中觀論疏 9.7

9.7

From "The question says: the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit" downwards is the fourth pair: the cause perishing and transforming [versus] the cause perishing without transforming. The proponent's position states: that the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit means, upon examining the opponent's view, they merely call perishing "transforming"; hence, the cause's perishing is itself transforming into the fruit. In the reply, the first half refutes it by showing the cause reaching the fruit, and the second half refutes it through repeated arising. The first line quotes the opponent's thesis, and the second line refutes it. The refutation says: since the cause transforms into the fruit, the substance of the cause does not perish; because the substance of the cause does not perish, the cause reaches into the fruit. The refutation by repeated arising in the second half means: when it is a cause, that is one arising, and upon reaching the fruit, that is another arising; hence, it is a repeated arising. This simply makes a single entity arise repeatedly, which is why an error is incurred. Furthermore, refuting another view, it says: if the cause transforms into the fruit, then the fruit is not distinct from the cause, and it is still the earlier cause acting as the later fruit. Just as a man named Zhang in the east, when arriving in the west, is still the same man named Zhang. If the cause is distinct from the fruit, then the cause perishes by itself beforehand, and it is not the cause that becomes the fruit. Moreover, we ask: if the cause transforms into the fruit, the cause must be distinct from the fruit; if it were not distinct, it should not transform. Furthermore, as with the transformation of the former Deer King reaching to the Buddha: the Buddha would have to be a deer; if he is no longer a deer, then the fruit is distinct from the cause, and before the cause perishes and there is no fruit, there would be no cause—with no cause, how could there be a fruit? Moreover, we ask: does it transform when perished, or transform when not perished? If it has perished, there is nothing that can transform; if it has not perished, it does not transform. Furthermore, concerning "having arisen, it arises again": as Kaishan states, when acting as a cause, that is one arising, and subsequently, upon attainment arriving in the present, that is another arising. This falls into the error of repeated arising. The prose consists of two parts: first, explaining the root verse; second, refuting alternative views. Regarding "prior-arising cause" and "co-arising cause": a prior-arising cause is a mutually generating cause and effect, where the cause arises prior and the fruit arises later, hence named a prior-arising cause. A co-arising cause is a mutually conditioning cause and effect, like beams and pillars existing simultaneously with the house, named a co-arising cause. These two kinds of causes encompass all instances. Further examining the text, mutually generating causes and effects themselves are of two kinds: first, simultaneous, like major and minor arising; second, sequential, like the retribution cause and effect. Now, intending to refute the prior-arising cause, the co-arising cause is set aside to clarify that the prior-arising cause falls into the fault of repeated arising. Question: Why is the first half of the verse not explained? Answer: Because the cause reaching into the fruit is still the opponent's thesis, it does not need to be explained. From "If it is claimed that the cause immediately transforms" downwards is the second part, which again refutes alternative views. It refutes two schools altogether: first, refuting "immediate transformation". The opponent defends: the cause immediately transforms into the fruit; there is only a single arising, without repeated arising. Hence the refutation now says: since you speak of "immediately", it cannot be called "transformation"; if you speak of "transformation", it cannot be called "immediately". Just as the physical eye (yan) is immediately the eye (mu), it cannot be called a transformation. From "The question says: the cause does not completely perish" downwards is the second defense, which states: the designation perishes while the substance remains constantly; because the substance remains, though transformed, it is immediate; because the designation perishes, though immediate, it transforms. Another says: the former Deer King was my very body; the spiritual awareness of the deer and the spiritual awareness of the Buddha are not distinct; it is merely that the designation of "deer" perished and the designation of "Buddha" arose. The spiritual awareness of humans and gods is also not distinct; it is merely that one designation is lost and another designation arises. Furthermore, according to the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine, the inherently pure mind-nature is neither cause nor fruit; when in the state of cause it is called cause; from beginning to end it is one mind, hence its substance is called one; names differ, so one name is lost and another name arises. Furthermore, like the non-Buddhists, from subtle to coarse, and from coarse to subtle, the meaning is also like this. Furthermore, the She-lun masters say: the substance of the ālaya has neither arising nor perishing, while its names and functions have arising and perishing; this is also of the same meaning. Furthermore, this doctrine contradicts the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, which clarifies the meaning of eight consciousnesses perishing. Regarding "The answer says: the lump of clay perishing prior and the pot subsequently arising is not called transformation": since a designation designates a substance, and a substance corresponds to a designation, when the designation has already perished, the substance must also perish; this being so, with earlier perishing and later arising, how could it be a transformation? Regarding "Moreover, the lump of clay does not arise alone": this phrase clarifies that not only does the designation arise, but in terms of substance it also arises; contrasting with the previous phrase, not only does the designation perish, but the substance also perishes. Furthermore, the opponent holds two tenets: first, that the substance of the cause does not perish; second, that the fruit exists within the cause. The former refutes that the substance does not perish; now this refutes the tenet of its existence. Moreover, it refutes the notion that the substance of the lump of clay is definitely imperishable; since two entities are combined, the substance is not fixed. Regarding "If there were only a designation": this phrase states, if you only claim that designations perish and designations arise, then there would only be designations and no substance; what entity would transform? Regarding "Transformation is named as milk transforming into curds": this phrase proves that when designations perish, substances also perish, and when designations arise, substances also arise. As in the Śata-śāstra, the five factors of shape, time, power, cognition, and name differ, hence they perish together and arise together. Refuting another view, it says: before your single lump of clay is made into a pot, it fully possesses the principles of all objects. When you say that when clay becomes a pot, the other principles undergo apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, there should also be a principle of the pot failing and a principle of the pot succeeding. Answer: There is also a principle of the pot failing. Just as when a single lump of clay is made into whatever one object, the other objects all fail. Question: Since they cannot all succeed simultaneously, they also cannot all fail simultaneously. Answer: Accomplishing an object lies in one; because concrete matters are difficult, they cannot succeed simultaneously. Question: Since the various principles are co-present, the concrete matters should also be co-present. Answer: Concrete matters obstruct one another, so they cannot exist simultaneously; principles do not obstruct one another, so they can exist simultaneously. Question: If when principles exist, concrete matters exist, then principles obstructing should mean concrete matters obstructing; if principles do not obstruct, principles also do not exist. From "The question says: although the cause perishes and is lost" downwards is the second part, refuting perishing without transforming. Since earlier perishing and later transforming falls into two arisings, they now say: it is merely that the cause perishes beforehand and the fruit arises afterward, without the fault of repeated arising. In the reply, the first half refutes: if the cause is lost, there is no cause; what would produce the fruit? The second half clarifies: if the cause is not lost, the cause would reside in the fruit; how could it produce the fruit? Just as if the rice is lost, there is nothing to make into cooked rice; if it is not lost, the raw rice remains and there is no cooked rice either. The reason for repeatedly refuting its not being lost is that the opponent posits cause and effect as only having two options, lost or not lost; if one refutes not being lost, they posit being lost; if one refutes being lost, they posit not being lost; therefore, one refutes them in their advance and retreat. Question: How does this differ from the refutation in the previous verse? Answer: Above, it was refuted through repeated arising; here, it is gathered together to show non-arising. Furthermore, as in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others, a single doctrine contains both lost and not lost: real dharmas are lost, while the continuum is not lost; therefore both are refuted: if real dharmas are lost, there is no cause to produce the fruit; if the continuum is not lost, the cause should reside in the fruit. Furthermore, this passage opens up the doctrine of stimulus and response (ganying). Now we ask: regarding the goodness that is to arise which stimulates, is this goodness existent, or is it non-existent? If it is existent, why must it stimulate? If it is claimed that the goodness of principle stimulates and the concrete response occurs, then the cause of principle stimulates the concrete fruit. Unless your doctrine holds that there are no sentient beings, if there are sentient beings, then all principles of goodness exist, and all sentient beings can constantly stimulate the sages, so there would be no need to cultivate concrete goodness to stimulate concrete fruits. Furthermore, we ask: if there is already a response before concrete goodness exists, there should also already be concrete goodness before a response exists. Furthermore, we ask about the meaning of stimulation: if without concrete action one cannot stimulate the fruit, then without concrete goodness one should also not be able to stimulate the sages. Furthermore, we ask: why does your doctrine of stimulus and response not correlate, with principle responding to the capacity of principle, and concrete action responding to the capacity of concrete action? If the capacity of principle stimulates concrete action, the capacity of concrete action should also stimulate principle. Next, we ask: if goodness of the two realms of past and present can stimulate, since goodness already exists, why must it stimulate? If it is said that it stimulates in order to increase and generate goodness, if so, then before goodness exists it should not stimulate; how could the first single thought of goodness arise? If a single thought of goodness arises of itself without needing the sage's response, subsequent ones should also arise of themselves without needing a response. Furthermore, asking Zhuangyan: since the two periods are non-existent, how can one achieve the past? Having achieved the past, how can you say it is non-existent? If a past cause stimulates a future fruit, past understanding should also sever future afflictions. If afflictions, being non-existent, cannot be severed, then the fruit, being non-existent, should also not be stimulated. Furthermore, asking Guangzhai about the doctrine of attainment: the sūtra says that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, yet you claim that the arising of a single thought of good or evil is permanent in function—does this not contradict the sūtra? Moreover, this incurs the faults of permanence within impermanence, and impermanence within permanence.