瑜伽師地論略纂 3.71

3.71

「又若計命即是身者」下，因難想作，便明有想論中我有色等、死後有想等餘八句，以前敘執中，於想及受皆起執故。命者，我也。執我有色，死後生有想地；執我非色，死後生有想地；若執我俱遍色非色，無二無缺，彼計我亦色亦非色，死後生有想地；為准此第三句，說第四我非色非非色，死後生有想地。

From the passage beginning, "Furthermore, if one posits that the life principle is identical with the body," onwards: through refuting what is produced by ideation, it then clarifies the remaining eight propositions in the treatise on conscious existence concerning "the self has form," and so forth, and "after death possessing ideation," and so forth, because in the previous presentation of assertions, grasps were formed regarding both ideation and feeling. "The life principle" is the self. One posits that the self has form and that after death one is born in a realm possessing ideation; one posits that the self is formless and that after death one is born in a realm possessing ideation; if one posits that the self pervades both form and the formless, being non-dual and without deficiency, then that [doctrine] posits that the self is both form and formless, and that after death one is born in a realm possessing ideation; on the model of this third proposition, the fourth proposition states that the self is neither form nor formless, and that after death one is born in a realm possessing ideation.