瑜伽論記 21.470

21.470

下辨四記為通，一者、一向記，謂為如理請問；二、分別記，或為如理或不如理來請問者，如小乘說如有問言為我說陰？應語彼云陰有五種，為說何等；三、反問記為令彼戲論問者自收己過者，亦如小乘如有問言為我說法？應反問言法有眾多，為說何等，不為分別色受等別；四者、置記，由四因緣，指思慧地。又知有問如來滅後，為有無等等者，九十六道皆說自所事師為如來，如問佛如來身滅後為有無等，此於二諦所有道理皆不應記，如來約勝義諦非有性故不可記別為有，以勝義諦畢竟無人故。約世俗諦所依能依道相違故者，約世俗諦中非無假人，以依道諦假建立故，道是所依人是能依，不同約勝義諦中二向是無，故言相違，於世諦中有斷惑盡不成實故，建立如來，故非無也，又就滅道法體亦不可得言有無，道是有為念念生滅，前念所依已滅不可言有，後念能依道有不可名無，是故相違，次就滅果亦非有無，斷惑得擇滅，不可言無，而擇滅但於真如假以建立無有實體，不可言有。

Below, the four declarations are distinguished to resolve them: first, a categorical declaration (ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇa), spoken for a question asked in accordance with reason; second, an analytical declaration (vibhajya-vyākaraṇa), for a question asked either in accordance with reason or not in accordance with reason—as the Hīnayāna explains, if someone asks, "Explain the aggregates to me," one should say to them, "The aggregates are of five kinds; which one should I explain?"; third, a counter-question declaration (praśnavyākaraṇa), to make one who questions out of conceptual proliferation recognize their own fault—likewise, as the Hīnayāna explains, if someone asks, "Explain the Dharma to me," one should counter-question, "Phenomena are manifold; which should I explain?" without distinguishing the particulars of form, feeling, and so forth; fourth, a setting-aside declaration (sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇa), which has four causes and points to the stage of discernment arisen from thought. Furthermore, knowing that someone asks whether the Tathāgata exists after extinction or not, etc.: all ninety-six non-Buddhist schools call the master they serve a 'tathāgata'; like asking whether the body of the Buddha, the Tathāgata, exists or not after extinction, etc., this should not be declared in terms of the principles of either of the two truths. Because the Tathāgata, in terms of the ultimate truth, is not of an existent nature, it cannot be declared to exist, for in ultimate truth there is ultimately no person. In terms of conventional truth, "because the basis and that which is based on the path are mutually contradictory": in conventional truth, nominal persons are not absent, because they are nominally established on the basis of the truth of the path; the path is the basis, and the person is that which is based. Unlike the ultimate truth where both directions are non-existent, this is called contradictory: in conventional truth, because the eradication of defilements is complete and not unreal, the Tathāgata is established, and therefore is not non-existent. Furthermore, with regard to the essential nature of the cessation and the path, existence and non-existence also cannot be asserted: the path is conditioned and arises and ceases from moment to moment; the prior moment which was the basis has already ceased and cannot be said to exist, whereas the subsequent moment of the path which is based exists and cannot be termed non-existent, hence they are mutually contradictory. Next, with regard to the fruit of cessation, it is also neither existent nor non-existent: by eliminating defilements, one attains analytical cessation, so it cannot be said to be non-existent; yet analytical cessation is merely nominally established upon tathatā without a real entity, so it cannot be said to exist.