瑜伽論記 2.275

2.275

又若計命即是身者下，因難想作便明有想論中，我有色等死後有想等餘八句，以前敘執中於想及受皆起執故，命者我也。執我有色死後，生有想地，執我非色死後，生有想地，若執我俱遍色非色無二無缺，彼計我亦色亦非色死後生有想地；若準此第三句說，第四我非色非非色死後生有想地。

Furthermore, from "If one posits that the life-principle is just the body" below: By way of challenging what is produced by ideation, it clarifies the remaining eight clauses in the doctrine of [the self] possessing ideation, such as "the self has form, etc., and possesses ideation after death," because in the previous account of doctrines, clinging arose with respect to both ideation and feeling. The "life-principle" is the self. Clinging to the self having form, and after death being born in a stage possessing ideation; clinging to the self being non-form, and after death being born in a stage possessing ideation; if clinging to the self as pervasively both form and non-form, without being two and without deficiency, they posit that the self is both form and non-form, and after death is born in a stage possessing ideation; by following this third clause, the fourth is that the self is neither form nor non-form, and after death is born in a stage possessing ideation.