how can conditions produce it? The third verse refutes the existent effect again: if the effect exists within the cause, and the effect possesses the four sense-data, then the sense faculties should perceive it. The fourth refutes nonexistence again: if the effect does not exist within the cause, then the cause is identical to a non-cause. The reason they are refuted in this interwoven manner is that when existence is refuted, the opponent clings to nonexistence, and therefore nonexistence is refuted; next, when nonexistence is refuted, the opponent shifts position and clings to existence, and thus existence is refuted again; when existence is refuted, they cling thoroughly to nonexistence again; because their attachments are unstable, they are refuted in an interwoven manner. Furthermore, this treatise has many approaches to refutation: previously existence and nonexistence were treated separately by category, but now existence and nonexistence are interwoven; since adaptations to circumstances differ, the approaches to refutation are not singular. Question: Why among the ten schools are existence and nonexistence refuted first? Answer: Existence and nonexistence are the root of annihilation and permanence, and annihilation and permanence are the source of all views; wishing now to exhaust their root, they are refuted first. Moreover, cause and effect in the Buddhadharma are precisely the middle way, and existence and nonexistence directly obstruct the middle way. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are the heads of the non-Buddhist schools, and the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas are the root of the various Buddhist sects; since these inner and outer traditions specifically cling to existence and nonexistence, they are refuted first. Question: Why not refute both-existence-and-nonexistence and neither-existence-nor-nonexistence? Answer: Both-existence together with not-nonexistence still have the meaning of existence; both-nonexistence together with not-existence still have the meaning of nonexistence; therefore, merely by refuting the two barriers, the four doctrines are subsumed. First the prose establishes the position, then the verse refutes it: this is the Sāṃkhya together with the Sthaviras explaining that an effect exists within the cause. Clinging to the existence of an effect has three grounds: First, one visibly sees that the effect comes from the cause, and therefore the effect exists within the cause. Second, it arises by relying on conditions, so one knows it exists within the conditions; if it did not exist within the conditions, even when combined it would not arise. Third, trusting the Buddha's words, as a sūtra states: 'Because there is the nature of arising, arising can bring about arising.' The first half of the verse cites [the position], and the second half refutes it. The opponent rescues [their claim], saying: The actual fact of the effect does not exist within the cause, but relying on the combination of conditions, the actual effect arises; how can you object that it does not need the combination of conditions to arise? Answer: That there is no actual effect within the cause is ultimately the meaning of there being no effect within the cause. Because there is no actual thing within the cause and yet an actual thing arises, one should know that this actual thing previously was nonexistent and now exists, and therefore this is [the thesis that] there is no effect within the cause. Furthermore, if the combination of conditions brings forth the actual thing, the principle should also exist only when there is combination. If the principle exists of itself, the actual thing should likewise be so. Furthermore, if the actual thing is caused by the principle, the principle should have a further cause. Furthermore, if the actual thing is caused by the principle, the actual thing might be existent, but since the principle has no cause, there should be no principle. One further asks: does it already exist originally and then require the combination of conditions, or does it exist only after the combination of conditions? If it already exists originally, why require the combination of conditions? If it exists only after the combination of conditions, then before the combination it is nonexistent; though relying on the combination of conditions, the effect ultimately would not arise. Below 'The question states,' the thesis that the effect does not exist within the cause is established, which is the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika and the Mahāsāṃghika that [the effect in] the two times is nonexistent. In the answer, the first half of the verse cites [the position] and the second half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: if the effect does not exist within the cause, this nonexistence is no different from the nonexistence of empty space or a hare's horn; empty space and a hare's horn do not arise from the combination of conditions, and the effect would likewise be so. If the effect can arise accordingly, while empty space does not arise, then empty space could be nonexistent and the effect should be not nonexistent. If both are alike nonexistent, yet empty space does not arise while the effect arises, then it could also be that empty space should arise while the effect does not arise. The first half of the third verse reiterates existence, and the second half directly refutes it. For the non-Buddhists, the pot in the clay completely possesses the five sense-data, so the five sense faculties should be able to perceive it; in the inner Dharma, the pot is composed of four sense-data, so the four sense faculties should cognize it. Furthermore, in the inner Dharma, if the pot in the clay is provisional, it should be grasped by conceptual thought, but neither is the case; therefore, know that it does not exist. The first half of the fourth verse reiterates nonexistence, and the second half directly refutes it. The refutation has three points: First, mutually and alike being nonexistent, the cause is identical to a non-cause, and mutually they do not arise; furthermore, if all are non-causes, there is no cause, and because cause is nonexistent, non-cause is also nonexistent. Second, mutually and alike being nonexistent, the non-cause is identical to a cause, and mutually all are causes with no non-cause; since there is no non-cause, there is also no cause. Third, if both are alike nonexistent and yet there are causes and non-causes, then both being alike causes, there should also be existence and nonexistence; furthermore, being equally nonexistent, one should also seek fire in ice and seek milk in water, which would cause great chaos in cause and effect.