瑜伽論記 2.274
瑜伽論記 2.274
- Language
- Classical Chinese
2.274
下破後際常論,言所執之我,由想所作及受所作等者,此中意顯想受二法,俱為我所,由此二種擊作於我,我或有時有一想等,故想受二名為能作,我為所作如世財物擊作有情,有情或時緣少財等生貪瞋等,此亦如是,非我先無為想受作方始有義。若言無者有一想已復種種想等者,此下合難想受,作我無變異義,以有想十六見為難,十二見想作,四見受作。一想者,八十七云:在空無邊處識無處。種種想者,謂在下地。狹小想即種種想。無量想即是一想。無所有處亦是一想,非無量想略故不說。又執少色為我,一想行與彼合名為少想,瑜伽故指在種種想地,執無量色為我想為我所等名無量想,瑜伽故指在於一想。然八十七云:如其次第前二有後二,然逆次第非順次第,義理推故,此難前想所作無變異我,純有樂等。若八十七云:有樂在下三靜慮,有苦在捺落迦,有苦有樂在鬼傍生人欲界天,不苦不樂在第四靜慮已上諸地,此難前受所作無變異,有想論中八句。
Below, in refuting the doctrine of permanence concerning the future, regarding the words "the posited self is produced by ideation and produced by feeling," and so forth: What is shown here is that both the two phenomena of ideation and feeling belong to the self (as its possessions); because these two impact and affect the self, the self may at times have a single ideation, and so forth. Therefore, ideation and feeling are called the "producing factors," and the self is the "produced," just as worldly wealth impacts and affects sentient beings, and a sentient being may at times, in dependence on a small amount of wealth or the like, generate greed, anger, and so forth. This is likewise so. It does not mean that the self was previously non-existent and only begins to exist when produced by ideation and feeling. Regarding the words "If one says it does not exist, having had a single ideation, there are further diverse ideations," and so forth: Below, this collectively challenges the notion that ideation and feeling produce a self that is devoid of change, using the sixteen views possessing ideation to raise the challenge—twelve views being produced by ideation, and four views being produced by feeling. "A single ideation": [Fascicle] 87 states that it is in the Stage of the Infinity of Space and the Stage of the Infinity of Consciousness. "Diverse ideations": this refers to the lower stages. The "narrow and small ideation" is just the diverse ideations. The "immeasurable ideation" is just a single ideation. The Stage of Nothingness is also a single ideation; it is not an immeasurable ideation, and is omitted for brevity and not mentioned. Furthermore, clinging to a small amount of form as the self, where the activity of a single ideation unites with it, is called a small ideation; therefore the Yogācārabhūmi points to its being in the stages of diverse ideations. Clinging to immeasurable form as the self, and ideation as the self's possession, and so forth, is called an immeasurable ideation; therefore the Yogācārabhūmi points to its being in a single ideation. However, [Fascicle] 87 says: "In regular sequence, the first two have the latter two"; however, it is in reverse order, not direct order, as deduced by reasoned principle. This challenges the former changeless self produced by ideation as having purely pleasure, and so forth. As [Fascicle] 87 says: Having pleasure is in the lower three dhyānas; having suffering is in the Naraka hells; having both suffering and pleasure is among ghosts, animals, humans, and desire-realm devas; neither suffering nor pleasure is in the fourth dhyāna and the stages above. This challenges the former changeless [self] produced by feeling, which consists of eight clauses in the doctrine of [the self] possessing ideation.
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- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation