十二門論宗致義記 2.3

2.3

In explaining this gate, there are briefly four points: First, explaining the name: all gate names have three meanings: 1. adducing the contemplative wisdom as the observing agent; 2. adducing what is eliminated and relied upon as the gate, which is the observed 'existence of the effect or nonexistence of the effect'; 3. entering the gate and seeing the truth, which is the 'true emptiness' below; all chapters are titled in accordance with the first two meanings. Second, the intention of its occurrence: there are two meanings: 1. the preceding chapter generally refuted causes, conditions, and effects as all being empty; now this [chapter] specifically investigates existence and nonexistence in the cause to reveal unarisenness, and hence it follows next; 2. previously, mutual elimination between self and other regarding causes, conditions, and effects was used to reveal unarisenness; now, inquiry and discernment into existence and nonexistence in the cause are used to reveal unarisenness, so as to make the preceding true emptiness exceedingly clear and to leave the minds of those clinging to existence or nonexistence with nothing to abide in; therefore it follows. Third, the doctrinal purport: first, stating what is refuted: 1. non-Buddhists: the Sāṃkhyas posit that there is an effect in the cause; the Vaiśeṣikas posit that there is no effect in the cause; the Nirgranthas posit that there is both an effect and no effect in the cause; the Jñātṛputras posit that there is neither an effect nor no effect in the cause. 2. Hīnayāna: the Sarvāstivādins posit that the nature of the effect exists in the cause; the Sautrāntikas posit that the substance of the effect does not exist in the cause. Furthermore, the Mahāsāṃghikas posit that the past and future are nonexistent, which means there is no effect in them. The Vātsīputrīyas posit both existence and nonexistence, because there is no concrete thing (vastu) yet there is intrinsic nature. By analogy, the Mahāyāna of Dharma Characteristics states neither existence nor nonexistence, because depending on conditions it is not existent, yet serving as a cause it is not nonexistent. Passages such as these are all what is refuted. 2. What is revealed as the core doctrine: namely, solely because of these four propositions as reasons, in all [cases] production is impossible. The state that does not depend on production is the doctrine entered into. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are four [sections]: 1. general statement; 2. specific explanation; 3. conclusion on the doctrine; 4. analogical elimination. In the first, there are two: first stating the core doctrine and origin, and then quoting the verse to establish the doctrine; this is understandable. In the second, the specific explanation, there are two: first, quoting the verse to set up the three chapter-sections; second, explaining from 'For what reason' onward. In the explanation, there are three: first, explaining that an existing effect in the cause is not produced; next, explaining nonexistence; finally, explaining both. In explaining that existence cannot accomplish production, there are fifteen refutations. The first is the refutation of eternal production and non-production. Within this, there are four: 1. presenting the fault; 2. taking up their doctrine and refuting it; 3. precluding their defense and refuting it; 4. concluding the refutation. The first two are concessions to refute, meaning that assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced entails that it should be eternally produced; the latter two are direct eliminations, assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced entails that it should be eternally unproduced. In the second of the former [two], taking up their doctrine and refuting it, the formal inference (anumāna) is: The cause ought to produce the effect again after it has already been produced, because the effect always exists in the cause, like the cause whose effect is not yet produced, because the state of the cause does not alter between being unproduced and produced. Furthermore, because the already produced effect is not different from the time when it was not yet produced, therefore it always exists in the cause and is constantly produced. 'From this existent aspect it ought to be produced again' means: because this dharma of the effect is existent both while in the cause and when emerging from the cause, since it is already produced while in the cause, why should it not be produced when emerging from the cause? Therefore, being produced again after having been produced leads to infinite regress; this is the infinite regress of repeated production. 3. Precluding their defense and refuting it is also the refutation of eternal non-production. Within it, first taking up the opponent's defense: What is already produced is accomplished as an actual thing; once accomplished as an actual thing, it does not need to be produced. What is not yet produced exists in nature; because it exists in nature, it must be produced. Later, directly refuting it, [the text] says: As for there being no principle of production, since what is already produced is existent and not produced again, what is not yet produced is also existent and should likewise not be produced; therefore it says there is ultimately no principle of production. There is also an inference: The cause not yet produced ought not to produce an effect, because there is no principle of production for an effect existing in the cause, like the cause whose effect is already produced; this is the fault of eternal non-production. If assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced, there would be eternal production; if assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced, there would be eternal non-production. Possessing these faults, the fourth therefore concludes with unarisenness. The second is the refutation of the disparity between both being existent. The intent of the refutation is: If both the already produced and the not yet produced are existent, and yet one is produced and one is not produced, it could also be that between the already produced and the not yet produced, one is existent and one is not existent. If you say that the not yet produced is existent in nature and therefore has production, while the already produced is existent as an actual thing and therefore has no production, then production could also have two kinds of production: 1. production of nature; 2. production of actual things. In the text on non-production, first taking up the attachment, and later directly refuting it, can be understood. The third is the refutation of the mutual contradiction between the already produced and the not yet produced. Here, first directly refuting, and later explaining to establish it. In the first, since being produced and not yet being produced are mutually contradictory, if the not yet produced is existent, what is already produced should be nonexistent, because of their mutual contradiction, like light and darkness. In the explanation, 'two actions are also contradictory' means: the not yet produced takes existence as its action-characteristic, and what is already produced also takes existence as its action-characteristic; since the already produced and not yet produced are opposite, how could their action-characteristics not be contradictory? Therefore it causes disparity. It can also be that this is the refutation of losing identity through switching positions, meaning: since the not yet produced is an existent that subsequently acts, when already produced it should lose its own nature, because it has lost the position of not yet being produced. The fourth is the refutation of there being no distinction between the already produced and the not yet produced, meaning that if you do not accept the fault of contradiction, you fall into the error of having no distinction. The inference is: The not yet produced ought to be identical with the already produced, because they are both existent in substance and have no distinction, just like what is already produced. Previously, using the already produced and not yet produced to interrogate their own substances, the substances could not be one. Now, using their own substances to interrogate the already produced and not yet produced, the already produced and not yet produced cannot be distinct. In the text there are three: stating, explaining, and concluding, which can be understood. The fifth is the refutation of prior accomplishment rendering [the cause] useless, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, the cause has no productive efficacy, just as when fruit is in a vessel, the vessel has no efficacy in producing the fruit; hence it says 'having been made, it is not made,' and so forth. In the text there are three: 1. direct refutation; 2. adducing an analogy; 3. concluding the error, which can be understood. The sixth is the refutation that what already exists ought to be seen. First directly refuting, meaning: if the effect exists and yet is not seen, by what further dharma is this known to exist? The inference is: The existent is nonexistent, because it is not seen, just like a nonexistent thing. Second, refuting the defense: the defense argues that because it has not transformed, it has no characteristics, and therefore is not seen. The intent of the refutation is: since in the clay it has not transformed and lacks the characteristics of a jar, what difference is there between this and the clay also lacking the characteristics of a horse? If the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, it also lacks the substance of a horse; if the clay lacks the characteristics of a jar, how could it have the substance of a jar? The inference and the conclusion can be understood. Furthermore, if the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, there is no way to know there is a horse; if the clay also lacks the characteristics of a jar, by what is it known that there is a jar? There is also an inference, which can be understood. This later part is also refuting by interrogating the effect through its characteristics. The seventh is the refutation of losing the effect by exhausting transformation. Within it, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: 1. refutation by assimilating transformation to the effect: if the effect exists, transformation also exists, so now it ought to be visible; this is a concession to refute. From 'yet in reality' onward, concluding the error according to principle, which is a direct elimination. 2. From 'if it is said that before transformation' onward, refutation by assimilating the effect to transformation: if transformation is nonexistent, the effect is also nonexistent, which entails losing the dharma of the effect. Since transformation is initially nonexistent, it is ultimately nonexistent later, because in their school, if an effect is nonexistent beforehand, it is ultimately not produced later; therefore, transformation can ultimately never exist, and because it can ultimately never exist, the effect is permanently nonexistent. 3. Refutation of the indeterminacy of existence and nonexistence: because it contradicts their original doctrine and contravenes their own words; the text can be seen. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. the opponent's defense; 2. direct refutation; 3. repeated defense; 4. repeated refutation. First, the intent of the opponent's defense is to cite the eight worldly conditions to prove that transformation exists, yet lacks manifestation; therefore, all the preceding objections are thoroughly cleared. In the text there are three: 1. one phrase stating their own school; 2. from 'all things' onward, citing their own kind; 3. from 'what you say of the cause' onward, concluding the refutation of the error. In citing the kinds, there are four: 1. stating; 2. enumerating; 3. explaining; 4. concluding; all can be understood. The opponent's intent merely takes the eighth as an inference. Second, in the direct refutation, there are three: 1. general differentiation of difference; 2. sequential specific differentiation; 3. specifically refuting the eighth. That is, because beginning and end are one, both are definitely existent, and therefore cannot change. The formal inference can be understood. Third, the repeated defense can be understood. Fourth, in the repeated refutation, there are three: 1. refutation of losing the effect by assimilating the effect to coarseness, meaning that your claim that it is subtle when not yet produced entails that the coarse effect is nonexistent beforehand, contradicting your own school. 2. From 'furthermore, in the cause' onward, refutation of losing the effect by using subtlety to eliminate coarseness, meaning that if you say that after being produced it turns coarse, then the subtle is not an effect and cannot be called an effect; being subtle, it is ungraspable. Investigating both coarseness and subtlety, the substance of the effect is fundamentally nonexistent. 3. From 'thus' onward, concluding with a rebuke of their emotional clinging. In the eighth, the refutation of self-destruction of cause and effect: first, taking up the doctrine and stating the destruction; second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining and revealing the characteristics of destruction. Here, first explaining the destruction of the cause: because the cause lacks a cause and is merely the place where the dharma of the effect resides, just as with fruit in a vessel the vessel is not the cause of the fruit; threads and the like are the subject, the vessel and the like are the analogy; the formal inference can be understood. Second, from 'if the cause is destroyed' onward, explaining the destruction of the effect. First is refutation by mutual dependence, next is explaining the refutation; they can be understood. In the ninth, the refutation of losing dharmas through vain pursuit, there are three: first, stating that because of non-action, the effect is destroyed, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, because it exists beforehand it is not that which is produced; not being that which is produced, it cannot be called an effect, which is the loss of the effect. Second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining that because of non-action, the cause is destroyed, meaning that one never speaks of a cause as having productive capacity merely because an effect resides in it; therefore, lacking productive capacity, there is no cause. Third, from 'thus' onward, concluding with vain pursuit, meaning that since both cause and effect are nonexistent, why futilely pursue existence or nonexistence? Furthermore, in the previous gate, because the cause is destroyed, the effect is destroyed; in this gate, the effect is destroyed and the cause is also lost. The cause takes producing the effect as its productive capacity, and the effect takes arising from [the cause] as what is produced. Since the effect already exists beforehand, the cause loses the function of productive capacity, and the effect destroys the meaning of arising from [the cause]; therefore both are lost. The tenth is the refutation that without characteristics, the substance is lost. How does this differ from the previous inquiry about the characteristics of a jar in the clay? The previous one inquired into substance and characteristics, whereas this one interrogates indicative characteristics; hence they differ. In the text there are three: 1. conceding existence to interrogate characteristics; 2. adducing analogies to point to matters; 3. from 'thus' onward, directly eliminating emotional clinging. All can be understood. In the eleventh, the refutation of demanding whence the effect comes, there are three: first, taking up that the effect does not come from the cause; second, from 'if the cause does not' onward, precisely investigating that the effect has no source; third, from 'if the effect has no' onward, concluding that both are nonexistent; this can be understood. In the twelfth, the refutation of self-destruction of the two categories, there are four: first, stating the attachment and showing the fault through an inference: the effect ought to be permanent, because it is not made from anything, like the nature of nirvāṇa. Second, from 'if the effect' onward, destruction of the conditioned. Third, from 'if all' onward, destruction of the unconditioned. Fourth, concluding the error and rebuking it to cease. All can be understood. In the thirteenth, the refutation of the infinite regress of causes of causes, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: first, taking up the attachment and showing the fault; second, from 'like fine cloth' onward, citing analogies, which is also conceding existence based on their attachment, meaning that there is an effect in the cause, and this effect again becomes another cause, in which there is again another effect, and thus it is infinite. Relying on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: just as milk already exists in a cow, and in this milk there is curd, up to clarified butter, therefore the five flavors are already complete in the cow; and it also says: tomorrow one should take ghee, but today one already suffers from its smell, up to [butter] ought to exist in food, and so forth. Furthermore, selling a mare entails taking a foal, and within it is yet another foal, so that a single horse would be an entire herd; this is what it means. Third, from 'yet in reality' onward, directly eliminating based on principle: since the effect inside the cause is distinct, the effect is nonexistent and does not serve as a cause, so the effect in the cause does not exist. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. taking up the attachment and generally denying it; 2. from 'For what reason' onward, explaining the denial and revealing the refutation. The intent of the refutation is: if it is like the fragrance of the earth, which must await conditions to manifest, before it manifests it is not called an effect. Because you take what can be manifested as an effect, water is the manifesting agent and fragrance is what is manifested; since manifesting is an action, it can be called an effect. Jars and the like already exist beforehand, and not being an action, they are not effects. 3. Re-explaining; 4. concluding the error; both can be understood. The fourteenth is the refutation that being identical to manifestation entails losing production, meaning: if you hold that water manifesting the fragrance of the earth is merely a manifesting cause (jñāpaka-hetu) for jars and the like, it should concurrently accomplish other things, just as a lamp illuminating a jar also illuminates other things. Furthermore, do you take action as the effect, or do you take manifestation as the effect? If the effect is an action, jars and the like exist beforehand; not being actions, they are not called effects. If the effect is manifestation, since clay and the like manifest a jar, why do they not also concurrently produce other things? In the text there are four: 1. dharma; 2. analogy; 3. application; 4. conclusion. All can be understood. The fifteenth is the refutation that two actions cannot be established, meaning that because the effect already exists beforehand, which is made now and which will be made in the future? Because that school posits two different actions, it loses its own doctrine. In the text, first interrogating and then concluding can be understood. The above finishes explaining the section on the non-production of prior existence.