瑜伽論記 18.114

18.114

次明實有。謂若諸法，不待所餘，是實有相等者，景云：如色香等實體之法，更不待餘方始施設色香等名，此是實有。若有諸法，待於所餘，依於所餘，施設自相，應知假有者，如瓶盆等待餘色等依餘色等施設瓶名，故是假有。如於色等乃至如是即於色等想事，假立色等者，如獨頭意識尋色等名而取色等，如此色等此名為實假從因緣生名為實法，由藉色名方生色覺又名為假。

Next, substantial existence is explained. Regarding the text stating: "If phenomena do not depend on anything else, they have the characteristic of substantial existence, and so forth": Jing says: As with real, substantial phenomena like form and scent, without depending on anything else one first posits the names 'form', 'scent', and so on; these are substantial existents. Regarding "If there are phenomena that depend on others and rely on others to posit their self-characteristics, one should know they are nominal existents": as with jars, basins, and the like, which depend on other factors like form and rely on other factors like form to posit the name 'jar', they are nominal existents. Regarding "as in the case of form, etc., up to... in this way, nominally designating 'form' and so forth with reference to the conceptualized entities of form and so on": as when isolated mental consciousness pursues the names of form and so forth and grasps form and so forth, such form and so forth are called real; arising from causes and conditions, they are called real phenomena; but because one gives rise to the cognition of form only by relying on the name 'form', they are also called nominal.